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EMILIUS AND SOPHIA.

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
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EMILIUS AND SOPHIA;

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A NEW SYSTEM

OF

EDUCATION.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH OF

*Mr. J. J. ROUSSEAU,*

CITIZEN OF GENEVA.

BY THE TRANSLATOR OF *ELOISA*.

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VOL. II.

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EMILIUS AND SOPHIA

OF

A NEW SYSTEM



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MR. J. H. ROBERTSON

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# EMILIUS;

OR,

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EDUCATION.

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## BOOK III.

**A**LTHOUGH a child, till he arrive at the age of puberty, be in a constant state of imbecility and weakness, there is a certain period in this stage of life, at which the progress of his passions being greater than that of his necessities, the growing animal, though absolutely weak, becomes relatively strong. His wants not having all displayed themselves, his actual powers are more than capable to provide for those of which he is sensible. Considered as a man, he is undoubtedly weak; but as a child he is more than sufficiently strong.

Hence we see proceeds the weakness of man, that is from the disproportion arising between

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his faculties and his desires. It is our passions that render us feeble; because to gratify them, requires greater powers than nature has furnished us with. Diminish, then, the number, check the extravagance, of your desires, and you increase your powers of gratification. He who can compass more than he requires, hath ability to spare; and is certainly a powerful being.

At this period commences the third stage of infancy, of which I am now about to treat; it being that state of childhood which approaches nearly to puberty without being quite arrived at that term.

At the age of twelve or thirteen, the powers and faculties of a child make a speedier progress than his desires, and display themselves in greater proportion than his wants. The most impetuous, the most coercive of all physical necessities he hath not yet experienced. The very organs that provide for its gratification are as yet imperfect, and seem to wait the exertion of the will to capacitate them for action. Unaffected by the inclemency of the weather or the change of seasons, his natural heat supplies the artificial warmth of apparel, and his keenness of appetite the provocatives of fauce. At his age whatever is but nourishing is good; if he be drowsy, he stretches himself on the ground and falls asleep. Whatever he hath occasion for is within his reach; he craves not after imaginary dainties; he feels

no





no disgust from prepossession. His desires confined within the sphere of his abilities, he is not only capable of providing for himself, but possesses superfluous faculties for which he has no use. This, however, is the only time during life, in which he will be in such a situation.

It will possibly be objected that, though I have not supposed the wants of my child fewer than they really are, yet that I attribute to him too great a power of satisfying them. It should always be remembered, however, that I am speaking particularly of my own pupil, and not of those enervated puppets, who make it a journey to waddle out of one room into another; who gasp for breath in strait-laced stays, or labour under a load of whalebone or buckram. It may be said that manly abilities are displayed only in a state of manhood; that the animal spirits, duly prepared and distributed in their proper channels through the whole body, are only capable to give that consistence, activity, tone, and elasticity to the muscles which constitute real strength. Such, indeed, is the philosophy of the closet; but I appeal to experience. I see sturdy boys daily employed in the fields about the most laborious parts of husbandry; so that they might be taken for grown men, if their voices did not betray them. Even in our cities we see the young artisans frequently as robust as their masters, and equally expert for the time they have served. If there be any difference in their capacity and abilities,

and I confess there is some, it is much less, I say again, than that between the impetuous desires of a man and the confined inclinations of a child. For, it is to be observed, we are not here speaking of mere corporeal abilities: but more particularly of those mental faculties and talents, by which the former are directed and supplied. This interval, in which the individual is able to effect more than he requires, though it be not the period of his greatest absolute strength, is, as I before observed, that of his greatest relative ability. This interval contains the most precious moments of his life; moments never to return, few, and transitory; hence the more precious, as to employ them well becomes of the greater importance.

To what use, then, is it proper a child should put that redundancy of abilities, of which he is at present possessed, and hereafter will stand in need of? He should employ it on those things which may be of utility in time to come. He should throw, if I may so express myself, the superfluity of his present being into his future existence. The robust child should provide for the subsistence of the feeble man; not in laying up his treasure in coffers whence thieves may steal, nor by entrusting it in the hands of others; but by keeping it in his own. To appropriate his acquisitions to himself he will secure them in the strength and dexterity of his own arms, and in the capacity of his own head. This, therefore, is the time for employment, for instruction

struction, for study. Observe also, that I have not arbitrarily fixed on this period for that purpose : nature itself plainly points it out to us.

So circumscribed is human intelligence, that we are not only denied the power of attaining universal knowledge, but it is impossible even to know perfectly the little that is attained by others. As the reverse of every false proposition is true, the source of truth must be as inexhaustible as that of error. A proper choice, therefore, should be made of the subjects, as well as of the time for instruction. Of the arts and sciences within our acquisition, some are fallacious, others useless, and others again serve only to flatter the vanity of their respective professors. The small number of such as really contribute to our well-being, are those only that merit the attention of a wise man, and of course of the child that we are solicitous to make so. The point in view, therefore, is not what may be true, but what is useful.

From this scanty proportion of useful knowledge, we must yet further subtract those truths which require an understanding already formed ; such as presuppose the knowledge of those different relations and circumstances, with which a child cannot be acquainted, and which, though true in themselves, dispose an unexperienced mind to form a wrong judgement on other occasions.

Thus are we reduced, in our system of education, to a very small circle, compared with

the system of things. This, however, appears an immense sphere to the contracted faculties of a child: so dark are the clouds that obscure the dawn of the human understanding! Where is the man who hath temerity enough to attempt their dissipation? What an abyss hath fruitless knowledge dug round the hapless youth! Tremble, presumptuous man! thou who art about to conduct him through its dangerous paths, and to draw from before his eyes the sacred curtain of nature. Be first well assured of his capacity and your own, lest the intellects of one or the other, and perhaps both, be perverted in the attempt. Beware of the specious allurements of falsehood, and the intoxicating fumes of pride. Remember, constantly remember, that mere ignorance hath never been hurtful; that error alone is destructive, and that we do not err in things we are professedly ignorant of, but in those which we conceive we know.

The progress which your pupil makes in geometry, will serve, both as a proof and a guide, in the display of his capacity. As soon, however, as he is capable of distinguishing what is useful, it requires great address and circumspection to introduce speculative subjects. Are you desirous, for instance, that he should know how to find a mean proportional between two given lines? begin by inducing him practically to find a square, equal to a given rectangle. If the question be, to find two mean proportionals, it will be requisite to make the problem of doubling



bling the cube peculiarly interesting. Hence you see, in what manner we might approach by degrees those truths, on which are founded the moral distinctions of good and evil. Hitherto we have been governed by no law but that of necessity; at present we begin to consider what is useful, and shall not be long before we come to the consideration of what is good and proper.

The various faculties of men are excited by the same instinct. To the activity of the body, making constant efforts to display its abilities, succeeds that of the mind, as constantly seeking after information. Children, when very young, seem endowed only with a capacity and inclination for motion; they afterwards become inquisitive and curious, and this curiosity, well directed, becomes at the age they have now attained, their chief spring of action. Let us be always careful to distinguish those propensities which are implanted by nature, from those which are ingrafted by the dictates of prejudice and opinion. A thirst after knowledge may proceed merely from the vanity of desiring to be thought learned; it may also arise from that curiosity which naturally excites us to enquire after every thing in which we may be either directly or indirectly interested. Our innate desire of happiness, and the impossibility of our fully gratifying that desire, are the cause of our constant researches after new expedients, to contribute to that end.

This is the first principle or motive of curiosity; a principle which is natural to the heart of man, but which displays itself only in obedience to our passions and in proportion to our acquirements of knowledge. Let us suppose a philosopher cast ashore on a desert island, together with his books and instruments, and that he was under an absolute certainty of spending in that solitude the remainder of his days. He would never trouble himself further about the system of the universe, the laws of attraction, or the fluxionary calculus. It is probable he would never after look into a book, during his whole life: but he certainly would not fail to explore the island, however extensive, even to its remotest corners. Let us, therefore, in our early studies, reject those sciences for which man has not a natural turn, and confine ourselves to those which instinct directs us to pursue.

This earth is the island on which mankind are cast, and the most striking object of their observation is the sun. As soon as our ideas begin to extend beyond ourselves, our attention will therefore naturally be engrossed between two such interesting subjects. Hence the philosophy of almost every savage nation is confined solely to the imaginary divisions of the earth, and the divinity of the sun. "What an excursion! cries the reader. We were but just now employed about objects that immediately surround us, and we are now traversing the globe, and soaring to the distant extremities of the universe." This excursion,



sion, however, is the simple effect of the progress of our faculties and the bent of our understanding. During our infant state of weakness and incapacity, all our thoughts, influenced by self-preservation, are confined within ourselves. On the contrary, in a more advanced age, as our abilities increase, the desire of improving our existence carries us out of ourselves, and our ideas extend to their utmost limits. As the intellectual world, however, is as yet unknown to us, our thoughts cannot extend farther than we can see; but our comprehension dilates itself with the bounds of space.

Let us convert our sensations into ideas; but let us not fly at once from sensible to intellectual objects. It is by a due and rational attention to the former we can only attain the latter. In the first operations of the understanding, let our senses then always be our guide, the world our only book, and facts our sole precepts. Children, when taught to read, learn that only; they never think; they gain no information; all their learning consists in words.

Direct the attention of your pupil to the phenomena of nature, and you will soon awaken his curiosity; but to keep that curiosity alive, you must be in no haste to satisfy it. Put questions to him adapted to his capacity, and leave him to resolve them. Let him take nothing on trust from his preceptor, but on his own comprehension and conviction: he should not learn, but invent, the sciences. If ever you substi-

tute authority in the place of argument, he will reason no longer; he will be ever afterwards bandied like a shuttle-cock between the opinions of others.

You intend, we'll suppose, to teach your child geography, and for that purpose provide for him maps, spheres, and globes. What an apparatus! Wherefore all these mere representations of things? Why do you not rather begin by showing him the object itself, that he may, at least, know what it is you are talking about?

Walk out with him, some fine evening, to a convenient spot, from whence an extensive horizon may give you a full view of the setting sun; and then take particular notice of such objects as mark the place of its going down. Return the next morning, with a professed design only of taking the fresh air, to the same place, before the sun rises. There you will see the fiery rays it scatters among the clouds, as harbingers of its approach. The illumination increases, the east seems all in flames, and you expect the glorious orb long before it discovers itself above the horizon; you think you see it every moment; it at length appears. Its rays dart like lightning over the face of nature, and darkness vanishes at the sight. Man glories in his habitation, and sees it embellished with new beauty. The lawn is refreshed by the coolness of the night, and the light of the morn displays its increasing verdure: the dew-bespangled flowers that enamel its surface glitter in the sun-beams, and, like rubies

rubies and emeralds, dart their colours on the eye. The chearful birds unite in choirs, and hail in concert the parent of life: not one is silent—at this enchanting moment none are mute, though in feeble notes, more slow and soft than those they chaunt all day, as if from peaceful slumbers scarce awoke, they join in languid harmony. The assemblage of so many pleasing objects imprints a glowing sensation that seems to penetrate the soul. Who can withstand the rapture of this short interval of enchantment? It is impossible so grand, so beautiful, so delightful a scene can be ever beheld with indifference. Full of that enthusiastick rapture with which a preceptor is inspired on such an occasion, he endeavours perhaps to communicate it to his pupil; he expects to excite the same emotions in the child, by attracting its attention to those sensations which he experiences within himself. Ridiculous expectation! It is the heart only that contemplates the beauties of nature: to be seen they should always be felt: a child indeed may perceive the several objects, but their connexion is to him invisible; he is insensible to the harmony of the spheres. He requires an experience he hath not yet attained, and sentiments to which he is as yet a stranger, to be susceptible of that complex impression which is the general result of all these sensations. If he has not travelled over deserts; if his feet have never been parched by burning sands; if he never hath felt the scorching sun-beams reflected from the surround-

ing rocks, how can he taste the fresh air of a fine morning? How should he be enraptured with the fragrance of the flowers, the refreshing verdure of the grass, the dew drops sparkling in the sun, or the soft carpet of the downy moss? How should the warbling of birds inspire him with glowing raptures, who is a stranger to the soft accents of love and delight? How can he behold with transport the dawn of so lovely a day, whose imagination cannot paint to itself the joys it is capable of bestowing? In a word, what tender sensations can be excited, by the charms of nature, in him who is ignorant by whose hand she is so beautifully adorned? Talk not to children in a language they do not comprehend; make use of no pompous descriptions, no flowers of speech, no tropes and figures, no poetry; taste and sentiment are at present quite out of the question: simplicity, gravity, and and precision are all that are yet required: the time will come but too soon, when we must assume a different style.

A pupil educated agreeably to these maxims, and accustomed to receive no assistance till he has discovered his own abilities, will examine every new object with a long and silent attention. He will be thoughtful without asking questions. Content yourself, therefore, with presenting proper objects opportunely to his notice, and when you see they have sufficiently excited his curiosity, drop some leading laconick questions,



questions, which may put him in the way of discovering the truth.

On the present occasion; having for some time contemplated the rising sun, and made your pupil observe the hills and other neighbouring objects on that side, permitting him the while to talk about them without interruption, stand silent a few moments, and affect a profound meditation. You may then address him thus: "I am thinking that when the sun set last night, it went down yonder behind us; whereas, this morning, you see, he is risen on the opposite side of the plain, here, before us. What can be the meaning of this." Say nothing more; and, if he asks you any thing about it, divert his attention, for the present, by talking of something else. Leave him to reflect on it himself, and be assured he will think of your observation.

To accustom a child to give attention to objects, and to make sensible truths appear striking to his imagination, it is necessary to keep him some time in suspense before they are explained or discovered to him. If he should not sufficiently comprehend the nature of the present question by the means proposed, it may be rendered still more obvious, by diversifying the terms of it. If he cannot comprehend in what manner the sun proceeds from its setting to its rising, he knows at least how it proceeds from its rising to its setting; he hath ocular information of this. Explain the first question, then, by the second, and if your pupil be not  
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extremely dull indeed, the analogy is too obvious to escape him.

Such is our first lecture in cosmography.

As we proceed slowly from one sensible idea to another, making ourselves familiarly acquainted with each as we go on, and as our pupil's attention is never required upon compulsion, the distance will be very considerable, from the object of his first lesson to the knowledge of the sun's course, and the figure of the earth: but as the apparent motion of all the heavenly bodies depends on the same principle, and as the first observation naturally leads to all the rest, it requires less capacity, though more time, to proceed from the diurnal rotation of the earth to the calculation of an eclipse, than to acquire clear ideas of the phenomenon of day and night.

As the sun turns round the earth he describes a circle, and every circle hath a center; this we already know. This center, also, must needs be invisible, because it is in the middle of our globe; but we can suppose two points on the surface so corresponding with it, that a rod passing through all three and extended both ways to the heavens, would be at once the axis of the earth and of the sun's apparent diurnal motion. A whirl-bone or globular totum, turning upon one of its points, may serve to represent the heavens turning upon their axis, the two points of this play-thing being the two poles; one of which may be pointed out to our pupil, near  
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the tail of the little bear. This would furnish us with an amusement for the night; by which means we should become gradually acquainted with the stars, and thence in time grow anxious to distinguish the planets and constellations.

Emilius and I have seen the sun rise at midsummer: we shall next take a view of his rising, some fine morning in the depth of winter. We are neither of us idle you know, and both despise the cold. I have taken care to make the second observation on the very same spot, where we made the former; so that in consequence of a little preparatory discourse to introduce the remark, one or other of us will infallibly cry out when the sun first appears above the horizon, "Ha! this is pleasant enough! the sun does not rise in the place it used to do. Here, you see, are our old marks to the left, and now he rises yonder, to the right. So it seems there is one east for the summer, and another for the winter."

These examples will be sufficient to show the unexperienced preceptor the way to bring his pupil acquainted with the sphere, by making use of the earth itself instead of a globe, and the apparent revolution of the sun instead of any imperfect representation of it. It ought, indeed, to be laid down as a general rule, never to substitute the shadow unless were it is impossible to exhibit the substance; for the representation engrossing the attention of the child generally makes him forget the object represented.

The armillary sphere appears to me a very ill contrived and disproportioned machine. Its confused circles, and the strange figures delineated thereon, give it an air of necromancy, which is enough to frighten children. The earth is, besides, too small; the circles too wide and numerous; while some, particularly the two colures, are entirely useless. Each circle exceeds in breadth the diameter of the earth, and their thickness gives them such an air of substance and reality, that when you tell your pupil they represent only imaginary circles, you confound him; he neither knows what he sees, nor comprehends what you say to him.

We never know how to suppose ourselves in the place of children; we never enter into their manner of thinking. On the contrary we attribute to them our ideas; and, pursuing our own method of argumentation, fill their heads, even while we are discussing incontestible truths, with extravagance and error. It is disputed, whether the sciences are best taught by the synthetic or analytic method. It is not always necessary to abide by either. We may sometimes compound and resolve in the same disquisition, and instruct a child by the former mode of argument while he thinks himself employing the latter. Add to this, that, by making use of both methods indifferently, they serve reciprocally to confirm each other. Setting out at the same time from two different points, without seeming to take the same route, he will  
be

be surprised to find himself directed two ways to one and the same object; and that surprise cannot fail of giving him great satisfaction. In teaching him geography, for example, I would begin at its two extremes; and, with the study of the apparent astronomical revolutions, unite that of the divisions and measurement of the earth. While he is studying the sphere, and thus transporting himself in imagination to the heavens, I would call back his attention to the divisions of the earth, and point out to him their relation to his own place of abode.

The two first objects of his geographical studies, should be the town where he resides, and his father's seat in the country. After having well observed the situation of these, he should take the like notice of the neighbouring villages and country seats on the road, together with the adjacent rivers; observing the situation and aspect of each object, in regard to the rising and setting of the sun. This is the point of re-union. He should make a map from this survey; beginning simply with the two first objects before-mentioned, and inserting the others by degrees, as he comes to know, or estimates, their position and distance. You see, already, the advantages he will have in this respect, by having accustomed him to measure objects and distances by his eye.

Notwithstanding this advantage, however, it will be necessary to direct a child in these operations a little; but this should be very little and



and imperceptibly. If he falls into a mistake, let him. Be in no haste to set him right; but wait with patience till he be himself in a state to discover and correct his error; or at most take occasion only, at a favourable opportunity, by some distant hint, to make him sensible of it. If he should never mistake, he would make but little improvement. It is not necessary that he should know at present the topography of the country, but the means whereby such knowledge is obtained; it is of no importance to him to have a number of maps in his head, provided he knows what they serve to represent, and has clear ideas of the art, by which they are constructed. Here you see the difference between Emilius and the pupils of others. Their knowledge lies in maps and charts, that of my pupil in the science of geography. His progress in the art of map-making will hence furnish new ornaments for his apartment. You will remember it is my constant maxim, not to teach a child a multiplicity of things, but to prevent his acquiring any but clear and precise ideas. His knowing but little is of no consequence, provided he imbibes no false principles. I store his head with truth, only to prevent the entrance of error. Reason and judgement advance but slowly, while prejudice attacks with early impetuosity; we must carefully guard therefore against the latter. If you regard science, indeed for its own sake, and aim at knowledge in general, you enter upon an unfathomable ocean, without a shore,



shore, to founder among the rocks. When I see a man, enamoured by the charms of universal knowledge, and flying from the pursuit of one science to another, I think I see a child gathering shells on the sea-shore. He first loads himself indiscriminately with as many as he can carry; when, tempted by others of a gayer appearance, he throws the former away, taking and rejecting, till, fatigued and bewildered in his choice, he hath thrown all away, and returns home without a single shell.

During the first term of childhood, we endeavoured only to lose time, to avoid the ill employment of it. The case is now altered; and we have not time sufficient for every thing that might be useful. The passions advance upon us apace, and the moment they give notice of their arrival, your pupil will give no ear to any other monitor. The term of dispassionate intelligence is short and transitory; and is, besides, employed on so many subjects of present utility, that it is a folly to think it sufficiently long for a child to acquire much learning or wisdom. It is not our business at present to make him an adept in the sciences, but to give him a taste for them, and point out the method of improving it. This is most certainly the fundamental principle of a rational education.

The present is also the proper time to accustom your pupil by degrees to fix his attention, for some time, on one and the same object. This attention, however, must always be accompanied

accompanied by pleasure or inclination, and never be the effect of compulsion. We must be careful, also, not to keep it too long upon the stretch, lest weariness and disgust should ensue. Keep, therefore, a watchful eye over your pupil, and by no means permit him to fatigue himself by too intense application. He had better learn nothing, than learn upon compulsion.

When he asks a question, be your answer always calculated rather to keep alive than satisfy his curiosity; especially when you observe he has a mind to trifle rather than be instructed. You ought to pay less regard to the terms of interrogation, than to his motives for enquiry. This conduct becomes of the greatest importance when a child begins to reason.

The sciences are connected together by a series of propositions, all dependent on some general and common principles, which are gradually displayed. The philosophers make use of these; with us they are as yet out of the question. There is another chain of reasoning, of a different construction, by which every particular object is connected to some other, and points out that which succeeds it. This order of succession, which, from our natural curiosity, keeps alive our attention, is generally made use of by grown persons, and is peculiarly adapted to children.

Before we begin to delineate our map, we must trace a meridian. The two points of intersection

tion found by shadows of equal length in the morning and evening, will give an excellent meridian for an astronomer of thirteen. To find these, however, will require time and oblige us to work constantly on the same spot. This method might be too troublesome and disgusting: having foreseen this inconvenience, therefore, we have provided against it.

But I am now fallen again into my usual custom of being tediously circumstantial. I hear your murmurs, grumbling reader, and disregard them. I am determined I will not sacrifice the most useful part of my book to your impatience. Act as you please with regard to my prolixity, I am, for my part, perfectly easy about your complaints.

My pupil has long since observed that amber, glass, wax, and several other bodies, on being rubbed, attract bits of straw, feathers and the like; and that other bodies in general have not that quality. Among them, however, we have accidentally discovered one, which is possessed of a yet more singular property: it attracts steel-filings and bits of iron, not only at a distance, but without friction. This discovery engages our attention for some time, without answering any other purpose than amusement. At length, we perceive it communicates its attractive property to iron and steel. About this time, I take my pupil to see the diversions of a neighbouring fair; where, among other wonderful performances, a juggler produces a duck of wax, swimming

swimming about in a basin, after a piece of bread, which he holds in his hand. We are greatly surprized at this strange phenomenon, but as we are unacquainted with the fables of witchcraft, we charge not the artist with being either a wizard or conjurer. As we are daily accustomed to various striking effects, of whose causes we are confessedly ignorant, we are not very anxious to account for every thing we see; but rest contented till some fortunate event affords us information.

At our return home, however, our conversation very naturally turns on this extraordinary duck, and accordingly a thought suggests itself of imitating it. We take a large needle, and touching it on the load-stone, cover it with wax, which we mould as well as we can into the shape of a duck, the needle passing through its body from the beak to the tail. We then set it afloat in a basin of water, and presenting a key to its beak, we find, to our great joy, the duck follows it, in the same manner as that of the juggler followed the bread. As to the line of direction in which the body of the duck remains when at rest, we may observe that some other time: at present, we are too much taken up with the first object of attention to think of any thing else. In the evening we repair to the juggler's booth, with a piece of bread, properly prepared, in our pocket; when the boasting artist having performed his trick, my young philosopher, who had with difficulty so long contained himself,



himself, tells him, there is nothing in it, and that he himself can do as much. He is taken at his word; and instantly pulls the bread with the concealed iron out of his pocket. His heart flutters as he approaches the table, and his hand trembles as he presents the bread. The duck, however, follows it, on which he leaps for joy, and triumphs in the applause of the spectators. The juggler, though a little confounded, embraces him, felicitates him on his success, and begs he will honour him with his presence the next day, when he promises to collect a more numerous assembly to witness and applaud his abilities. Our young naturalist, in the mean while, so proud of his science, is just on the point of discovering the secret; when I hurry him away from the scene.

Full of the applause he is to receive to-morrow, he counts the moments, in the mean time, with ridiculous impatience. He invites every one he knows, and would be glad the whole world should be witnesses of his triumph. At length the appointed hour is come; we hasten to the place of rendezvous, and find the room already crowded with spectators. His young heart is elated with joy at the sight. Other tricks in their course preceding our's, the juggler surpasses his usual dexterity, and performs wonders. My pupil, however, pays no attention to what is doing; but keeps fumbling all the while in his pocket; with his piece of bread in his hand, fetching his breath short, and sweating with im-  
patience



patience and anxiety. At length it is his turn to exhibit: the artist pompously introduces the apparatus and prepares the spectators for the trick. Emilius, though somewhat abashed, approaches the table, and offering his bread to the duck—what a new turn in human affairs! tame as it was yesterday, it is become a mere wild-duck to day: instead of presenting its beak, it turns tail and swims away, flying from the bread, and the hand presenting it, as fast as it before had followed them. After many fruitless tryals, for which he is constantly hissed by the company, my pupil complains that he is imposed on, and that this is not the duck he practised on yesterday: defying the juggler himself to draw this about in the same manner.

The artist, without making a reply, 'takes up a piece of bread, and presenting it to the duck draws it immediately after his hand. Emilius takes up the same piece of bread; but, instead of succeeding better than with the former, has the mortification to see the duck turn regardless from him and make circles round the basin: On this he retires in confusion, unable to stand the hisses of the company any longer.

The juggler now takes the piece of bread my pupil had brought, and makes use of it with as much success as he did his own: He takes the iron from within it; and, exposing it to the company, raises another laugh at our expense: He even draws the duck about, as before, with the bread thus separated from the iron. He per-  
forms

forms the same trick, also, with another piece, cut from the loaf by a third person; he does the same thing with his glove, and with the bare end of his finger. He next advances into the middle of the room, and declaring aloud, with that emphatick tone so peculiar to these gentry, that his duck would obey his call as well as his motions; he speaks to it, and it immediately obeys the word of command. If he bids it move to the right, to the right it goes; if to return, it returns; if to turn about, about it turns; its motion constantly obedient to his order. The repeated shouts of applause, that follow these specimens of his art, are so many insults upon us; we, therefore, privately slip out, and making the best of our way home, shut ourselves up in our apartment, instead of going about, as we had projected, to tell every body our success.

The next morning somebody knocks at the door: who should this be but our friend the juggler? He enters, and modestly complains of our conduct: he cannot think what he has done to us, that we should endeavour to discredit his tricks, and deprive him of his bread; or that there is any thing so very wonderful in the art of drawing about a duck of wax, that we should be ambitious of that honour, at the expence of a poor man's subsistence. "Faith, gentlemen (continues he) if I could get a living by any other talent, I should never be proud of this. You should reflect that a man, who has spent great part of his life in the exercise of this pitiful industry

dustry must of course know more of the matter than you, who only throw away a few minutes on it. If I did not exhibit the master-piece of my dexterity at first, it was because one should not be in haste to make an unnecessary display of one's knowledge: I have always taken care to preserve my best tricks for particular occasions; and have, besides what you have seen, many others to check young and indiscreet observers. I am come, nevertheless, gentlemen, very readily to acquaint you of the secret that so much embarrassed you; at the same time hoping you will make no ill use of it, to my prejudice; and that you will another time be more reserved."

He produces his machine; when, to our very great surprise, we see it consists only of a powerful loadstone, which a child, hid under the table for that purpose, moved about without being perceived.

As he is putting his loadstone up again, we thank him, and, excusing ourselves for what is passed, offer to make him a present, which he refuses. "No! gentlemen (says he) you don't deserve so well of me, that I should accept your favours; you shall be obliged to me against your will; this is all the revenge I shall take. You may hence learn that there are men of spirit in all conditions of life: I am paid for the exercise of my hands, and not of my tongue." In going out he addresses to me, particularly, the following reprimand: "I can easily excuse the child (says he aloud) as he offended only through ignorance.

rance. But you, sir, who ought to have known his error, why did you permit him? As you both live together, you, as the elder, owe him your advice and direction: your experience should be the authority for his conduct. In reproaching himself, as he grows up, for the faults of his youth, he will doubtless reproach you for those of which you did not advise him."

Having said this, he departs, leaving us both in a good deal of confusion. I blame myself for my own easy and pliant temper; promising my pupil to sacrifice it another time to his interest, and to warn him of his faults before he commits them. For the time is now approaching when our relation to each other must change, and the severity of the master give place to the complacency of the companion. This change ought to be effected by degrees; and, like every other, be timely and early provided for.

We return the next day to the fair, to see the trick repeated, of which we are let into the secret. We accost our Socratic juggler with a profound respect; hardly daring to look him in the face. He, on the other hand, loads us with civilities, and in seating mortifies us with the most humiliating marks of distinction. He performs his usual flights, and amuses himself a long time with the trick of the duck, casting every now and then a severe and confident look at us. In the mean time, we, though privy to the whole, keep the most profound silence.



Should my pupil dare but to open his mouth on such an occasion, I should have no hopes of him.

The circumstantial account of this example is of more consequence than it may at first appear. How many lessons are contained in this one! How many mortifying consequences are sure to follow the first emotion of vanity! Watch with care, young preceptor, this first emotion in your pupil; and be assured that, if you can thus make it productive of humiliation and disgrace, you will be long before you see any appearance of a second. What preparations are here! you will say: I confess it; and all to make us a compass to serve us instead of a meridian.

Having learnt that a load-stone acts through the substance of other bodies, we have nothing to do but to construct a machine like that we have seen. To this end, we procure a large flat basin; placing it on a table and filling it with water; we make our duck also a little neater than the former; and thus our apparatus is ready. From our constant attention to what passes in the basin, we at length remark that the body of the duck, when at rest, preserves always nearly the same direction. We repeat the experiment, and, on examination, find this direction to be from south to north. This is sufficient; our compass is now as good as made.

The earth hath various climates, and those climates different temperatures; the seasons varying more considerably in proportion as we



approach either pole. All bodies contract with cold and dilate with heat; this effect is still more conspicuous in fluids than solids, and is commensurable by spirituous liquors; by means of which the Thermometer was constructed. The wind blows against our faces; hence we find air is a body, a palpable fluid, although we cannot by any means see it. Press a drinking-glass, turned upside down, into water, the fluid will not occupy the whole space within it, unless by leaning it side-ways you let the air escape. Hence we find air is capable of resistance: press the glass with a still greater force downwards, and the water will gain upon the air without ever being able entirely to fill the glass; hence we find air is capable of a certain degree of compression. A ball filled with compressed air will rebound better than another filled with any other substance: air then is an elastick body. Lying down at one's full length in a bathing tub, if we endeavour to raise our arms in an horizontal position out of the water, we shall find them loaded with a prodigious weight; air, therefore, is evidently heavy, and may be weighed against other fluids; hence the contrivance of the barometer, the syphon, the wind-gun, and the air-pump. All the laws of staticks and hydrostaticks discover themselves by experiments equally obvious and common. I would not, therefore, have him enter the cabinet of an experimental philosopher to learn any of these. His apparatus and pomp of machinery disgust me; their

scientifick air is destructive to science itself; those various engines either frightening a child, or taking up that attention to their figure which he ought to bestow on their effects. I would have all our machines be of our own construction, and would not begin to construct the instrument before I had made the experiment; but, after having made this imperfectly, and as it were by chance, we would by degrees invent the instrument to confirm it. I had rather our machines should be less accurate and complete, and that we should have more just ideas of what they ought to be, and of their operations. For my first lesson in staticks, instead of providing myself with a balance and scales, I lay a stick across the back of a chair; I measure the length of both ends, when it hangs in equilibrio, I next hang different weights on each; placing them nearer or farther off the point of suspension, as occasion requires: by these means I find that the equilibrium depends on a reciprocal proportion between the weights and the length of the levers; and thus I instruct my young mechanic to rectify a balance before he has ever seen one.

We acquire, without doubt, notions more clear and certain of things we thus learn of ourselves, than of those we are taught by others. Another advantage also resulting from this method is, that we do not accustom ourselves to a servile submission to the authority of others; but, by exercising our reason, grow every day more

more ingenious in the discovery of the relations of things, in connecting our ideas, and in the contrivance of machines; whereas, by adopting those which are put into our hands, our invention grows dull and indifferent; as the man who never dresses himself, but is served in every thing by his servants, and drawn about every where by his horses, loses by degrees the activity and use of his limbs. Boileau boasted that he had taught Racine to rhyme with much difficulty. Among the many admirable methods taken to abridge the study of the sciences, we are in great want of one to make us learn them with difficulty.

The most obvious advantage of these slow and laborious researches, is to preserve, in the cultivation of speculative studies, the activity of the body; to preserve the suppleness of the limbs, and to be always busied in some manual operation or employment, of use to mankind. The diversity of instruments, invented to direct us in our experiments, and make up for the deficiency of our organs of sense, makes us neglect the exercise of the latter. A Theodolite dispenses with our estimating the extent of angles; the eye, which is capable of measuring distances with great exactness, gives up the task to the chain; the steel-yard excuses me from judging of the weight of any thing by poising it in my hand. Thus the more ingenious and accurate our instruments, the more unsusceptible and inexperienced become our organs: by assembling a heap

of machinery about us, we find afterwards none in ourselves.

But when we set about the construction of these machines ourselves, and employ therein that sagacity and address which are required to do without them, we lose nothing: on the contrary we gain every thing; and, by adding the knowledge of art to nature, become more ingenious without being less dextrous. If instead of keeping a boy poring over books, I employ him in a work-shop, his hands will be busied to the improvement of his understanding; he will become a philosopher while he thinks himself only an artisan. In short this practice hath other uses which I shall speak of hereafter, and show in what manner these philosophical amusements lead to the exercise of the proper functions of a man.

I have already observed that the mere speculative part of science is by no means adapted to children, even when they approach adolescence; it is proper, nevertheless, though you do not enter with them too profoundly into the depth of physical theory, to connect their experiments by some chain of deduction, that they may arrange them in some order in their minds, for the sake of remembering them: for it is very difficult to retain separate and independent facts and conclusions long in the memory, without some leading clue for occasional recollection.

In your researches into the laws of nature, begin always with the most common and obvious



vious phenomena; accustoming your pupil to look upon them always as mere facts. I take up, for instance, a stone; and, pretending to place it in the air, open my hand, and it immediately falls to the ground. I look upon Emilius, who stands all the while attentive to what I am doing, and ask him, why the stone falls? Where is there a child who would not have an answer ready to that question? There is none, not even Emilius, if I had not taken great pains to prepare him not to know how to answer it. Every one will say the stone falls because it is heavy. And what is heavy? the thing that falls. So the stone falls because it falls. Here my little philosopher is stopped in good earnest; and thus ends my first lecture of physical theory; whether he profits by it, also, in this science or not, it is a general lesson of good sense.

As a child advances in understanding, other important considerations oblige us to be more nice in the objects of his employment. As soon as he acquires so much knowledge of himself, as to conceive in what his happiness consists; or becomes sensible of such extensive relations, as to be able to judge what is fitting or unfitting to his state and condition; he is then in a situation to perceive the difference between labour and amusement, and to regard the latter only as a relaxation from the former. Objects of real utility may then make part of his study, and engage him to give a more constant application to it than he might do to mere amusements.

The law of necessity, ever recurring to the mind, teaches us betimes to do that which is disagreeable, in order to prevent consequences still more displeasing. Such is the use of forecast; in the regulation of which consists all the wisdom, and depends all the misery of mankind.

Every individual would be happy: but, in order to arrive at happiness, it is first necessary to know what it is. The happiness of man in a state of nature, is as simple as his manner of living: it consists in his being free from pain; and is constituted by health, liberty and the necessaries of life. The happiness of man in a state of society, is another thing; but this is at present out of the question. I cannot too often observe, that objects purely physical are those only which can interest children, particularly those whose vanity is not yet excited, and who are not already vitiated by the prejudices of opinion.

When they come to foresee their wants, their understanding is considerably advanced, and they begin to be sensible of the value of time. It is of consequence, now, to use them to employ themselves on subjects of utility; this utility, however, should be applicable to their age, and adapted to their knowledge. Every thing that depends on moral institutions and the practices of society, should not be so early presented to their view; because they are not in a capacity to understand it. It is a folly to require them to apply themselves to things, merely because they are  
told

told in general terms that such things are good for them, while they are ignorant in what that good consists; we may in vain assure them they will find their interest therein as they grow up; while they are uninterested by their present use, they are incapable of comprehending the future.

Let a child do nothing merely because he is bid; nothing is good for him which he cannot perceive to be so. In hurrying him on before his knowledge, you think yourselves making use of forecast, and you only betray the want of it. In providing him with many implements he may never use, you deprive him of the most universal and useful of all others, that of good sense. You use him to permit himself to be always conducted, and to be only a machine in the hands of others. In requiring him to be docile and tractable when he is little, you prepare him to be a credulous dupe when he is grown up. You are for ever telling him,—“All I desire of you, child, is for your own advantage; though you are as yet incapable of knowing it to be so. What is it to me whether you do what I require or not? It is for your own good only you should do it.” With such fine speeches as these, intended to make him wise, you only pave the way for the success of those who may hereafter take him to some projector, alchemist, false prophet, or any kind of cheat, with a view to entrap him by some snare, or in order to make him adopt their own folly.

It is requisite men should be acquainted with many things, of which children cannot in the

least comprehend the utility : but is it necessary, or even possible, that a child should learn every thing it is requisite a man should know ? Endeavour to teach a child every thing that is useful to him at his age ; and you will find him full employment. Why will you insist on his application to the studies proper for an age to which he may never arrive, in prejudice of those which are proper for him at present ? But, you will ask me, perhaps, whether he will have time to learn what he ought to know, when it is required of him to make use of his knowledge ? This I cannot tell ; but I am very certain it is impossible to learn it sooner ; for our real and only true instructors are experience and sentiment. Never can man be made truly sensible of what is useful to him but from the circumstances in which he is situated. A child knows he is designed to grow up to manhood ; all the ideas he can form of that state will be to him so many opportunities of instruction : but as for those which are above his capacity to comprehend, it is better he should remain in absolute ignorance of them. This whole treatise is calculated to illustrate this principle of education.

As soon as we are so far advanced as to give our pupil an idea of the word useful, we have attained a considerable influence over his future conduct ; this term being very striking, provided the sense annexed to it be adapted to his years, and he see clearly its relation to his present welfare. Ordinary children are not affected by this term, because no care has been taken to affix to it an idea  
conform



conformable to their understandings, and because, others taking upon them to provide for them what is useful, they have no need to think of it themselves, and therefore remain ignorant of the meaning of utility.

What is the use of that? This, for the future, shall be the determinate question between my pupil and me, on all occasions. On my part I shall infallibly make use of it in answer to all his interrogatories, which may serve as a check to that multiplicity of silly, troublesome questions, with which children are incessantly teizing those about them, more for the sake of indulging themselves in a kind of imperiousness, than out of a desire of information. The child who is taught, as the most important lesson, to know nothing but what is useful to him, will interrogate with the views of a Socrates: he will not put a question, without having an answer ready to that which he knows will be put to him before his own is resolved.

What a powerful instrument have I here put into your hands, for the conduct of your pupil! Knowing a reason for nothing, he is reduced to silence whenever you please; while, on the other hand you can make use of every advantage your knowledge and experience give you, to demonstrate the utility of what you propose. For you, must not mistake the end of this question; it is only to instruct him to question you in his turn; and you must expect, in whatever you propose to him afterwards, to have him reply by asking you

you, of what use is this or that, in the terms of your proposal.

This will lay a snare, perhaps, which a governour will not easily avoid falling into. If on a child's asking this question, you only endeavour to divert the affair, by giving him an answer he cannot well comprehend, he will think that you reason on your own ideas and not on his, and will believe what you call useful to be so to yourself only, and not to him: he will no longer place any confidence in you, and then all is over. But where is the preceptor who will stop short and own his want of knowledge or mistakes to his pupil? it is the general rule with tutors not to confess their real ignorance, whereas I make it mine to affect to be more ignorant than I am, when I cannot adapt the required information to his understanding. Hence, always apparently candid in my behaviour, he does not suspect my motives, and I gain more credit with him by affecting ignorance, than other preceptors would do by concealing their's.

In the first place, you are to consider how seldom it is proper for you to propose what he is to learn; it is his place to desire to know, to seek for, to discover it: it is your's artfully to excite this desire, to place the object within his reach, and to furnish him with the means of attaining it. It follows hence, that your interrogations should be few, but select; and that, as he will have much more to do with you, than you with him, you will be less exposed than he,

and more often in the circumstances of saying to him, of what use is it to you to know what you ask?

Add to this, that as it is of little consequence whether he learns many things, or not, provided he has a clear conception of what he does learn, and its use; whenever you have not a proper explanation of the thing required at hand, you may safely forbear to give him any at all. You may say to him without scruple—"I have no good reason to give you; I am somehow mistaken;" and leave it there. If your instruction was really improper, it is not amiss to give it up entirely; and, if not so, you will soon find occasion to make him sensible of its utility.

I do not at all admire explanatory discourses: young people give little attention to them, and never retain them in memory. The things themselves are the best explanations. I can never enough repeat it, that we make words of too much consequence; with our prating modes of education we make nothing but praters.

Let us suppose that, while I am studying with my pupil the course of the sun and the method of its returning to the east, he should stop me short by asking me to what purpose is all this? What a florid discourse might I not make him, in answer to such a question? What a number of fine things might I not take occasion to expatiate on, by the way; particularly if there were any witnesses to our conversation. \* I might

\* I have often remarked, that the learned instructions usually given to pupils, have been calculated rather for

might talk to him of the utility of travelling, the advantages of commerce, the produce peculiar to every climate; of the manners of different nations, of the use of the Kalendar, of the computations of the returning seasons for agriculture, of the art of navigation, and the manner of conducting a ship at sea. Politics, natural history, astronomy, and even morality itself, with the laws of nations, might all be introduced in the course of my harangue, with a view to give my pupil great ideas of the sciences, and to excite in him a desire to study them. When I had done, however, I should only have been exposing my own pedantry, without my pupil's having comprehended one single thing I had been talking about. He would have still a great mind to ask me, as before, to what end the sun returned to the east, but he would be fearful of offending. He would therefore find his account in pretending to understand what he was thus compelled to hear. This is the practice carried on in polite education. Our Emilius, however, brought up in greater rusticity, and so difficult of comprehension, will listen to nothing of all this. At the very first word he might not understand, he would turn away, and play about the room, leaving me to finish my oration by myself. We must seek, therefore, some more obvious solution:

this

the grown persons, in whose presence they were delivered, than for the puerile capacity of children. I am very certain, also, of the justice of this remark, as it is founded on my own repeated observation.



this scientific method of explication being useless to him.

We were observing the position of the forest to the north of Montmorency, when he interrupted me with his impertinent question, of "To what end is all this?" On which, I answer—You are in the right, we must think of this matter at leisure, and if we find this enquiry is useless, we will drop it, for we have no need of useless amusements." We then betake ourselves to some other employment, and talk no more of geography during the rest of the day.

I propose to him next morning a walk before breakfast: he likes nothing better; children are in general ever ready for running about; and mine is fit for exercise. We enter the forest, traverse the country, and rambling about till we are almost tired, we lose ourselves, and know not which way to return home. Our time is spent; the heat of the day increases; we begin to grow hungry, and wander about from one place to another, among copses, woods, and quarries, without meeting with any object we are acquainted with. At length overheated, famished, and fatigued, we find ourselves only more and more bewildered. We sit down, therefore, to rest ourselves and deliberate on what is to be done. Supposing Emilius to have been educated like another child, he does not deliberate about the matter, but sits down and begins to cry; ignorant that we are just by the gate of Montmorency, which is concealed from us only by the trees of

a narrow coppice: these trees, however, appear an impenetrable forest to him; such a little gentleman as he, lost in the bushes.

After some few minutes passed in silence, I say to him, with an air of disquietude—"What shall we do, my dear Emilius, to get out of this forest?"

EMILIUS, *all in a sweat, with the tears running down his cheeks.*

I know not: I am so weary, so hungry, so dry, I know not what to do.

Rousseau.—Do you think I am in a better situation than you; or that I should not cry too if I could breakfast upon tears? Our business is not to weep, but to look about us. Look at your watch; what is it o'Clock?

Emilius.—It is noon and I have not yet breakfasted.

Rousseau.—It is very true; it is noon, and I am fasting too.

Emilius.—You must then surely be very hungry?

Rousseau.—Yes! but the worst on't is my dinner will not come here to find me. Let me see—it is noon; that is precisely the time at which we observed yesterday the situation of this forest from Montmorenci: if we could but observe in like manner the position of Montmorenci from this forest—

Emilius.—True, but yesterday we saw the forest, and we cannot from hence see the town.

Rousseau.—

*Rousseau.*—That's our very misfortune——  
If we could, by any means, but find its situation without seeing it——

*Emilius.*—O, my good friend! but how?

*Rousseau.*—Did not we observe that the forest lay——

*Emilius.*—To the north of Montmorenci.

*Rousseau.*—Montmorenci therefore should be——

*Emilius.*—To the south of the forest.

*Rousseau.*—We have a method to find out the north at noon.

*Emilius.*—We have so, by the direction of our shadow.

*Rousseau.*—But as for the south.

*Emilius.*—How shall we find that?

*Rousseau.*—The south is always opposite to the north.

*Emilius.*—That's true; we have only to take the direction contrary to our shadows: Here, this must be the south. Montmorenci must certainly lie on this side: let us go this way.

*Rousseau.*—You may possibly be in the right; here, let us take this path through the wood.

EMILIUS, *clapping his hands and shouting for joy.*

Ah! I see Montmorenci directly before us. Come alonge, let us go to breakfast, to dinner, let us make haste: Astronomy, I see, is good for something.

Observe that if he does not actually make use of the latter expression, he will think so; it does not signify which, provided I do not teach it him. You may be assured, also, he never will

will forget this day's lesson as long as he lives; whereas had I only supposed this adventure in my chamber, all that I could have said on it would have been forgotten the next day. For this reason we ought to inculcate all we possibly can by actions, and to say only what we cannot do.

The reader will not expect I can have so little opinion of his sagacity, as to give him an example in every kind of study; but, whichsoever may occasionally relate to the point in question, I cannot too much exhort the preceptor to adapt his explication to the capacity of his pupil; for I repeat it once more, the evil lies not in what he is ignorant of, but in what he imagines he understands.

I remember, that, one day, endeavouring to give a child a taste for chemistry, after I had shown him several metalline precipitations, I explained to him the method of making ink. I told him its blackness was occasioned only by the very fine particles of iron separated from the vitriol, and precipitated by an alkaline fluid. In the middle of my learned explication, the shrewd little querist stopped me short with my question, which I had taught him; and which indeed not a little embarrassed me. After thinking a little, however, I took the following method to resolve it. I ordered a bottle of wine to be brought out of the cellar, and another of common ordinary wine to be fetched from the tavern. I then took a little phial full of a solution  
of



of fixed alcali ; and pouring out two glasses of wine, one out of each bottle, I thus prepared for the experiment\*.

It is customary, said I, for the venders of certain commodities to adulterate them in order to make them look better than they really are. These adulterations deceive both the eye and taste ; but are in themselves hurtful, and make the adulterated commodity, notwithstanding its appearance, worse than before.

Liquors in particular, and wines more than any other, are subject to this adulteration ; because the deception is not easily detected and is very profitable to the vender. The adulteration of tart or sour wines is made with litharge, which is a preparation of lead. Lead united to an acid produces a sugar or sweet salt, which corrects the taste of sour wine, but is poisonous to those who drink it. It is requisite, therefore, before we drink any wine suspected of adulteration, to know certainly whether there be litharge in it or not. Now, it is by this method of reasoning I am led to the means of discovering it.

I know that wine contains not only an inflammable spirit, as you have seen in the brandy distilled from it ; but also an acid, as you may be convinced, by the tartar subsiding from it, and the vinegar into which it is converted.

The

\* A little preparation is necessary to every experiment exhibited to children, as it serves to render them attentive to what is doing.

The acid is attracted by metallic substances, and adheres to them in their solution, forming a compound salt; such, for example as is the rust of iron, which is nothing more than the particles of the metal dissolved by the acid spirit contained in the air or in water: such also is verdigris, which is only copper dissolved by vinegar.

At the same time this acid has a stronger attraction, however, to alkaline than to metalline substances; in so much that by the intervention of the former between the compound salts above-mentioned, the acid is separated from the metal to which it was before united, and adheres to the alkali. Hence the metalline substance, detached from the acid, which kept it in a state of solution, is precipitated, and makes the fluid black.

If, then, either of the wines before us be adulterated with litharge, its acid keeps it in a state of solution. So that if I pour this alkaline fluid into them, it will compel the acid to let go its hold of the metal and adhere to itself; when the lead, being no longer kept floating, will again appear, trouble the wine, and at length be precipitated to the bottom of the glass.

On the contrary, if there be no lead nor mixture of other metal in the wine,\* the alkali will

\* The wines, which are sold by retail by the wine-merchants at Paris, although they should not be purposefully adulterated with litharge, are seldom without some lead in them: because their measures and other imple-

will unite itself quietly to the acid\*, the whole will remain dissolved, and you will see no precipitation.

On this, I poured the alkaline solution successively into both glasses; the liquor in one of them remaining afterwards clear and transparent; that in the other became thick and troubled, and in less than an hour we could see clearly the lead precipitated to the bottom.

There, said I, you see one of these wines is pure and genuine, and the other adulterated and poisonous. This discovery we make, by means of that kind of knowledge, of which you require to know the utility. When we know how to make ink, we know how to detect adulterated wine.

I was myself very well satisfied with the explication and example I had given; I observed, however, that it did not strike the child. It required some time for me to discover it to be very idle, and that I had been all the while talking to no purpose. For, setting aside the impossibility that a boy of twelve years of age should follow the course of my argument, the utility of the

experiments are usually made of lead; and the wine, in passing through them always dissolves some part. It is strange so manifestly abusive and dangerous a practice should be suffered in a city so respectable for its police. It is true people of fashion and substance, never drinking these re-tailed wines, they are not so liable to be poisoned.

\* The vegetable acid is very mild. If it were a mineral one, their union would not be effected without fermentation.

experiment would never enter his head ; because, tasting both wines and finding both good, he had annexed no meaning to the term of *adulteration*, which I thought I had so clearly explained ; the words *pernicious* and *poisonous* conveying no idea to his apprehension.

Those relations between cause and effect of which we cannot perceive the connexion, that good and evil of which we have no idea, and the necessities we have never felt, have no influence on our understandings. We have as vague notions, at fifteen years of age, of the happiness attendant on wisdom, as at thirty of the celestial glories of the New Jerusalem. If we have no clear conceptions of the one or the other, we shall take but little trouble to obtain them ; and, though our ideas were ever so precise on these subjects, we should take just as little, unless we felt some attachment to, or desire after them. It is easy to convince a child of the utility of whatever we have a mind to teach him ; but it signifies little to convince him of this, unless you can persuade him also to pursue it. Reason in vain may induce us coldly to approve or blame ; the passions only are the springs of action ; and how can our passions be excited by objects or circumstances in which we do not perceive ourselves at all interested ?

Never point out any thing to a child which is beyond his views. While he is a stranger to the relations and duties of humanity, as you cannot raise his comprehension to the state of manhood,



manhood, you should bring down the state of manhood to a level with his capacity. In projecting what may be useful to him hereafter, speak to him directly only of what is apparently useful to him at present. Beware, also, in general, of making comparisons between your pupil and other children; let him have no rival, no competitor, not even in his corporeal exercises, as soon as he begins to reason. I had much rather he should not learn at all whatever must be taught him by means of vanity or jealousy. I would content myself, in this respect, with remarking his annual progress, and comparing his situation and exploits in the present year with those of the past. I would say to him, you are grown so much since such a time; here is the ditch you leaped, the weight you lifted, the distance you threw a stone, so far you ran without fetching breath; let us see what you can do more at present. Thus would I excite him to emulation, without making him jealous or envious of a rival; he would be desirous indeed to excel himself, and so he ought to be; I see no inconvenience in this kind of emulation.

I hate books; they only teach people to talk about what they don't understand. It is said that Hermes engraved the elements of the sciences on columns, to secure his discoveries from being lost in the time of a general deluge. Had he imprinted them on the minds of men, they had been better preserved by tradition. The organs of the memory, duly prepared, are the monuments

ments on which human science would be most indelibly engraven.

Is there no expedient to be thought of, to collect the various instructions, scattered up and down in so many voluminous tomes? to unite them under one general head, which may be easy to comprehend, interesting to pursue, and which may serve as a *stimulus*, even to children of this age? If one could but conceive a situation, in which all the natural wants of man would be displayed, in a manner adapted to the understanding of a child, and wherein the means of satisfying those wants are gradually discovered with the same ease and simplicity, it would be in a just and lively description of such a state, that we should first exercise his imagination.

I see the imagination of the philosopher already take fire. Impetuous genius! give yourself no trouble; such a situation is already discovered; it is already described, and I may say, without any impeachment to your talents, much better than you could describe it yourself; at least with more exactness and simplicity. Since we must have books, there is one already which, in my opinion, affords a complete treatise on natural education. This book shall be the first Emilius shall read: In this, indeed, will, for a long time, consist his whole library, and it will always hold a distinguished place among others. It will afford us the text, to which all our conversations on the objects of natural science will serve only as a comment. It will

serve as our guide during our progress to a state of reason; and will even afterwards give us constant pleasure unless our taste be totally vitiated. You ask impatiently, what is the title of this wonderful book? Is it Aristotle, Pliny, or Buffon? No. It is Robinson Crusoe.

Robinson Crusoe, cast ashore on a desolate island, destitute of human assistance, and of mechanical implements, providing, nevertheless, for his subsistence, for self-preservation, and even procuring for himself a kind of competency. In these circumstances, I say, there cannot be an object more interesting to persons of every age; and there are a thousand ways to render it agreeable to children. Thus, you see, I have realized that desert island, which I at first made use of only by way of comparison. Such a situation, I confess, is very different from that of man in a state of society. Very probably it will never be that of Emilius; but it is from such a state he ought to learn to estimate others. The most certain method for him to raise himself above vulgar prejudices and to form his judgment on the actual relations of things, is to take on himself the character of such a solitary adventurer, and to judge of every thing about him, as a man in such circumstances would, by its real utility. This romance beginning with his shipwreck on the island, and ending with the arrival of the vessel that brought him away, would, if cleared of its rubbish, afford Emilius,

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during

during the period we are now treating of, at once both instruction and amusement. I would have him indeed personate the hero of the tale, and be entirely taken up with his castle, his goats and his plantations; he should make himself minutely acquainted, not from books but circumstances, with every thing requisite for a man in such a situation. He should affect even his dress, wear a coat of skins, a great hat, a large hanger; in short, he should be entirely equipped in his grotesque manner, even with his umbrello, though he would have no occasion for it. I would have him when at a loss about the measures necessary to be taken for his provision or security, upon this or the other occasion, examine the conduct of his hero; he should see if he omitted nothing, or if any thing better could be substituted in the room of what was actually done; and, on the discovery of any mistake in Robinson, should amend it in a similar case himself: for I doubt not but he will form a project of going to make a like settlement. Not unlike to this were those ancient castles in Spain, in that happy age when the height of human felicity consisted in the enjoyment of liberty and the necessaries of life.

What opportunities of instruction would such an amusement afford an able preceptor, who should project it only with a view to that end! The pupil, eager to furnish a magazine for his island, would be more ready to learn than his tutor to teach him. He would be solicitous to  
know



know every thing that is useful, and nothing else : You would in such a case have no more occasion to direct ; but only to restrain him. Let us hasten, therefore, to establish him in this imaginary isle, since to this he confines his present happiness ; for the time will now soon come, in which, if he is desirous of life, it is not to live alone, and in which even a man *Friday*, the want of whom does not now affect him, would not be long satisfactory.

The practice of simple manual arts, to the exercise of which the abilities of the individual are equal, leads to the invention of the arts of industry, the exercise of which requires the concurrence of many. The former may be practised by hermits, and savages ; but the latter can be exercised only in a state of society, and render that state necessary. While man is subject only to the calls of physical necessity, he is capable of satisfying them himself : but, by the introduction of superfluous wants, the joint concern and distribution of labour become indispensable : for though a man by his own labour, when alone, procures only subsistence for an individual, yet an hundred men, working in concert, will easily procure, in the same time, subsistence for double the number. As soon, therefore, as one part of mankind take upon themselves to live idle, it becomes necessary that the concurrent labour of numbers should supply the place of those who live without work.

Your greatest care should be to keep from your pupil the notions of those social relations, which he is not in a capacity to comprehend; but when the connection of his ideas oblige you to speak of the mutual dependence of mankind, instead of presenting him at first the moral side of the question, divert his attention as much as possible to industry and the mechanick arts, which render men useful to one another. In going about with him to the work-shops of various artisans, never let him see any thing performed without lending a hand to the work, nor come out of the shop without perfectly understanding the reason of what he observes there. To this end, you should work yourself, and in every thing set him an example. To make him a master, be you in every thing the apprentice; and reflect that he will learn more by one hour of manual labour, than he will retain from a whole day's verbal instructions.

The different arts are entitled to various proportions of public esteem, and that in an inverse ratio to their real use. This esteem is directly as their inutility, and so it politically ought to be. The most useful arts are those which are the worst paid for, or least rewarded; because the number of workmen is proportioned to the wants of the whole society, and the labour the poor must purchase must necessarily be at a low price. On the contrary, those important artisans, who, by way of distinction, are termed artists, and  
are

are employed only in the service of the rich and idle, set an arbitrary price on their workmanship; and as the excellence of their baubles is mere matter of opinion, their high price constitutes great part of their merit, and they are esteemed in proportion to what they cost. The value thus set upon them is not on account of any use they are of to the rich, but because they are too costly to be purchased by the poor. *Nolo habere bona nisi quibus populus inviderit.\**

What will become of your pupils, if you permit them to adopt this ridiculous prejudice; if you encourage it yourself, or see them, for example, enter, with more respect the shop of a jeweller than that of a locksmith? What a judgment will they form of the real merit of the arts and the intrinsic value of things, when they see whim and caprice universally opposed to real utility, and find the more a thing costs the less it is worth? If ever such ideas as these take root in their minds, you may as well give up at once the remaining part of their education; they will, in spite of all you can do, be educated like the rest of the world, and you will have taken, for fourteen years past, all your trouble for nothing.

Emilius will see things in a very different light, while he is employed in furnishing his island. Robinson Crusoe would have set a greater value on the stock in trade of a petty ironmonger, than on that of the most magnificent

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and

\* Petron.

and best furnished toy-shop in Europe. The first had appeared to him a respectable personage, while the owner of the latter had been despised as frivolous and contemptible.

I doubt not but some sagacious member of society will make the following objection. "My son (he will say) is formed to live in the world; not to reside among a set of philosophers, but to herd with fools; it is proper, therefore, he should be acquainted with those follies that influence their conduct. The knowledge of things, as they are, may be useful; but that of men and opinions is much more so; for, in society, the knowledge of mankind is the best means to make the most of them, and he is the wisest man who acquires the most, and makes the best use of it. To what purpose, then, is it to give children the ideas of an imaginary order of things, directly contrary to that which custom has established, and by which they must regulate their behaviour? Read them, first, lectures to make themselves wise, and then you may take what method you will to instruct them in what respect others are fools."

Such are the specious maxims, on which is founded the false prudence of parents, who endeavour to make their children slaves to those prejudices in which they themselves are educated. How many things are necessary to be known, previous to the study of mankind! This is the last and most arduous task of the  
philoso-



philosopher, and you would have it be the first of a child. Before you instruct him in the knowledge of your own sentiments, you should begin, by teaching him to form some estimate of their truth and propriety: Our opinions are imparted to children as reasons; is this the way to teach them the folly of them? In order to attain wisdom, it is necessary to be able to discern what is not so. How shall your child know how to study mankind, if he is incapable to judge of their sentiments, or to detect their errors? It is a misfortune for him to know their opinions, while he is ignorant whether they be true or false. Teach him first, therefore, what things are in themselves; and you may afterwards instruct him at leisure, what are the general sentiments of mankind. Thus will he be enabled to judge of our opinions by the criterion of truth, and soar above the mistaken notions of the vulgar. To adopt prejudices is not to know them as such, nor are the multitude governed by those who are like themselves. If you begin by making your pupil acquainted with the opinions of the world, before you have taught him how to judge of them, you may assure yourself, say what you will, they will become his, and you will never after be able to eradicate them. I conclude this subject, therefore, by laying down as a maxim, that to render a youth sensible and judicious, we ought to form his opinion of things and not to dictate our's.

You will observe that hitherto I have said nothing to my pupil about mankind, he would have had too much good sense to understand me, if I had; his connexions with, and relations to, his fellow-creatures, are not as yet striking and conspicuous enough to enable him to judge of others by himself. He has no ideas of human nature but what centre in his own person, and even his self-knowledge is but very confined. If his ideas, however, are contracted, at least they are just. He knows not the relative situation of others, but he is sensible of his own, and keeps his place. Instead of restraining him by social ties, the force of which he could not comprehend, we have bound him by the obvious chains of necessity. He is as yet little better than a mere physical being; let us continue to treat him as such.

He forms his judgement, and estimates the value of the works both of nature and art, by their relation to his own convenience, security, and preservation. Hence, he looks upon iron, as a more precious metal than gold, and glass to be more valuable than diamonds. For the same reason he hath more respect for a shoe-maker, or a mason, than for all the celebrated jewellers in Europe. A pastry-cook is, in his opinion, a person of singular importance, and the whole academy of sciences of less consequence than the respectable personage of the meanest confectioner. Goldsmiths, engravers, and gilders, are, with him, idle insignificant people, who  
amuse

amuse themselves in employments frivolous and useless; nay, he does not hold even a watch-maker in very high estimation. Happy in the enjoyment of this native liberty, he profits by time without knowing its value. That tranquillity, which, undisturbed by the violence of passion, makes its succession equal, serves him instead of a machine to measure the quantity elapsed\*. In supposing his pocket to be furnished with a watch, as in supposing him to cry, I only made use on that occasion of an Emilius vulgarly educated, for the sake of illustration: for, in fact, a child, so different from all others, can hardly be made use of as an example in any case.

There is another order of distinction, not less natural, and still more judicious, according to which the arts may be ranked agreeably to their order in that necessary chain which connects them together; placing the most independent in the first class, and those which depend on the greatest number of others, in the last. This method of arrangement, which may furnish important considerations on the order of society in general, is similar to the former in that it is equally subject to be perverted by the prepossessions and caprices of mankind. Hence it is,

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that

\* We lose our constitutional measure of time, when the passions would subject its duration to their will. The philosopher's time-piece is evenness of temper and tranquillity of mind; he is always in his own time, and knows it exactly.

that all manufactured substances, are first laboriously operated on by workmen below consideration, and almost without pay; that the more hands they pass through, the more expensive becomes the labour and the more creditable the profession of each successive artisan. I will not here enquire whether it be true, that industry is more exerted in the elegant arts than in those which give the first form to the massive substance, and fit it for common uses; but I affirm that in all cases, those arts which are the most general and indispensable are incontestibly those which deserve to be held in the greatest esteem; and that such as require the least assistance from others deserve still less to be degraded lowest of all, when they are at the same time the most free and independent. These rules form the true criterion whereby to judge of the merit, and estimate the value, of arts and industry. All other are arbitrary and capricious. The first and most respectable of all arts and professions is that of agriculture: next to the husbandman I rank the smith; to the smith succeeds the carpenter, and so on. A child, who should not have acquired a misjudging partiality from vulgar prejudices, would rank them also precisely in the same order. How many important reflections on this subject, may not Emilius deduce from Robinson Crusoe! What will he think in seeing the arts carried to perfection, by being divided and subdivided into such a number of branches, and by the inven-



tion of such an infinite variety of implements to work with? Will he not call their ingenuity ridiculous, and think they are afraid their arms and fingers are not fit for use, that they have contrived so many expedients to work without them? To exercise one trade, they must be furnished with tools by a thousand others: The artisans of a whole town must be employed to set any one of them to work. As to my companion and myself, our ingenuity lies in our dexterity; we make use of the tools we carry about us. Let the proudest workman belonging to the nicknackitories of Paris come to our desert island, his talents uselefs here, he will be glad in his turn to serve an apprenticeship to us.

Confine not your observation here, reader, to the corporeal exercise, and manual dexterity of my pupil; but consider the proper methods we take to gratify his childish curiosity; remark the effects of his good sense, his genius for invention, his foresight and other intellectual abilities. In whatever he sees, or is employed in, he wants to know the reason of every thing; tracing back one instrument from another, till he arrive at the first and most simple. He takes nothing upon supposition or on trust; but refuses even to learn any thing that requires a previous knowledge of which he is not possessed. If he sees, for instance, a file, or a spring, he immediately recurs to the method of working up the materials from the ore. If he sees the sides of a chest fitted together, he must know the methods  
of

of felling the timber and sawing it into planks. If he be, himself, at work, he never fails to reflect on every new tool he makes use of, and to consider how he might have constructed such an implement, or have made shift without it.

There is an error, however, difficult to avoid, in employing your pupil in these mechanical operations; and that is, you will always suppose him to have a taste for those you are fond of yourself: but you must beware, that, while you are seeking your own amusement, you do not fatigue and disgust your pupil, who perhaps will not let you perceive it. Your little artisan should find in himself every thing needful to execute his designs, but he should find in you every thing needful to direct him in those designs. You should observe him, and watch his motions continually, without his knowing it; you should anticipate his thoughts, and prevent those which are improper; in short, you should keep him so employed, that he should not only be sensible of the use of his own talents, but that he should take delight in his employment, from a like sense of its utility.

The intercourse of the arts consists in the reciprocal exchange of industry, that of commerce in the exchange of commodities, and that of money in the exchange of bills and cash: All these are intimately connected with each other, and we have already acquired ideas of the principles on which they are founded, from our dispute with Robert, the gardener. At present

sent we have nothing more to do than to generalize those ideas, and to extend them to a variety of examples, in order to give Emilius a just notion of the nature of commercial connexions; which may be exemplified by the natural history of the produce peculiar to different climates, by enumerating the arts and sciences which relate to navigation, and representing the various obstacles that are surmounted in transporting commodities from one country to another. No society can exist without making use of the expedients of exchange, nor can any exchange be carried on without some common standard: this also must be formed on some principle of equality. Hence every society has, for its first law, some conventional equality, both of persons and of property.

The conventional equality between persons is very different from the natural, and therefore requires the protection of government and laws. The political knowledge of a child should be very clear and confined: he ought to have no other idea of government in general than what relates to the notion concerning the right of property which he hath already imbibed.

The conventional equality, between articles of property, gave rise to the invention of money; which serves as the means of comparing the value of the different species of such articles; and in this sense money may be denominated the real bond of society. Every thing, however, may be converted into money. Formerly  
cattle

cattle were made use of as such, so at present, in some countries, are shells, teeth, &c. The money of Sparta, was iron, that of Sweden has been made of leather, as our's is now of gold and silver.

Metals, as the most easily transported, are generally made choice of to form this mean term in our usual course of exchange. To facilitate this end, by sparing the trouble of recurring to weights or measures, they are converted into regular coin. For the stamp imprinted thereon is no more than an attestation, that the piece so marked is of such a certain weight; the sovereign only having a right to coin money, so long as he is possessed of a right to require his attestation to pass unquestioned through a whole people, or so long as he reserves to himself such exclusive privilege.

The use of this invention, thus explained, will be readily perceived by a child of the dullest apprehension. It is, indeed, difficult to make a direct comparison between commodities of different kinds; as for example, between cloth and grain: but when a standard common to both, such as money, is established, it is easy for the manufacturer and husbandman to apply the value of their respective articles thereto, and to judge what quantity of each is equivalent to the other. For if so many yards of broad-cloth be worth a certain sum of money, and so many bushels of wheat be worth the like sum, the draper, in taking the wheat for his cloth, makes a fair and  
equi-



equitable exchange. Thus it is, that through the medium of money, the produce and manufactures of different kinds and countries may be estimated and compared with each other.

Go no farther than this, nor enter into any disquisition concerning the moral effects of this institution. It is of consequence, in every case, to bring your pupil acquainted with the nature and end of every custom before you point out its abuse. If you attempt to explain to children in what manner signs are substituted for things, that money hath been productive of the numerous chimeras of prejudice and caprice, and that countries abounding in silver and gold must be proportionably destitute of real wealth; in doing this, I say, you treat them, not only as if they were professed philosophers, but also as men of experience; and attempt to give them conceptions of what even few philosophers have clearly understood.

To what a variety of interesting subjects may we not, by these means, direct the curiosity of our pupil, without ever quitting those real and sensible relations, which are contained within the sphere of his knowledge, or exciting in his mind one idea beyond the reach of his capacity. A judicious preceptor will not dwell, with heavy prolixity, on frivolous subjects, but be constantly preparing his pupil for the knowledge of those important relations, which will one day be necessary for him, in order to his forming a right judgement of the good or evil customs of society.

society. He will endeavour to adapt his conversation and amusements to the turn of mind he has given him. A question that would scarce excite the attention of another child, will perplex Emilius for six months together.

I take an opportunity, we will suppose, to carry him to dinner at the house of some opulent family; where, when we arrive, we find great preparations making for an elegant entertainment, much company, a number of servants, a variety of dishes, and a superb side-board of plate. There is something intoxicating, to those who are unaccustomed to it, in this appearance of splendour and festivity. I foresee the effect it will have on my pupil; and, therefore, in the midst of the hurry and clamour that prevail round the table, I whisper in his ear, and ask him, how many hands he thinks were employed in furnishing the entertainment before us. What a crowd of ideas will those few words bring thronging into his mind! In an instant his delirium vanishes. He muses, reflects, begins to calculate, and puzzles himself with thinking. While grave philosophers, inspired by the wine, or perhaps by the charms of the ladies, degrade themselves by talking idly, and, in the gaiety of their hearts, behave like children, Emilius sits philosophising by himself at one corner of the table: he applies to me with an interrogation, which I refuse to answer, deferring it to another opportunity. At this he grows uneasy, he cannot eat a morsel, nor  
drink

*Not sensible / see him a the  
on the table or three*

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drink a drop more, but burns with impatience to get away from table, in order to converse with me more freely. What an object this for his curiosity to work upon! What a text, pregnant with instruction! With a sound judgment, unbiaſſed by prepoſſeſſion, and untainted with prejudice, what ideas muſt he form of luxury, when he comes to find that all the countries in the world have been laid under contribution, that twenty millions of hands have been for a long time employed, that thousands of men, perhaps, have loſt their lives, and all this to preſent him, in ſuch publick pomp at noon, what he may privately diſburthen himſelf of before night?

Be very attentive to thoſe concluſions which the heart of a child will deduce in ſecret from all his obſervations. If you have taken leſs pains with your's than I have preſcribed, he may be tempted, in ſuch a caſe as the above, to give his reflexions quite a different turn, and look upon himſelf as a perſon of very great importance in the world, in ſeeing ſo much pains taken to provide for his dinner. If you foreſee this ſentiment, you may eaſily prevent it, or at leaſt preſently efface the impreſſion it makes on him. Being as yet ignorant of the means of appropriating any thing to himſelf except by actual poſſeſſion and enjoyment, he cannot judge of their convenience or inconvenience to him, but by the pleaſure they afford him. Now the ſimple comparison between ſuch a ſplendid and formal repaſt,

past, and a plain and homely dinner, provided by his own labour, and seasoned by appetite, liberty, and ease, is sufficient to make him sensible that all that magnificent appearance of festivity, had been of no real use, and that, his hunger being as fully satisfied at the table of the peasant as at that of a lord, he enjoys nothing at the one more than at the other, which he can truly call his own.

Let us imagine what a polite governour would say to a child on such an occasion. "Recollect the circumstances, he would say, of each repast, and determine within yourself which afforded you the greatest pleasure. At which have you demonstrated the greatest expressions of joy? At which have you shown the keenest appetite, drank the most cheerfully, and laughed the most heartily? Which lasted the longest without making you weary, or kept you longest from being again hungry? Yet, see the difference: this brown bread, which you relish so well, comes from the corn sown and reaped by the peasant; his thick wine, so refreshing and wholesome, is produced from his own vine; his tablecloth is made of his own flax, spun in the winter by his wife and children: no other hands than those of his family have been employed in providing for his table; the nearest mill, and the next market town, are to him the extremities of the universe. What then have you really enjoyed of all that profusion, with which the most distant parts of the earth, and the complicated



cated industry of man, so splendidly furnished the table at which you lately dined? If that splendour did not add to the satisfaction of your repast, what did you gain by all that superfluity? What did you find there made for you? Had you even been the master of the house, might he add, the magnificence would be still less, with any propriety, to be called your's: for your sollicitude to display the wealth and plenty you enjoyed, to others, would absolutely deprive you of such enjoyment: you only would have all the trouble, and your guests the pleasure."

This discourse may be very fine, but it would be of no use to Emilius; being above his comprehension, and, moreover, to dictate his reflexions is not our custom. Speak to him, therefore, in a more simple manner. Having made both the above experiments, say to him some fine morning—"Where shall we dine to day? round that mountain of plate that covered three fourths of the table, and the desert of artificial flowers and looking-glasses? among those women with their great hoop-petticoats, who treated you like a puppet, and wanted to make you talk what you did not understand? or shall we rather go to the village two leagues off, where the good people received us so joyfully, and gave us such excellent cream?" Emilius will not hesitate a moment to determine; for he is neither given to babbling, nor puffed up by vanity; besides this, he hates restraint, and has no relish for high-seasoned ragouts: but he is always ready to run  
about

about the fields, and loves fine fruit, fresh vegetables, good cream, and good people\*. There is no doubt, but the reflexion you want to inculcate, will suggest itself, during our excursion; and that our pupil will observe, that the people who furnish out such grand entertainments, throw away their labour, or that they are quite ignorant of our enjoyments.

The examples, which I introduce by way of illustration, though proper for one subject, may be improper for a thousand others. If the reader enters into the spirit of them, however, he will see they may be varied as occasion requires; their application depending on the genius and disposition of the pupil; a knowledge of which is acquired by the opportunities given them to display themselves. It cannot be expected that in the space of three or four years, we should give a child, even of the most happy turn and disposition, such an idea of the arts and

\* The taste which I suppose my pupil to have for the country, is the natural effect of his education. Having, besides nothing of that foppish and affected air, which is so taking with the women, he is less caressed than other children; and of course less pleased with, and spoiled by, being in their company, the charms of which he is at present incapable to perceive. I have taken care in particular, not to learn him to kiss the hand; to repeat their ceremonious nonsense, or show them in preference to the other sex, even the respect which is their due. I lay it down as an inviolable rule to require nothing of him, of which he is not in a capacity to comprehend the reason: now no good reason can be given, why a child should treat one sex with more respect than another.

and sciences, as is sufficient to enable him to study them without further assistance. In thus bringing him acquainted, however, with the various objects requisite for him to know, we put him in a situation to display his genius and taste by degrees, to make the first advances to their proper objects, and to indicate the route which must be taken to second the designs of nature.

Another advantage arising from our thus giving him a just, but limited, series of ideas, is that of showing him their proper relations and connexion, of placing every thing in a due order in his estimation, and of preventing the rise of those prepossessions which most men entertain, in favour of the talents they cultivate, and to the prejudice of such as they have neglected. He, who perceives the order of the whole, sees the due place of every part; and, though a man who knows only a part, if intimately acquainted with it, may be stiled a man of knowledge, the other only, is the man of judgement; and it is to be remembered that the great object in view, in our method of education, is judgement, and not science.

However this be, my method is independent of the examples I make use of to illustrate it. It is founded on the progress of the human faculties at different periods, and on the choice of those proper objects on which such faculties should be employed. I conceive it will be very easy to find another method which will promise better;

better; but if, it be less adapted to our species, age and sex, I doubt much if it will be attended with the same success.

In the commencement of this second period of childhood, we took the advantage of our abilities exceeding our wants, to extend our views beyond our own persons: we soared into the expanse of the heavens, took measure of the earth, deduced the laws of nature; in a word, we have explored our whole island: let us now, therefore, return home to our more immediate habitation; happy to find at our entrance, that no enemy hath taken possession, or threatens to wrest it from us by force!

What remains for us to do after observing every thing that surrounds us? To make use of every thing we can appropriate, and to employ our curiosity to our advantage. Hitherto we have made a provision of tools and implements, of every kind, without knowing to what uses we shall have occasion to put them. Perhaps, useless to ourselves, they might yet be of service to others; and perhaps we in our turn, may have need of their's: Hence we should all find our account in making an exchange. In order to do this, however, it is necessary to learn our reciprocal wants, every one should know what the other possesses that might be of use to himself, and what he might be willing to accept in return. Let us suppose, for instance, ten men, each of whom stands in need of ten different things.



things. If they go about separately to supply their wants, each must apply himself to ten different kinds of occupation; but, on account of their different turn and genius, some will succeed better at one occupation, and others at another: thus though collectively they might succeed equally in all; yet, each attempting it separately, they are every one but ill served. Let us form a little society, therefore, of these ten individuals, and let each apply himself, solely, to that kind of occupation at which he is most expert; by this expedient each will profit as much by the talents of the rest as if he had possessed them all. By continued application, also, to one kind of employment, they would all acquire additional dexterity, and thus would not only be completely provided for themselves, but soon acquire a superfluity for the use of others. This is the apparent principle on which are founded our various mechanical and other institutions. It is not my business to examine here into the consequences; I have already done it in another treatise.

On this principle, a man who should be desirous to consider himself as a solitary and independent being, could not fail of being miserable. It would be even impossible for him to subsist; for, finding the earth already occupied and divided into *meum* and *tuum*, and having no implements or property, by what means would he provide himself with the necessaries of life? In departing, ourselves, from a state of nature,

we oblige all our fellow creatures to do the like; no one can remain therein, in spite of the rest; and it would be to act most preposterously against nature to be obstinately tenacious of a situation, in which it is impossible we should exist: for the first law of nature is that of self-preservation. Thus may we form, by degrees, in the mind of a child, ideas of social relations, even before he really becomes an active member of society. Emilius sees already, that, to acquire implements for his own use, he must possess some for the use of others, which he may exchange for those he stands in need of: thus I lead him easily to perceive the necessity of this commercial intercourse, and prepare him, when occasion offers, to turn it to his advantage.

“*Sir, I must live,*” was the saying of a wretched libeller to a minister of state, who reproached him with the infamy of his profession. “*I cannot see the necessity of it,*” replied the minister very coldly. This reply, excellent as it was from a secretary of state, had been unjust and inhuman from any other person. Every man must live. This argument, which, every one thinks more or less cogent, in proportion to his humanity, appears to me unanswerable, with respect to the person who urges it. Of all natural antipathies, our aversion to die is the strongest; it follows, therefore, that necessity has no law, and that nature authorises a man, who hath no other possible means of living, to take any step for his preservation. The principles, on which  
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a virtuous man acquires a contempt for life, and learns to sacrifice his existence to his duty, are very different from this primitive simplicity. Happy people, among whom goodness requires no self-denial, and men may be just without virtue! If there be so miserable a state in the world, as that wherein men cannot subsist without injustice, and whose citizens must of necessity be knaves, it is not their criminals who ought to be hanged, but those who made them such.

As soon as Emilius knows what life is, my first care shall be to teach him to preserve it. Hitherto I have made no distinction of situation, rank, or fortune, nor shall I distinguish them otherwise in the sequel; for man is the same in every rank and situation. The rich have not better appetites than the poor, nor quicker digestion: The master has no longer arms or stronger than the servant: a great man is no taller than the meanest artisan; in a word, our natural wants being the same in every situation of life, the means of providing for them ought to be in all the same. Adapt the education of a man to his personal and not accidental abilities. Don't you see that by bringing him up only to fill one station in life, you make him unfit for every other? and that mere accident may render all the pains you have taken useless, or destructive to him? Is there a more ridiculous being on earth than a lord, become a beggar, and retaining in his misery the prejudices attached

to his birth? What is more vile and contemptible than a rich man become poor, sensible of the disgrace of poverty, and reduced to the lowest of the human species? The one hath no other resource than to turn common cheat, and the other servilely to put on a livery, with this fine phrase in their mouths; *we must live.*

You make a dependance on the actual order of society, without thinking that order subject to unavoidable revolutions, and that it is impossible to foresee or prevent that which may affect your children. The high may be reduced low, and the rich may become poor, and even the monarch dwindle into a subject. Are these changes of fortune so unfrequent, that you can flatter yourself that your pupil will be exempt from them? We certainly are approaching the crisis of human establishments, the age of political revolutions\*. Who can assure you what will be your lot? All that men have made, they may destroy. There are no characters indelible but those imprinted by nature, and nature never made man royal, noble, or rich. What then will become of the pupil you have educated to live only with splendour, when debased

\* I hold it impossible, that the great monarchies of Europe can subsist much longer; they all affect magnificence and splendour. Every state that doth this, is upon its decline. I could give very particular and cogent reasons for this assertion; but it may not be proper; and indeed they are but too obvious.



debased into indigence and meanness? What will become of a farmer of the revenues, whose soul delights in nothing but wealth, when he is reduced to want and beggary? How miserable must be the situation of that pampered helpless being, who, destitute of every thing, is incapable of providing in the least for himself, and places all his satisfaction in things dependent on others? Happy is he who knows how to quit a rank that is quitting him, and to remain still a man in spite of fortune. Let others lavish what encomiums they please on the frantick behaviour of the vanquished monarch, who wanted to bury himself alive in the ruins of his throne; for my part, I hold him in contempt. It appears to me that his existence depended on his crown, and that had he not been a king, he would have been nothing at all: But the monarch who can throw aside the robes of royalty and be still himself, is, in my opinion, infinitely superior to a crown. From the rank of a king, which may be filled up by a coward, a knave, or a fool, he rises to that of a man, which so few are able to fill with decency and dignity. Such a man may brave the vicissitudes of fortune, and will triumph over them: He owes nothing to any one but himself, and though destitute of all adventurous substance, is not therefore annihilated; he is still something. Yes! I prefer infinitely the character of a king of Syracuse turned schoolmaster at Corinth, of a king of Macedon become a notary at Rome, to that of an unhap-

py Tarquin, ignorant how to subsist without a kingdom; of an heir to a race of kings, become the sport of all who are brutal enough to exult in his misery, wandering from court to court, in search of relief, and meeting on every side with nothing but insult, mockery, and affronts; and all for want of knowing how to exercise any employment different from that to which he has been educated, and which is no longer in his power.

Whether we consider ourselves as men or citizens, or whatever be our station in life, we can contribute nothing more than our own personal abilities to society; all our other acquisitions belong to it, in spite of ourselves; hence, when a man becomes rich he must either not enjoy his wealth himself, or the publick will enjoy it also. In the first case he only robs others of what he also deprives himself; and even in the last he gives them nothing. Thus the debt he owes society remains undischarged so long as he pays it only with the use of his property. But, you will say, perhaps, my progenitor, in amassing his wealth, was of publick service. He might be so, and therefore, may have discharged his own debt, but not your's. Nay, you lie under still greater obligations than if you had been born poor, as you have had greater opportunities of profiting by education. It is not equitable that what one man hath done for the publick should discharge another of what it has a right to expect from him: for every one, stand-  
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ing indebted, in himself to society, cannot substitute any thing in the room of his personal service. A father cannot transmit to his son the right of being useless to his fellow-creatures; and yet, according to your notions, he actually does this, by transmitting to him his wealth, the proof and reward of his labour. The man who earns not his subsistence, but eats the bread of idleness, is no better than a thief; and a pensioner, who is paid by the state for doing nothing, differs little, according to my notion of things, from a robber who is supported by the plunder he makes on the highway. Man, in a state of solitude, not being indebted to the assistance or good offices of others, hath a right to live as he pleases: but in a state of society, where he must be necessarily maintained at the expence of the community, he certainly owes the state so much labour as will pay for his subsistence; and this without exception to rank or persons. To labour, then, is the indispensable duty of social or political man. Rich or poor, strong or weak, every idle citizen is a knave.

Now of all the occupations, which serve to furnish subsistence to mankind, those which approach nearest to a state of nature are the manual arts: of all conditions of life, the most independent of fortune or the caprices of mankind, is that of the artisan. The artisan depends only on his own labour; he is as free as the husbandman is a slave; for the latter de-

pend on the produce of his fields, which lie at the discretion of others. The enemy, the sovereign, a powerful neighbour, a law-suit, may run away with the crop which he hath laboriously toiled for: he may be distressed a thousand ways by means of the local stability of his property; whereas, if an artisan be oppressed in one place, his baggage is easily packed up, he folds his arms about him, and disdainfully marches off to another. Agriculture is, nevertheless, the principal profession of mankind; it is the most honest, the most useful, and of course the most creditable in the world. I have no need to bid Emilius apply himself to agriculture: it is already his study: every kind of rustick employment is familiar to him. His first application was to the labours of the husbandman, and it is in those he regularly exercises himself. I say to him, therefore, cultivate the land thou inheritest from thy fathers. But it may be said, suppose this were to be lost, or that a child had no paternal inheritance, what must he do then? Learn a trade.

“ My child learn a trade! make my son a mechanick! Consider, Sir, what you advise”—  
“ I do, Madam, I consider this matter better than you, who would reduce your child to the necessity of being a lord, a marquis, or a prince, or perhaps one day or other to be less than nothing. I am desirous of investing him with a title that cannot be taken from him, that will in all times and places command respect; and, I  
can



can tell you, whatever you may think of it, he will have fewer equals in this rank than in that he may derive from you."

The letter destroys and the spirit maketh alive. I would not have him learn a trade, merely for the sake of knowing how to exercise it, but that he may overcome the prejudices usually conceived against it. You will never be reduced, you say, to work for your bread. So much the worse for you; I say, so much the worse. But, no matter; if you labour not through necessity, do it for reputation. Stoop to the situation of an artisan that you may raise yourself above your own. To make fortune subservient to your will, you must begin by rendering yourself independent. To triumph in the opinion of the world, you must begin by despising that opinion.

Remember, I do not advise you to acquire a talent, but a trade, a mechanical art, in the exercise of which the hands are more employed than the head; an art by which you will never get a fortune, but may be enabled to live without one. I have often observed, and that in families far enough removed from all appearance of wanting bread, a provident father very anxious to furnish his children with various kinds of knowledge, that, at all events, they might be capacitated to earn a subsistence. In doing this, also, such parents conceived they did a great deal in the way of making provision for their offspring, in case of the worst accidents. In

this, however, they did nothing; because the resources with which they thus provided their children, depend on the same good fortune, of which they wanted to render them independent. So that a man possessed of the finest talents, unless he find himself in favourable circumstances to display them, is as liable to perish for want, as he that hath none.

Ever since the intrigues of party have been in fashion, it requires as much art and assiduity to live genteelly by a liberal profession, as to regain the estate you may have lost. If you have cultivated those arts, whose success depends on the reputation of the artist; if you have fitted yourself for such employments as are in the gift of the great; of what use to you will be all your acquirements, when, disgusted with the world, you disdain to make use of those means, without which it is impossible you should succeed? Let us suppose you may have studied politicks, and made yourself perfectly acquainted with the interests of princes: all this is very well; but what will you do with your knowledge, if you know not how to get access to ministers of state, have no patroness in a woman of quality, no interest with the commissioners of the several departments of the finances; if you have not the art of making yourself agreeable to them, or the baseness to do all the dirty business in which they might find you employment? But you are an architect or painter, we will say. It is very well; they are noble

arts: but you must make your abilities known to the publick. Do you think to carry your point merely by exposing your designs at an exhibition? No, no, this will not do. You must be previously admitted into the academy; you must be honoured by the protection of the great: you must throw aside your pencil and rule, take coach, and drive about from house to house, to make interest for reputation in your profession. At the same time you are to observe, that the houses you are to visit have all Swifts or other porters, who understand nothing but facts, and have the gift of hearing only in their hands. Are you desirous of teaching any of the arts and sciences you have learned; to become a teacher of geography, of the mathematicks, of languages, of musick, or design? To do this you must find scholars, and of course advocates and puffers. It is of more consequence to be acquainted with the arts of quackery and imposition, than to excel in your profession; and you may depend on it, if you know nothing but what you profess, you will ever be treated as a blockhead.

Thus you see how unserviceable will be all those fine accomplishments on which you depend, and how much you stand in need of others to profit by these. What then must become of you in this humiliating state of depression? The rebuffs you meet with will debase without instructing you; subject more than ever to the caprice of publick prejudice, how will you raise

yourself above it, when it is become the arbiter of your fortune? How will you be able to despise that meanness and vice which are necessary to your subsistence? You would depend on the encouragement of wealth, and would soon become dependent on the persons of the rich; you would have only added mortification to servility, and loaded yourself with misery. Thus would you behold yourself poor without being free; the most wretched and contemptible state into which it is possible to fall.

But if, instead of recurring to these sublime professions, which are rather calculated to nourish the mind than the body, you apply yourself, when occasion requires, to the use of your hands, all these difficulties will disappear; the arts of servility are needless; your resources are at hand the moment you want to profit by them: probity and honour are no obstacles to your subsistence; you have no need to fear or flatter the great, to creep or cringe to knaves, to be complaisant to the world, or to be either a borrower or a thief, which is much the same thing when a man sees no prospect of paying what he borrows. The opinion of others will not affect you; you will be under no necessity of paying your court to any one, you will have no ideot to humour, or Swifts to soothe, no courtesan to bribe, nor what is worse, to flatter. Let knaves jostle each other, and thrust themselves into preferment; it is nothing to you: this will not hinder you, in your obscure situation,



situation; from being an honest man, or gaining a livelihood. You have only to go into the first shop of the trade you have learned, and desire employment, and it will be readily given you. Before noon you will have earned your dinner; and, if you are sober and industrious, before the week is out you will have earned enough to subsist on a fortnight; thus may you live free, healthy, sincere, diligent, and honest: a man's time is not thrown away in learning to make this provision.

I am determined, therefore, that Emilius shall learn a trade. "A creditable one, to be sure!" you will say. I should like to know the meaning of that word. Is not every employment creditable that is useful? I would not have him learn to be an embroiderer, a gilder, or varnisher, like the fine gentleman of Mr. Locke. I would have him neither a fiddler, a player, nor a pamphleteer. Except these professions, and a few of a similar nature, he might take his choice of all others; I would confine him to nothing. I had much rather he should be a cobbler than a poet; that he should learn to pave the highway, than enamel or paint the flowers on China. But, you will say, spies, bailiffs followers, and even hangmen are useful people in their way. That they are so is the fault of government, which might render them useless: but to give up this point: I was indeed mistaken; it is not enough to fix on a trade useful to society; it should be such a one as doth  
not

not require those who exercise it to be possessed of those detestable qualities of mind, which are incompatible with humanity. We will recur, therefore, to the term you made use of, and choose a creditable employment, always remembering, however, that nothing should be called creditable that is not at the same time useful.

A celebrated modern authour, whose books are full of extensive projects and confined views, made the vows of chastity, like other priests of his communion, and had, therefore, no wife of his own. Being a little more scrupulous, also, in having to do with the wives of others than many of his profession, it is said, he chose to have pretty servant-maids, with whose assistance he endeavoured to repair, as well as possible, the wrong he had done his species by entering into such rash engagements. He looked upon it as a duty incumbent on a citizen, to provide children for the state, and with the tribute he paid of this kind, he peopled the class of artisans. As soon as his children were arrived at a proper age, he put them all to some profession agreeable to their inclinations; excepting against those only which were idle, frivolous, or subject to the fashion; such, for example, as is that of a peruke-maker, which is not at all necessary, and may some time or other become useless: unless nature, indeed, should take it into her head not to furnish our heads with hair.

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By these views, should we be conducted in choosing a trade for Emilius; or, rather, we ought to leave that choice entirely to him; as, the maxims he hath already imbibed, giving him a natural contempt for things that are useless, he will never think of throwing away his time in an unprofitable employment; and he judges of their being profitable by their real utility: he would choose a trade that might have been of use to Robinson Crusoe in his desert island.

By giving a child a successive view of the various productions of nature and art, by exciting his curiosity, and tracing its tendency, we may be enabled to study his taste, inclinations, and propensities; to discover the first spark of his genius, if he have one of any particular turn. But it is a common error, which you ought carefully to avoid, that of attributing to the warmth of genius the mere effect of opportunity, and to construe into an inclination for a particular art, that spirit of imitation which is as common to the ape as to the human species, and leads him mechanically to do what he sees done by others, without very well knowing to what purpose. The world is full of artisans, and particularly of artists, who have no natural talents for the arts they profess, to which they have been trained from their infancy, either from motives of convenience, or from some apparent zeal which had operated as well in favour of any other art, had the same opportunities offered of seeing it exercised. One  
youth

youth hears the beat of a drum, and conceives himself born to be a general; another sees the masons at work, and immediately forms the design of being an architect. Every one is tempted to make choice of that profession which offers itself, and appears to be held in esteem.

I knew an instance in a foot-boy, who, from seeing his master design and paint pictures, took it in his head to be a limner and history painter. From the moment he formed this resolution, he took up the crayon, which he laid down only to assume the pencil, and this he will never quit while he lives. Without rules, without instructions, he set himself down to design every thing that fell in his way. Three whole years did he sit poring over his wretched daubings, getting nothing but his labour for his pains, and yet without being disgusted at the little progress his mediocrity of talents permitted him to make. I remember to have seen him, for six months together in a very hot summer, sitting, or rather nailed to his chair, in a little antechamber open to the south, before a globe, of which he was attempting to draw the figure on canvass; beginning, rubbing out, and beginning again with the most invincible obstinacy, till at last he hit off the rotundity of the sphere to his satisfaction.

By the directions of an artist and the patronage of his master, he at length so far succeeded as to throw off his livery, and live by the pencil. Perseverance supplied his want of talents .



talents to a certain degree; having attained this, he could never go farther. The spirit of emulation and resolution of this honest lad are commendable: he will be ever esteemed for his assiduity, fidelity, and good behaviour; but he will never rise in his profession higher than to the merit of a sign-painter. Who is there that has not been misled by his inclinations, and mistaken them for real abilities? There is a considerable difference between being pleased with any occupation, and being capable of it. It requires much nicer observation than is generally imagined, to ascertain the taste and genius of children; their casual inclinations display themselves oftener than their innate dispositions, and we judge from the first, for want of knowing how to study the last. I wish some judicious hand would give us a treatise on the art of studying children—an art of the greatest importance to be acquainted with, though fathers and preceptors know not as yet even its simple elements.

But, perhaps we here make the choice of our employment of too great consequence. As it relates only to some handicraft business, Emilius need not hesitate, he hath already served half his apprenticeship in the exercises to which he has been accustomed. He is ready to turn his hand to whatever you may require of him: he knows how to handle the spade and the hoe, to make use of the mallet, the plane, and the file; the tools of all kinds of workmen are familiar to him. All that he needs further, is,  
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to acquire the same dexterity and facility, in the use of them, as a good artist in that peculiar branch to which he may apply. To this end, also, he hath a great advantage above most other children; in the agility of his body and the suppleness of his limbs, by means of which he can throw himself into any attitude, and continue any kind of exercise for a long time without tiring. Add to this, that his senses are acute and experienced; and all the mechanism of the arts already known to him. To turn the work out of his hands like a master, he requires nothing but practice; and practice is to be gained only by time. All that we have to do, therefore, is to determine what kind of mechanick employment we shall bestow so much time on, as to make ourselves expert in the exercise of it.

Let every man apply himself to one that is becoming his sex and age. A close and sedentary profession, which enervates the body, will neither please nor be proper for youth. No one ever yet naturally aspired to be a tailor; artificial motives are required to induce our sex, for whom such business was never designed, to embrace so effeminate an employment\*. The sword and the needle are not made for the same hands. Were I a sovereign, I would permit none but women, or maimed and deformed persons, to follow any such kind of trade. On the

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\* There were no tailors among the ancients, the clothes of the men being made at home, by the women of the family.

supposition that eunuchs are necessary, I think the Turks very great fools for making them on purpose. Why do not they content themselves with such as are impotent by nature; selecting them from that herd of dispirited, cowardly mortals, whose mutilated hearts render them unfit for the more manly offices of life: society hath a use for all others. Every feeble, timid and delicate male, is condemned by his constitution to a sedentary life; he is formed to live among the females; or at least after their manner. Let such be early initiated into the mysteries of the tailor, the mantua-maker, and other professions of the like nature; and if it be absolutely necessary to have real eunuchs, let those only be made such, who dishonour their sex by their voluntary application to such unbecoming employments. Their very choice sufficiently indicates the error of nature; in correcting it therefore, either one way or the other, you can do no harm.

I prohibit my pupil following any unhealthy business, but not those which are laborious, or even dangerous. The latter exercise at once both his strength and his courage; they are proper for the men only; the women making no pretensions to them: how comes it then, the men are not ashamed to encroach on those properly exercised by the women?

*Luctantur paucae, comedunt colliphia paucae  
Vos lanam trahitis, calathisque peracta refertis  
Vallera\*.*

In

In Italy no women are to be seen serving in the shops, which gives the streets a very dull and heavy appearance to those who have been accustomed to the gay and lively figure they make in France and England. When I see your haberdashers and man-milliners, measuring out lace, ribbons, and gauze to the ladies, I cannot help thinking such elegant commodities appear very ridiculous in those clumsy fists, which would be with greater propriety employed in blowing a smith's bellows, or at the labours of the anvil. I should think that in such countries, the women ought by way of reprisals to turn sword-cutlers and gun-smiths. Let each sex manufacture and vend the arms peculiar to itself. To understand them well, it is requisite we should know how to employ them.

I would have a young man learn to exert a strong arm; to handle the axe and the saw; to square a piece of unhewn timber, to mount the roof of a house, to lay on the ridge, and to fit the joists and scantlings. Would it be more ridiculous in him, while thus employed, to call out to his sister to come and assist him in his labour, than for her to bid him sit down to her needle-work?

I perceive I have already said too much for my polite and delicate cotemporaries; but I sometimes permit myself to be hurried away by the force of my own arguments. Thus far however, is certain, that if any man whatever



be ashamed of being seen to handle a plane, or wear a leather apron in publick, he is only a slave to prejudice, one that would be ashamed of the most commendable actions, if they were ridiculed as unfashionable. We may give up nevertheless to the prepossessions of parents, whatever be not injurious to the understanding of the child. It is not necessary to exercise indiscriminately such professions as are useful, merely to do honour to them all; it is sufficient not to hold any one in less esteem than it deserves. When we are at liberty to make our choice, and have no other motives to determine us, why may we not consult our own inclination and convenience, in choosing among professions of the same rank? The manufacture of hard-ware is useful, perhaps the most useful of all others; and yet, without some particular reason for it, I should not make your son a brazier or a blacksmith; I should not like to see him, at the forge, resemble the figure of a Cyclops. Neither would I make him a mason or bricklayer, and still much less a shoe-maker. Somebody doubtless must be of those trades; but he who can make choice of which he pleases, ought to have some regard to cleanliness and neatness: these do not depend on caprice, but affect our senses. Add to this, I should not like any of those stupid professions, in the exercise of which the workmen need neither industry nor ingenuity; but like mere machines, employ their hands constantly in the same manner. Such  
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are cloth and stocking-weavers, stone sawyers, and the like. To what purpose should a man of any understanding be put to such trades; wherein the workman and his engine are only one machine moving another?

All things duely considered, the trade I should like best my pupil should have a taste for, is that of a joiner. This is neat, useful, and may be carried on within doors: it is sufficiently laborious to keep the body in exercise, and requires both diligence and dexterity: at the same time, taste and elegance are not excluded from being displayed on the form and contrivance of the work.

If it should so happen, indeed, that your pupil has a natural turn for the speculative sciences, I should not blame you for teaching him a mechanick art conformable to his inclinations; let him learn for example, to design and construct mathematical instruments, quadrants, telescopes, and the like.

When Emilius learns a trade, I also will learn it with him; for I am convinced he will never learn, as should be, what we do not learn together. We will, therefore, both serve an apprenticeship; not affecting to be treated as gentlemen, but as real apprentices, who are not trifling with a profession: Nay, why should we not be so in reality? Czar Peter worked as a common ship-carpenter in the yard, and served as a drummer in his own troops: do you think that prince was not your equal, at least,  
either

either in birth or merit? The reader will observe I do not ask Emilius this question, but put it to every one, of whatever rank he may happen to be.

Unfortunately we cannot spend all our time at the work-bench; as we not only apprentice ourselves to the profession of a joiner but to that of man; the latter of which is by much the most tedious and difficult to learn. What then shall we do? Shall we hire a master-joiner, for an hour in a day, as we do the dancing-master? No! That would not be making ourselves his apprentices, but his scholars; and our ambition is not so much to learn the trade, as to raise ourselves to the condition of a joiner. I am therefore of opinion that we should go once or twice a week, at least, and spend the whole day at his shop; that we should rise at his hour in the morning, that we should be at our work before him, that we should eat at his table, work according to his orders, and, after having had the honour of supping with the family, return, if we pleased, to sleep on our own hard mattrasses. Thus you see how we might learn several trades at once, and exercise ourselves with manual labour, without neglecting our other accomplishments.

Be simple in well-doing. Let us not encourage vanity by the means we are taking to destroy it. To take a pride in having overcome prejudice, is to submit to it. It is said, that from an ancient custom peculiar to the  
Ottoman

Ottoman race, the Grand Signor is obliged to practice some mechanical employment, and every one knows the superior merit of such workmanship: A prince can turn nothing out of his hands but a master-piece. These curious productions of his ingenuity he distributes about magnificently to the grandees of the court, and the work is paid for according to the quality of the workman. The real evil of this custom is not in the pretended imposition of it, against which some have so loudly exclaimed. This, on the contrary, is a benefit: for in thus obliging the bashaws and other petty tyrants of his empire to divide with him the spoils of the people, the prince is excused from doing it directly himself. This is a necessary relief to despotism, without which that horrible mode of government could not possibly subsist.

The real inconvenience of such a custom lies in the idea it gives the poor wretch of his princely merit. Like Midas, he sees every thing he touches changed into gold; but perceives not the long ears sprouting out and exposing the ass. To preserve Emilius from being exposed in the like manner, we shall not give him any such valuable talent; the price of his labour shall not depend on the workman but on the work. We shall never suffer him to judge of the merit of his workmanship, but by comparing it with that of the best artisans. Of any thing that is well executed, we may say to him, "*this is well made;*" but it will be wrong  
to



to add, "*who made it?*" And if he should ever himself add, with an air of triumph and satisfaction, "*it was I that made it,*" it will be requisite to answer coldly, "*whether you, or any body else, it is no matter; the work is very well done.*"

Let every careful and well-meaning mother guard against the impositions, to which she may be liable in respect to the improvement of her child. If her son pretends to much knowledge, let her distrust every thing he affects to know: if he has the misfortune to be rich, and to be educated at Paris, he is undone. So long as he is in the midst of able artists he will be possessed of all their talents; but, when he is at a distance from them, he will have none at all. At Paris, a man who is rich knows every thing: there is nobody ignorant there that is not poor. That capital is full of pretended connoisseurs, and superficial judges, of both sexes. I know but three honourable exceptions amongst the men, though there may be more. But I know not of one among the women, and I much doubt that there is really any. In general, a name is acquired in the arts as in the law; we may become artists, and judge of artists, as readily as take up a degree in the civil law, and become a magistrate.

If, therefore, it should ever become fashionable to be master of some mechanick art, your children would soon be expert at it, without taking the trouble to learn: They would pass masters of arts like the counsellors of Zurich.

I will admit of no mere ceremonies of this kind with Emilius; he shall make no appearances, but always possess the reality. He shall not talk of what he knows, but continue to improve himself in silence. He shall be always employed about a master-piece, without ever setting up for a master, and be known for a workman only by his labour, and not by what he professes.

If I have hitherto made myself understood, the reader will perceive that, while I have accustomed my pupil to corporeal exercise and manual labour, I have given him insensibly a taste for reflexion and meditation; in order to counterbalance that indolence which would be the natural result of his indifference for the opinions of mankind, and the tranquillity of his passions. It is necessary that he work like a peasant, and think like a philosopher, lest he become as idle as a savage. The great secret of education is, to make the exercises of the body and the mind serve as a relaxation to each other.

Let us beware, however, of anticipating those instructions which require a riper judgement. Emilius will not be long a workman before he becomes sensible in himself of that inequality of conditions which he at first barely perceived. Hence, proceeding on the maxims I have laid down, he will be disposed in turn, to examine me. In receiving every thing from me, and seeing himself so little removed from a state of poverty,

poverty, he will be curious to know wherefore I appear to be so rich. Taking me unprovided on this head, he may put some very knotty questions. "*You are rich (he might say) you have told me so, and I see it. But a rich man owes his labours to society in his quality as man; and of what publick utility are your's?*" What answer a polite tutor might make to such a question I know not. He might probably be ridiculous enough to talk to him of the nature and importance of his services in taking care of his education. As for me, the joiner's workshop affords me an apology: I might, therefore, put off the question thus: "*A very pertinent query, Emilius; and I promise to answer it, on my part, when you can make a satisfactory reply to it on your own. In the mean time, I shall take care to give my superfluity to you and the poor, and to make a table or a bench every week, that I may not be quite uselefs to the publick.*"

Thus are we returned again to ourselves. Behold my pupil, just ready to throw off a state of infancy, recur again to himself, and perceive more than ever that necessity he lies under to circumstances and things. After having set out with the exercise of his body and its organs, we proceeded to that of his genius and understanding, and have at length united the use of his limbs with that of his faculties. We have succeeded in the formation of an active, thinking being; to complete the man we have nothing more to do than to render him affectionate and

susceptible; that is to say to perfect his reason by sentiment. But, before we enter upon this new disposition of things, let us take a retrospect of that we are about to leave, and trace, as exactly as possibly, how far we have proceeded. Our pupil had at first only sensations, at present he has ideas; he once did nothing but perceive, he can now form a judgement of things. It is from the comparison made between several successive or simultaneous sensations, and the judgement formed thereon, that a kind of complex or mixed sensation arises, which I call an idea.

The peculiar manner in which we form ideas, is that which constitutes the genius and character of the mind. To form our ideas of things on their actual relations only, betokens a solid understanding; whereas, to be contented with their apparent relations, betrays a superficial one. To conceive these relations as they really exist, displays a right judgement; to conceive, mistaken notions of them, denotes a wrong one. Those who see imaginary relations, that have neither reality nor appearance, are madmen, while those who make no comparison between them are ideots. The less or greater aptitude to compare these ideas and discover such relation, is what constitutes a greater or less degree of genius and understanding.

Simple ideas are only the result of comparative sensations. A judgement is to be formed from simple as well as from complex sensations;



and this I call a simple idea. In judging of our sensations, the judgement is merely passive; it deduces only the perception of what is immediately perceived. But in the ideas arising from those sensations, the judgement is active; it collects, compares, and determines those relations which the senses could not. This is all the difference, but this is very considerable. Nature never deceives us; we are always deceived by ourselves.

A child, eight years old, hath some freezing milk set before him. He puts the spoon up to his mouth without knowing what it is, and no sooner doth the ice touch his lips than he cries out "*he is burnt.*" He feels a very acute sensation, and knowing none more sharp and painful than that of heat, he imagines that to be the cause. He is nevertheless mistaken; the sudden cold may hurt, but it does not burn him, nor are the sensations of heat and cold alike, those who are most accustomed to both never confounding them together. It is not the sensation, therefore, that deceives him, but the judgement he forms of it.

We are liable to the same kind of deception the first time we see a mirror, or make use of any optical machine; when we go into a vault in the depth of winter or in the height of summer; when we put a very warm or cold hand into water of a middle temperature; or when we hold a round ball between the finger and thumb of each hand held crosswise. Should we con-

tent ourselves, in any of these cases, with declaring simply what we perceive or feel, the judgement would be merely passive; but when we judge of the thing itself by its appearance, the judgement is active; it compares, and reasons on, those relations which are not perceived, and thence we become liable to deception. It is from experience only we learn to prevent, or correct such errors.

Show your pupil in the night the clouds passing over the moon, and he will at first think the moon moves the contrary way, and that the clouds stand still. He will conclude so from a precipitate induction, because he is more accustomed to see little objects move than great ones, and the clouds appear to him much bigger than the moon, of whose distance he cannot judge. When standing still in a ship in full sail, he views the shore at a small distance, he falls into a contrary error; the trees and houses on the beach appearing to move, because not perceiving his own motion he conceives the ship and the sea as one immoveable object, of which the less objects on shore are only a part.

The first time a child sees a stick plunged half-way into the water, he sees it broken; he is not deceived by his sensation, which is a true one, and would be so were we even ignorant of the cause of this phenomenon. If you ask him, therefore, what he sees, he will tell you a broken stick, and it is very true, for it is very certain such is the object of his perception. But, if de-

ceived by his judgment, he should go farther, and, after having affirmed that he sees a broken stick, maintain that what he sees is actually such, or that the stick so placed in the water is really broken, he would then maintain a falsehood. And why so? Because then his judgement becomes active, he judges not from immediate inspection, but rational deduction, in affirming what he does not perceive, viz. that the conception suggested by one sense would be confirmed by another.

All our mistakes thus arising from error in judgement, it is clear that, if we were under no necessity of judging, we should have no occasion to learn any thing; we should never be liable to be deceived, and should be much happier in our ignorance than we can be in our knowledge. We do not deny that the learned know a thousand things to be true, of which the ignorant will never know any thing. Are the learned, therefore, nearer the truth in general? Quite the contrary; the more they advance, the farther off they find themselves; because the vanity of judging of things making greater progress than our abilities to judge, we form an hundred erroneous conclusions for one that is just. Nothing is more evident than that the learned societies of Europe are publick schools of falsehood; and it is very certain that the academy of sciences have adopted more errors than are to be found among the whole nation of Hurons.

Since our errors thus increase with our knowledge, the only method to avoid error is to remain in ignorance. So long as you suspend your judgement, you will not be deceived. This lesson is inculcated by nature as well as authorised by reason. If we except a very few of those striking relations, which things immediately bear to ourselves we have naturally a very great indifference for all the rest. A savage will not step a foot out of his way to view the mechanism of the finest machine, or the most astonishing phenomenon of electricity. *What is it to me?* is a phrase the most familiar with the ignorant, and the most proper for the learned.

Unhappily, however, this phrase is now useless. Every thing is something to us, since we are become dependent on all things; and our curiosity necessarily extends with our desires. For this reason I attribute great curiosity to a philosopher, and none at all to a savage. The latter stands in need of nobody and the former of every one, and particularly of numerous admirers.

Will it be said that I here deviate from nature? I deny it. Natural maxims, it is true, are founded on necessity and not opinion; but our necessities vary with our situations. There is a great deal of difference between the natural man in a state of solitude, and the natural man in a state of society. Emilius is not a savage, destined to prowl in the woods, but to inhabit towns and cities. It is requisite for him, therefore,



fore, to know how to manage his fellow-citizens, and to live among, if not like, them.

Amidst the variety of connexions and dependencies of such a state, he will be under a necessity of forming various judgements concerning them: let us instruct him, therefore, to judge of them aright.

The best way to effect this, is that which tends to reduce our experience to bare matters of fact, and enables us even to proceed, though wanting such experience, without falling into error. Hence it follows that, after we have long accustomed ourselves to explain and confirm the evidence of one sense by another, we should further learn to verify the testimony of each sense by itself, without having recourse to the others; by which means every sensation will stand in the place of an idea, and that idea will be always conformable to truth. Such are the acquirements which I have pointed out for this third stage of human life.

This manner of proceeding, I own, requires a degree of patience and circumspection of which few tutors are capable; and without which the pupil will never learn to judge properly. If, for example, when the latter is deceived in the appearance of the broken stick, you are in haste to convince him of his error, by precipitately taking it out of the water, you may undeceive him, it is true; but what will you teach him by it? Nothing but what he would soon have as well learned of himself. This,

therefore, is not the thing you are to do. The point aimed at is less to teach him what is actually and particularly true, than to teach him how to discover the truth in general, or at any other time. To instruct him properly on this occasion, therefore, you should not undeceive him so soon. Let Emilius and his tutor serve for your example.

In the first place, I suppose that a child educated in the ordinary manner, on being asked, if the stick be broken, will readily answer in the affirmative. I very much doubt, however, if Emilius will be so ready to determine it. As he sees no necessity either to be or to appear knowing, he is in no haste to judge of the matter: his judgement of things is founded on evidence, and he who so well knows how liable we are to deception in the objects of sight, is very far from thinking the evidence in the present case sufficient. Add to this, that knowing from experience that the most frivolous questions I put to him have always some material object, though not immediately perceived, he is not used to reply carelessly and without thinking. On the contrary, he is suspicious and attentive, examining such questions very carefully before he ventures to answer them. Hence he never makes me a reply that he is not well satisfied with himself, and it is no easy matter to satisfy him in this particular. In a word, neither he nor I pique ourselves on knowing the truth of things, but only in not falling into error. We should be  
much

much more ashamed of sitting down satisfied with an insufficient reason for a thing, than of our incapacity to find any reason for it at all. "*I don't know*," is an answer so satisfactory to both, and which we repeat so often, that it now costs us nothing. But, whether such an absurd affirmative should escape, or he should avoid it by our convenient negative *I don't know*, my reply to him would be still the same; our way should be to look and examine.

The stick, half immersed in water, stands, we will suppose, in a vertical position: to know whether it be really broken as it appears, we have many things to do before we take it out of the water, or even touch it with the hand.

In the first place, we should move round the stick, and in so doing we should see the apparent fracture turn with us; the eye appearing to occasion the change; but it is well known our looks cannot alter the form of the stick.

Secondly, we should look down it from end to end, in which case we should not see it broken or crooked. But can our eye have reunited or straightened it?

Thirdly, I would give the water an undulating motion, when we should see the apparent fracture take different sides, the stick appearing to bend backwards and forwards with the motion of the water. Now can we think the motion given to the water sufficient to break, soften, or bend the stick?

Fourthly, we take and pour out the water; by doing which we see the stick become gradually whole and straight in proportion as the water decreases. Can any thing further be required, to explain the nature of this fact, and lead us to the discovery of the refraction? It is not true, therefore, that the sight deceives us; since we have no need to use any other sense, to rectify those errors we attribute to it.

But suppose a child so great a blockhead as not to perceive the result of these experiments; in such a case it will be proper to call in the touch to the assistance of the sight. Instead, however, of taking the stick out of the water, let it remain some time in the same situation, and let the child carry his hand down it from the top to the bottom, by doing which he will find there is no angle; the stick is not bent or broken.

You will tell me, perhaps, this is not simply forming a judgement of things, but reasoning on them in form. It is very true; but do not you see plainly, that as soon as we arrive at ideas, to form a judgement of any thing is to reason upon it?

The consciousness of a sensation is a proposition, an opinion; and as soon as we compare one sensation with another we reason. The arts of judging and of reasoning are one and the same.

Emilius can never learn dioptricks, if I cannot teach it him by means of this stick. He shall



shall not, to this end, dissect insects, or count the spots in the sun; he shall not even know the use of microscopes and telescopes. More polite and learned pupils may possibly laugh at his ignorance; for before he knows how to make use of these things, I purpose that he shall invent them; and this you doubt if he will compass so soon.

You see here the spirit that governs my system. If a child holding a little ball between the fingers cross-wise, imagines he holds two, I would not permit him to look, before he had otherwise convinced himself that he held but one.

These explanations I imagine will suffice to denote precisely the progress of my pupil's understanding, and the route he hath taken. But you are alarmed, perhaps, at the multitude of objects which have been presented him. You are afraid his understanding should be depressed or bewildered by such a variety of knowledge. On the contrary, however, I have taught him to be ignorant of many more things than he knows. I have opened for him a way to science, smooth and easy indeed, but long, extensive, and tedious. I have instructed him at his first setting out, that he might know the entrance; but I shall never permit him to go very far.

Obliged to learn of himself, he makes use of his own reason and not of that of others; for to give no influence to prepossession, no weight should be given to authority; and it is certain  
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that our errors arise less from ourselves than from others. From this continual exercise of the understanding will result a vigour of mind, like to that which is acquired by the body from constant labour and fatigue. Another advantage is, that we advance in knowledge only in proportion to our capacity of digesting it. The mind may be overloaded as well as the body. But when the understanding makes every thing perfectly clear and familiar, before it commits it to the memory, whatever it deduces thence afterwards is properly its own. Whereas in over-charging the mind with the remembrance of a heap of confused ideas, we expose ourselves to the inconvenience of never recollecting any thing that can properly be called our own.

Emilius has but little knowledge; but what he has is truly his own; he knows nothing by halves. Among the few things he knows and with which he is well acquainted, the most important is, that there are many things he is now ignorant of, which he may one day know; that there are many more which others know and he will never be acquainted with; and that there is an infinity of others which neither he nor any body else will ever know. He possesses an universal capacity, not in point of actual knowledge, but in the faculties of acquiring it; an open, intelligent genius, adapted to every thing, and, as Montaigne says, if not instructed, capable of receiving instruction. It is sufficient for me that he knows how to discover the  
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utility of his actions, and the reason for his opinions. Once again, I say, my object is not to furnish his mind with science, but to teach him the method of acquiring it when he has occasion for it; to instruct him how to hold it in estimation, and to inspire him, above all, with a love for truth. By this method, indeed, we make no great advances; but then we never take an useless step, nor are we obliged to turn back again.

Emilius is acquainted with no other science than that which is merely physical. He knows not even the name of history, nor what is meant by metaphysics and morality. He hath studied the essential relations between men and things, but no moral relations between man and man. He is ill qualified to generalise his ideas, or form abstract notions of things; contenting himself with observing the general qualities of certain bodies, without reasoning on those qualities themselves. He has a notion of abstract space, by the help of geometrical figures; and of abstract quantity, by means of the signs in algebra. Those figures and signs, however, are the support of those abstractions, on which he rests without seeking any farther. He does not endeavour to find out the essence of things, or what they are in their own nature; but only their relations, and particularly those in which he is interested. He holds nothing external in estimation, but from its relation to himself; but then the degree of this estimation

mation is very just and exact. The caprice of custom, or general agreement, stamp no value on any thing with him. He holds that in the highest estimation which is the most useful; and, never departing from this method of estimating the value of things, pays no regard to fancy or prepossession. Emilius is laborious, temperate, patient, resolute, and bold. His imagination never exaggerates danger; he is susceptible of few evils; and knows how to suffer with patience, because he has never learned to contend against destiny. With respect to death, he is hardly sensible what it is; but, accustomed to yield without resistance to necessity, when it is his lot to die, he will submit to his fate without murmur or complaint.

This is the utmost that our nature will permit in that dreadful moment. To live independent and unattached to life by human connexions, is the best way to learn to die.

In a word, Emilius is virtuous in every thing relating to himself. To possess the social virtues also, he only requires to be made acquainted with those relations that give rise to them; he only wants that information, which his mind is already formed to receive.

At present, he considers himself as entirely unconnected with others. He requires nothing of any one, and thinks no one hath a right to require any thing of him. He stands alone and independent in the midst of society. Indeed his pretensions to independency are better  
founded



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founded than those of any other; as he is in himself every thing man is capable of being, at his age. He lies under no errors but those which are inevitable; he has no vices but such as no mortal was ever free from. He hath an healthy constitution, agility of body, perspicuity of mind, and a dispassionate heart. Self-love, the first and most natural of all the passions, as yet hardly exerts itself. Without disturbing the repose of others, he has hitherto lived as content, happy, and free as was possible for his nature. Do you think a youth, thus arrived at his fifteenth year, hath misemployed the term of his infancy?

END OF THE THIRD BOOK.

BOOK

BOOK IV.

**H**OW rapid is our course upon this earth! The first quarter of our life is fled before we are sensible of its use; during the last, we are incapable of enjoyment. Three fourths of the intermediate space are consumed in sleep, labour, pain, constraint, and troubles of various kinds. Life is short because of the little time we have for enjoyment, rather than from the real brevity of its duration. To what purpose were it to remove the hour of death farther from that of our birth, since life will always be too short when the intermediate time is ill employed? Man, if I may use the expression, is born twice; first to exist, and then to live; once as to species, and again with regard to sex. Those who consider women as imperfect men, are certainly mistaken, though exterior resemblance favours the opinion. Till the age of puberty, there is little apparent difference between the sexes, in children; countenance, shape, complexion, tone of voice, are all nearly alike; girls are children, so are boys; the same denomination serves for both. Those males, in whom the progress of the sex is impeded, preserve this conformity all their lives; they are always great children;

children; and women, who never lose it, seem, in many respects, to be little more.

But man in general was not born to remain in a state of childhood; nature marks a time when he emerges from infancy, and this critical moment, though short, is attended with a long train of consequences.

As the roaring of the sea precedes the tempest, so the murmuring of the passions portends this stormy revolution. The foaming surge foretels the approach of danger. A change of disposition, frequent starts, and a continual agitation of mind, render the pupil intractable. He becomes deaf to the voice of his preceptor; like a lion in his fury, he disdains his guide, and will no longer submit to be governed.

These moral indications of a changing disposition are accompanied by a visible alteration in the person. His features assume a character; the thin soft down upon his chin begins to gather strength. His voice is lost between hoarseness and squeaking: for, being neither man nor boy, he has the tone of neither. His eyes, those organs of the mind hitherto inexpressive, learn to speak; animated with a lively flame, their looks, though more expressive, are yet pure and innocent; but they have lost their primitive dullness and insipidity. He already feels their power of expression, he learns to cast them down and blush. He perceives his sensibility before he knows what he feels; he is restless without knowing the cause of his disquietude.

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Perhaps these symptoms may steal on slowly, and leave you time to guard against the danger; but if his vivacity renders him too impatient; if his transports become unruly; if he is one moment exasperated and the next softened; if he sheds tears without cause; if his pulse beats high, and his eye reddens when he approaches certain objects, which grow dangerous to his repose; if he trembles at the touch of a female hand; if he is uneasy and intimidated in the fair one's presence; Ulysses, O sage Ulysses! beware! those passages which you endeavoured, with so much care, to close, are still wide open. The winds are already let loose; quit the helm but a moment, and all is lost!

Here commences the second birth I was speaking of; at this age man is truly born to live, and enters into full possession of the powers of human nature. Our care hitherto has been little more than children's play: it now becomes of real importance. This æra, where common education ends, is properly the time where our's should begin; but, in order to convey a proper idea of our plan, it will be necessary to take a retrospective view of a more early period.

Our passions are the principal instruments of our preservation; therefore, to endeavour to destroy them is equally vain and absurd; it is to find fault with nature, to attempt to reform the works of God. Should the almighty require man to annihilate those passions which he had given him, he would not know his own mind,



mind, he would not contradict himself; but the Almighty never gave such a ridiculous command; and the heart of man has received no such injunction; and whatever is required of him, is not made known to him by the mouth of another; God himself imprints it on his heart.

To suppress the passions, in my opinion, is almost as absurd as intirely to destroy them; whoever imagines this to have been my intention, has grossly mistaken my meaning.

But because it is in the nature of man to have passions, is it therefore rational to conclude, that all the passions which we feel within ourselves, and which we perceive in others, are natural? Their source indeed is natural, but that source is increased by a thousand adventitious streams; it is a great river continually augmenting, in which it would be very difficult to find one drop of the original spring. Our natural passions are extremely limited; they are, however, the instruments of our liberty, and tend to our preservation. Such passions as are prejudicial, and by which our reason is subdued, spring from some other source; nature does not give them to us, we adopt them to the prejudice of nature.

The source of our passions, the origin and chief of every other, that which alone is born with man, and never leaves him while he lives, is SELF-LOVE: this is the original passion, prior to every other, and of which, in one sense, all the rest are only modifications. In this sense  
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they may be considered as natural. The greater part of these modifications proceed from adventitious causes, without which they would not exist; but these modifications are of no advantage to us; on the contrary, they are extremely detrimental; they change and counteract their first and principal object: in this case men become unnatural, and act in contradiction to themselves.

True self-love is always right, and always consistent. Every individual being especially charged with his own preservation, his first, and greatest anxiety is, and ought to be, to watch over it continually; and how can he do this if he does not make it his principal concern?

We must therefore love ourselves for own preservation; consequently we love that which contributes towards it. Children are particularly attached to their nurses. Thus Romulus ought to have been attached to the wolf that gave him suck; for this attachment is at first merely physical. Whatever contributes to the welfare of an individual engages his affection, whatever is likely to destroy it he will repel. This is merely instinct; but what transforms instinct into sentiment, attachment into love, aversion into hatred, is a manifest intention either to injure or to serve us. We are not indeed over-solicitous concerning those inanimate beings, which are only capable of acting as they are influenced by others: but those from whose disposition

fiction and will we may expect good or evil, those in whom we perceive a power to serve us, inspire the same sentiments in us, with regard to themselves which they discover towards us. We seek those who are able to be of use to us, but we love those who are actually willing to be so : we fly from those who have the power to injure us, but those who seem disposed to offend us we hate.

The first sentiment of a child is to love himself, and the second, which may be deduced from the former, is to love those who are employed about him ; for in his present helpless state his knowledge of persons is founded on the assistance which he receives from them. His attachment to his nurse or his governess is merely habitual. He looks for them because they are necessary, and he finds them convenient ; but this is rather acquaintance than affection. It requires a much longer time to make him sensible that they are not only useful, but desirous of serving him ; as he grows sensible of this, he begins to love them.

A child, therefore, is naturally inclined to benevolence because he sees every body round him ready to give him assistance ; and from this constant observation he learns to think favourably of his species ; but in proportion as he extends his connexions, his necessities, his active and passive dependencies, the idea of his relation to others, awakens and produces sentiments of duty and preference. The child then becomes imperious, jealous, and vindictive. If you educate him to be submissive and obedient, not perceiving the use  
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of your commands, he attributes them to a capricious design to torment him, and becomes mutinous. If, on the contrary, you generally comply with his humours, as soon as ever he meets with opposition he conceives a species of rebellion in every intention to oppose him, and revenges himself even upon the chairs and tables for disobeying his commands. Self-love, which regards our own personal good only, is contented when our real wants are supplied; but self-interest, or that self-love which stands in competition with the good of others, cannot possibly be contented, because as it prefers ourselves to others, it expects that others should likewise give us the preference; which is impossible. Thus we see how the soft and affectionate passions arise from self-love, and the hateful and irascible ones from self-interest. That which renders man essentially good, is to have few wants, and seldom to compare himself with others; that which renders him essentially wicked, is to have many wants, and to be frequently governed by opinion. Upon this principle it is easy to perceive, that all the passions of men or children may be so directed, as to produce good or evil. True it is, as we cannot always live in solitude, it will be difficult for us to continue uniformly good: this difficulty must necessarily increase in proportion to our connexions; and therefore the dangers of society render our care more indispensable, to prevent in the human heart



heart the depravation which proceeds from increasing necessities.

The proper study of man is that of his connexions and dependencies. During his mere physical existence, he should study only his relation to things. This is the employment of his infancy; when he begins to be sensible of his moral existence, his relation to mankind should then be the object of his contemplation; this is the proper employment of his whole life, beginning at the period to which we are now arrived.

As soon as man has need of a companion, he is no longer an unsocial being: his heart is no longer single. All his connexions with his species, all the affections of his soul are born with this sensation. His first passion soon ferments the other into being.

The peculiar tendency of instinct is indeterminate. One sex attracts the other; so far it is the operation of nature. Choice, preference, personal attachment; these are the produce of knowledge, prejudice, and custom. Time and experience are necessary to render us capable of affection: we love only after having judged, and there can be no preference without comparison. This judgement is formed unknown to ourselves, nevertheless it is real. True love, let men say what they please, will always be honoured by mankind; for, however its extravagance may lead us astray, though it does not exclude every vicious quality from the heart, it supposes some

estimable ones, without which it could not exist. That choice which we put in competition with reason is, in fact, the effect of reason. We have made love blind, because he has better eyes than ourselves, and sees things which to us are imperceptible. To one who has no idea of merit and beauty, every woman must be alike, and the first he beholds will be the most amiable. Love is so far from being the child of nature, that he restrains and regulates her inclinations: under his influence, if we except the beloved object, each sex becomes indifferent to the other. The preference which we bestow we expect should be returned; love ought to be reciprocal. In order to be beloved we must render ourselves amiable; to be preferred we must render ourselves more amiable than another, more amiable than every other person; at least in the eyes of the beloved object. Hence we first regard our fellow-creatures, hence we first compare them with ourselves, and hence proceeds emulation, rivalry, and jealousy. A heart overflowing with a new sensation, is glad to diffuse itself to its utmost extent; the want of a mistress soon produces the want of a friend; having experienced the pleasure of being beloved, we wish to be beloved by all the world, and this universal desire of preference must necessarily be productive of much discontent.

From the love of friendships proceed dissensions, envy, and hatred. On the foundation of these various passions, I see opinion erect  
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its immoveable throne; and senseless mortals, submitting to its empire, found their own existence on the judgement of each other.

Extend these ideas, and we shall see whence self-interest acquires that form which we suppose to be natural, and how self-love, ceasing to be a natural sentiment, becomes pride in great souls, in little souls vanity, and in all, is continually cherished at the expence of society. The seeds of these passions not having existence in the heart of an infant, they cannot grow spontaneously; we plant them there ourselves, and they never take root but by our own fault. In the heart of a youth, of a certain age, the case is very different; there they will take root in spite of us. It is time therefore to change our method.

Let us begin by making some important reflexions on that critical state of which we are now speaking. The step from childhood to the age of puberty is not so positively determined, as not to vary according to the temperament of individuals, and with regard to people according to climate. Every one knows the difference observable in this particular between the hot and cold countries, and it is generally allowed, that warm constitutions arrive at the age of maturity soonest; but we may be deceived as to the cause; and may frequently attribute to a physical, what ought to be ascribed to a moral source, which is one of the most common mistakes in the philosophy of the present age. The instructions of nature are late and tedious, those of man

are almost always premature. In the first case, the senses rouse the imagination, in the second the imagination awakens the senses, and gives them a too early activity, which cannot fail to enervate individuals, and in time the species. That the age of puberty in both sexes is always more forward in a polished and enlightened people, than amongst the ignorant and savage, is a more general and certain observation\*. Children have a singular sagacity in seeing, through the affectation of decorum, the vices which it is intended to conceal. The refined language which we are pleased to dictate, our lectures on decency, the mysterious veil formally held before their eyes, are so many spurs to their curiosity. It

\* In great towns, says M. de Buffon, and amongst people in affluence, children accustomed to eat plentifully and upon succulent food, arrive soon at maturity; in the country, and amongst poor people, their food being less nourishing, they require at least three years more.—Hist. Nat. T. iv. p. 238.

I admit the justice of the observation, but not of the cause assigned for it; for in countries where the inhabitants live extremely well, and eat a vast deal, as in the Valais, and even in some of the mountainous provinces of Italy, the age of puberty in both sexes comes as late as in great cities; where, to indulge their pride, they frequently eat sparingly. One is surprised to see, amidst these mountains, boys as robust as men, with female voices and beardless chins; and to find girls tall and perfectly formed, who have not the periodical distinction of their sex. This difference, I am of opinion, is owing to their simplicity of manners; the imagination remaining longer in tranquillity, is later before it ferments the blood, and accelerates the circulation.



It is evident from the effects, that by endeavouring to keep children in ignorance we really instruct them, and that, of all the instructions they receive, this makes the greatest impression.

Experience will inform you, how greatly this ridiculous method accelerates the work of nature, and ruins the constitution. It is one of the principal causes of mankind's degenerating in great towns. The young folks early exhausted continue diminutive, feeble, ill-made, and grow old instead of robust; like the vine which is compelled to bear fruit in the spring, and droops and dies before autumn.

One must have lived in the midst of rustick simplicity, to be able to form any judgement to what age a happy ignorance may prolong the innocence of children. It is a pleasing sight, to behold the two sexes engaged in the harmless sports of childhood, though in the bloom of youth and beauty; and evincing, even by their familiarity, the purity of their pleasures. When these amiable young people arrive at a proper age for marrying, the husband and wife, mutually sacrificing their first fruits, become dearer to each other. A race of healthy and robust children are the pledges of an unalterable union, and the happy consequence of their innocence in early life.

If the period when man becomes conscious of his sex, is as much determined by education as by nature; consequently this period may be accelerated or retarded: and if the body gains or

loses solidity, in proportion as this progress is forwarded or delayed; it follows that the longer it is retarded, the stronger we grow. I am now speaking of mere physical effects; we shall soon perceive that there are other consequences.

By these reflexions I am enabled to solve this question, so frequently the subject of debate: Whether it would be proper to gratify the curiosity of children betimes, or to put them off with some little piece of modest deceit? In my opinion both should be avoided. First, as we ourselves are the cause of this curiosity, we should endeavour to prevent it; and secondly, when there is no necessity for resolving their questions, you are not obliged to deceive them. You had much better impose silence, than answer a child with a lie: he will not be surprised at such a command, if he has been used to submit in matters of indifference. In short, if you choose to reply let your answer be plain, without mystery, and without embarrassment, and without a smile. There is much less danger in satisfying than in exciting the curiosity of children.

Let your answers be always concise, serious, and determined, without seeming to hesitate. It is needless to add, that they should be strictly true; one cannot teach children the danger of telling lies to men, without perceiving the greater danger of deceiving children. A single falsehood averred by the master to his pupil will for ever destroy the fruits of education.

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A total ignorance of certain things were, perhaps, the most to be wished; but they should learn betimes what it is impossible always to conceal from them. Either their curiosity should not be at all excited, or it should be satisfied before the time of danger. Your conduct with regard to your pupil greatly depends on his particular situation; the people by whom he is surrounded, and many other circumstances. It is of importance to leave nothing to chance; and if you are not positively certain that you can keep him ignorant of the difference of sex till the age of sixteen, be careful to let him know it before the age of ten.

I cannot approve of speaking to children in a language too refined, nor of palpable circumlocution, only to avoid calling things by their proper names. Virtuous innocence knows no disguise; but an imagination polluted by vice renders the ear delicate, and obliges us to a continual refinement of expression. Mere words can be of no consequence; lascivious ideas are what we should guard against.

Though modesty is natural to the human species, yet children have it not from nature. A sense of shame proceeds only from the knowledge of evil, and how can children who neither have, nor ought to have this knowledge, show its effects? To read them lectures on shame and decency, is to teach them that there are things shameful and immodest; it is inspiring them with a secret desire of knowing these things. Sooner

or later they arrive at this knowledge, and the first spark which catches the imagination, is sure to set the passions in a flame. Whoever blushes is already culpable; real innocence can never be ashamed.

Children, though they have not the same desires with men, are, like them, liable to that uncleanness which offends the senses, and for that reason may receive the same lessons concerning decency. Let us, in this respect, imitate nature, who placing the organs of secret pleasure and those of disgusting necessity, in the same parts of the body, suggests to us the same attention at different ages, first by one idea, and then by another; to man by the idea of modesty, and to children by that of cleanliness.

I see but one certain method of preserving the innocence of children; namely, that it be cherished and respected by those who surround them: otherwise the artifice and reserve with which they are treated will, sooner or later, infallibly be discovered. A smile, a glance, or a single gesture, is sufficient to discover to them all we intended to conceal, and effectually to betray our design of deceiving them. The delicacy of expression used by polite people in the presence of children, supposing a kind of knowledge which they should not have, is extremely injudicious; but, in conversing with them, if you pay a proper regard to their innocence, you will naturally use those terms which are most proper. There is a certain simplicity of expression which is suitable



ble and pleasing to innocence, and this I take to be the best method of diverting the dangerous curiosity of children. By speaking to them plainly of every thing, you leave them no room to suspect that there is any thing more to say. By uniting to indelicate words the disgusting ideas which they excite, you suppress the first fire of the imagination: you do not hinder them from pronouncing these words, and having these ideas but you extinguish, unknown to themselves, the desire of recollecting them. And what a world of embarrassment do you avoid by thus expressing your ideas without circumlocution or disguise!

“*How are children made?*” This, though an embarrassing question, may naturally be asked by a child, whose conduct and health, during his whole life, may possibly depend, in a great measure, on the answer. The shortest method which a mother can devise to extricate herself, without deceiving her son, is to impose silence: this might do well enough, if he had been, for some time, accustomed to it, in questions about indifferent things, and that he suspected no mystery from this new command. But a mother seldom stops here. “*This (says she) is the secret of married people; little boys should not be so curious.*” In this manner she may indeed extricate herself; but let me tell her, the little boy, piqued at the appearance of contempt in her reply, rests not a moment till he learns the secret of married people, and he will not long remain in ignorance.

Permit me to relate a very different answer which I remember to have heard given to the same question, and which struck me the more as it proceeded from a woman as modest in her discourse as in her behaviour, but who was wise enough, for the advantage of her son, and for the sake of virtue, to disregard the pleasantry of fools. It happened, a little while before, that the child had voided a small stone, which tore the passage; but the pain being over was soon forgotten. “*Mama* (says the boy) *How are children made?*”—“*Child* (replied the mother, without hesitation) *women make them in their water, as you did the stone, with such terrible pain that it sometimes costs them their lives.*”—Let fools laugh, and blockheads be offended; but let the wise recollect whether they have ever heard a more judicious and pertinent answer.

The idea of any thing mysterious is instantly absorbed in that of a natural necessity already known to the child. The accessory ideas of pain and death cast a veil of sadness over the imagination, and stifle curiosity: his thoughts centre, not upon the cause, but the consequence of child-birth. The infirmities of human nature, images of disgust and horror, such will naturally arise from the explanation of this answer, if he has any inclination to be further inquisitive. How can the inquietude of desire be produced by such a conversation? nevertheless we have not deviated from the truth, nor have we, instead of instructing, deceived our pupil. Your chil-

dren read, and thus acquire knowledge which otherwise they would not have obtained: if they study, the imagination catches fire even in the calm obscurity of the closet. If they mix with the world, they hear a strange jargon of words, they are struck with a variety of examples; and being perfectly persuaded that they are men, every thing which men do in their presence they will endeavour to imitate; it being natural for them to model their actions by those of other people, when other people's judgement serves them as a law. Servants, who are their dependents, and who consequently have an interest in pleasing them, will make their court at the expense of their morals. A foolish, flirting governess, in the presence of a child of four years old, will express herself in terms which the most impudent woman would be ashamed of before a boy of fifteen. She soon forgets the words she has uttered, but they have made a lasting impression upon the child. Loose conversation is the harbinger of immoral actions. A vicious foot-boy will debauch the principles of a child, and the secrets of the one become security for those of the other.

A child properly educated, according to his age, knows no attachments but those of custom; he loves his sister as he loves his playthings, and his friend as his dog. He does not perceive himself to be of any sex or any species; man and woman are equally unknown to him, and he applies nothing to himself which they either

say or do; he hardly sees or hears them; and pays no more regard to their discourse than to their example. He is not, by this method, led into an artificial error; it is the ignorance of nature. The time will come when the same nature will take care to instruct her pupil, and she will not, till then, enable him to profit by her instructions.

Such are my principles of education: a particular detail of rules is, at present, foreign to the subject, and the methods which I propose, with regard to other objects, may serve as examples in the present case.

If you mean to confine the growing passions within proper limits, prolong the time in which they are naturally displayed, that they may arrange themselves in due order. Thus you will do nothing more than suffer nature to dispose her own work. Your task would be easy if your pupil were alone; but every thing about him inflames his imagination. He is hurried away by the torrent of prejudice; in order to stop him, you must endeavour to carry him against the stream. The imagination should be governed by sentiment, and reason silence the voice of publick opinion. Sensibility is the source of all the passions, and their bias is determined by the imagination. Every being, who perceives his connexions, will naturally be affected when these connexions alter, and when he imagines, or thinks he imagines, others more suitable to his nature. The passions of finite beings,



beings, even of angels themselves, if they have any, are transformed into vices, by these errors of the imagination; for they must necessarily be acquainted with the nature of all beings before they can know what connexions are most suitable to their own.

All human wisdom, as far as it concerns the use of the passions, consists first, in perceiving the true relations of man, both with regard to the species and to the individual; and secondly, in regulating the different affections of the mind according to these relations.

But it may be asked, whether man has it in his power to regulate his affections according to this or that particular relation? Most certainly he has, if it be in his power to direct his imagination to any particular object, or to give it this or that particular turn. Beside, the present question does not so much regard man's power over himself, as what may possibly be done with our pupil, by a proper choice of the circumstances in which he is placed.

Whilst his sensibility is confined merely to himself, there can be nothing moral in his actions; it is only when he begins to extend to others that he acquires the perception and idea of good and evil, which constitutes him really man, and an integral part of his species; to this period therefore let us confine our observations. Possibly it may be attended with some difficulty, because we shall be obliged to reject the examples which are before our eyes, and go in  
search

search of others, where the faculties of the mind gradually display themselves in their natural order.

A child educated in the accomplishments of the polite world, who waits only for the power of putting in practice the premature instructions he has received, never mistakes the moment when that power begins. But, instead of waiting for that period, accelerates its progress; he knows what will be the object of his desires, long before they exist. Nature, when she makes him a man, has nothing more to teach him. He was a man in idea long before he became one in effect.

The real progress of nature is gradual and slow; the motion of the blood quickens; the spirits begin to ferment, and the constitution forms by slow and more certain degrees. The sagacious artist, who directs the machine, takes care that each part shall be perfect before it is put in motion; a long inquietude precedes our first desires, a long ignorance diverts them various ways, and we desire we know not what: the blood flows quick, the pulse beats high, and a super-abundance of life seems impatient to extend its limits. The eye acquires vivacity, and inquisitively explores all other beings; we begin to have an interest in those by whom we are surrounded; we begin to perceive that we were not made to live alone. Thus the heart begins to open to human affections, and becomes capable of attachment.

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The first sentiment of which a youth, carefully educated, is susceptible, is not love, but friendship. The first act of his youthful imagination is to inform him that there are beings similar to himself, and the species affects him before the sex. Another advantage arising from prolonging his innocence is, that it enables us, by means of his growing sensibility, to sow the first seeds of humanity in his heart; an advantage of infinite importance, because it is the only time of his life when this care will be attended with equal success.

I have always remarked, that young people, early corrupted, and addicted to debauchery, are inhuman and cruel; the heat of their constitution renders them impatient, vindictive, and impetuous: their imagination, engrossed by one particular object, rejects every other; they have neither tenderness nor pity, and would sacrifice father, mother, and all the world, to the most trifling gratification. On the contrary, a youth educated in simplicity and innocence, is inclined to the tender passions by the first impulse of nature. His sympathetick heart feels the sufferings of his fellow-creatures; it leaps with joy at the unexpected sight of a beloved companion, his arms fly open to embrace him with ardour, and his eyes overflow with gladness. He is sensible of shame for giving displeasure, of regret for having offended. If the natural warmth of his constitution renders him hasty and passionate, you will immediately perceive the extreme goodness

ness of his heart, in the effusion of his repentance; he weeps, he sighs over the wound he has given; he would gladly compensate with his own blood, that which he had shed; his anger subsides, and his pride is humbled in the sense of his fault. If he is offended, one single word of apology disarms him, though in the height of resentment; he pardons the faults of others as willingly as he makes a reparation for his own. Youth is not the age of revenge and hatred; on the contrary it is that of compassion, clemency, and generosity. I aver, and I fear no contradiction from experience, that a youth, not meanly bred, who has preserved his innocence to the age of twenty, is at that period the most generous, the best, the most affectionate, and the most amiable of mankind. “Strange doctrine! (cries the reader) I never heard of it before.”—Very possible: your philosophers, educated in the corrupt notions of a college, know nothing of the matter.

Man is rendered sociable by his weakness; it is our common misery which inclines our heart to humanity. Every attachment is a sign of insufficiency: if we stood in no need of assistance, we should hardly think of uniting ourselves to each other, so that human felicity, uncertain as it is, proceeds from our infirmities. A being absolutely happy, must be alone and independent: God only enjoys absolute happiness; but of that happiness who can have any idea? If an imperfect being could be supposed to have  
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an independent existence, what, according to our ideas, would be his enjoyment? In being alone he would be miserable. He who wants nothing will love nothing, and I cannot conceive that he who loves nothing can be happy.

Hence it follows, that our attachment to our fellow-creatures is rather owing to our sympathising with their pains than with their pleasures; for in the first we more evidently perceive the identity of our nature, and a security for their attachment to us. If our common necessities unite us from a principle of interest, our common miseries unite us by affection. The sight of a happy man is more apt to inspire envy than love: we readily accuse him of usurping a privilege to which he has no exclusive right, and our self-love suffers in the idea, that he has no need of our assistance. But who does not bemoan the unhappy sufferer? who would not release him from his misfortunes, if it cost no more than a wish? It is easier to imagine ourselves in the situation of the wretched than in that of the happy; because we perceive ourselves more nearly allied to the one than to the other. Compassion is a grateful sensation, because, though we sympathise with the sufferer, we secretly rejoice that his pains are not our own. Envy, on the contrary, is painful, because so far from sympathising in the happiness of others, we grudge them their enjoyments: the first seems to exempt us from the evil he suffers, and the latter to deprive us of the blessings he enjoys.

If

If you would encourage the first impulses of a growing sensibility in the heart of a young man, and incline his disposition towards virtue and benevolence, be careful not to sow the seeds of pride, vanity, and envy, by a false representation of human felicity; let him remain unacquainted with the pomp of courts, the magnificence of palaces, and the charms of publick entertainments; let him not appear in polite circles and brilliant assemblies. Give him not a superficial view of society, till he is able to make a proper estimate of its intrinsic value. To show him the world in general, before he knows something of man in particular, would be to corrupt instead of forming his mind; to deceive instead of instructing him.

Men are not naturally opulent, courtiers, nobles, or kings. We come into the world naked and poor; we are all subject to the miseries of life, to grief, necessity, and evils of various kinds: in short, we are all condemned to die. Such is the true picture of man. Let us therefore begin by studying those things which are inseparable from human nature, that which most essentially constitutes humanity. At the age of sixteen we know what it is to suffer, for we ourselves have already suffered; but we are hardly sensible of the sufferings of other beings: to see without feeling them is not to know them, and, as I have frequently said before, a child has no idea of what others feel; he knows no evils

evils but his own: but, when the first display of his faculties kindles the fire of his imagination, he begins to perceive that he does not exist independent of his fellow-creatures; he feels their complaints, and sympathises in their sorrow. At this time the tragical picture of our existence should excite in his heart the feelings of humanity.

If this period is not easily discovered in your children, whom may we blame for it? You instruct them so early in the language of sentiment, that they quickly learn to turn your own lessons against you, and leave you no method of judging when they begin really to feel what they say. As for my Emilius, he has hitherto neither felt, nor pretended to feel. Having no idea of love, he has never been heard to say, "*I love you dearly.*" he was never instructed *how to look* on entering into the sick chamber of his father, mother, or his governour; he was never shown how to affect a sorrow which he did not feel; he feigns no tears at the death of his friends, for he knows not what death means. The insensibility of his heart is visible in his behaviour. Indifferent to all except himself, like all other children, he is sensible of no attachment; he differs from them only in this, that he does not play the cheat as they do, or pretend to any thing that he does not feel.

Emilius, having bestowed little reflexion on sensible beings, will be some time before he has any idea of suffering and death. Lamentation  
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and cries will gradually begin to excite his compassion, he will turn away his eyes at the sight of blood; the convulsions of an expiring animal will create in him a kind of agony before he is sensible whence these emotions proceed. Had he continued indeed in a state of barbarity, totally uncultivated, he would have known no such feelings; if he had been further instructed, he would have known their source: he has compared ideas too often to have no feelings, but not sufficiently to conceive what they are.

Hence proceeds compassion, the first relative sentiment which touches the human heart, according to the order of nature. A child before he can be sensible of pity, must know that there are beings like himself, who are capable of feeling the same pain which he has already experienced. In short, how should we feel compassion, if not by being transported out of ourselves, and uniting our own persons, in imagination, to that of the suffering animal? by quitting, if I may say so, our own being for his? We suffer only in proportion as we think he suffers; it is not in ourselves, but in him that we suffer: therefore our sensibility does not commence till the imagination warms and begins to carry us out of ourselves.

To excite and nourish this growing sensibility, to guide or follow it in its natural propensity, it will be necessary to throw such objects in the way of our young pupil as will most  
effectually



effectually dilate his heart, extend it to other beings, and separate him from himself; to hide carefully from his view those objects which, on the contrary, tend to contract the heart and compress the spring of human selfishness: in other terms, to inspire him with goodness, humanity, compassion, benevolence, and all the soft attractive passions which are so pleasing to mankind; and to stifle envy and hatred and all those cruel and inhuman appetites, which, if I may be allowed the phrase, render sensibility not only null, but negative; becoming the torment of those who possess them.

The preceding reflexions, I think, may be comprised in two or three distinct and obvious maxims.

## FIRST MAXIM.

*It is not in the power of the human heart to sympathise with those who are happier than our selves, but with those who are only more miserable.*

IF there are any exceptions to this maxim, they are rather apparent than real. We do not sympathise with the rich or great to whom we are attached. Even in our most sincere attachment we only appropriate a part of their well-being. Sometimes we really love people in their misfortunes; but so long as they are in prosperity, they have no sincere friends, except such as are not dupes to appearances, and who rather

pity than envy them, notwithstanding their condition.

We sympathise in the happiness of rural simplicity, because the pleasure of contemplating the felicity of the honest rusticks is not imbittered by envy. We find ourselves really interested in their pleasures; and why? Because we think it in our power to descend to their state of peace and innocence, and to enjoy the same happiness: it is a last resource which excites none but agreeable ideas, and of which our will alone is sufficient to put us in possession. We have a satisfaction in contemplating this asylum, though we never intend to enjoy it.

Hence we may conclude that if we mean to inspire the heart of a youth with humanity, we are not to dazzle his eyes with the splendour of the rich and fortunate, but to display them such as they often are, gloomy and discontented, so that he may rather dread than envy their situation. Thus, having no temptation to follow the steps of other men in his pursuit of happiness, he will naturally strike out a path of his own.

#### SECOND MAXIM.

*We pity in others those evils only, from which we think ourselves not exempt.*

*Non ignara mali, miseris succurrere disco.*

WHAT

WHAT can be more beautiful, more affecting, and more true than this line!

Why have kings no compassion for their subjects? Because they never intend to become men.—Why are the rich so obdurate to the poor? Because they are not afraid of poverty.—Why are the lower class of people despised by the nobility? Because the nobles are in no danger of becoming plebeians.—Why are the Turks, in general more humane, more hospitable than we are? Because their government being arbitrary, and consequently the fortune and grandeur of particulars precarious, they are not entirely out of the reach of poverty and distress\*; he who is to-day the most powerful, may to-morrow be in the situation of the beggar he relieves. This reflexion, which so frequently recurs in the oriental romances, makes them infinitely more affecting than all our dry morality.

Do not therefore accustom your pupil to look haughtily down upon the sufferings of the unfortunate, and the labour of the poor: he cannot be taught to pity them while he looks upon them as almost of a different species. Let him understand that the lot of those miserable wretches may possibly be his own; that he is by no means exempt from their misfortunes, and that a thousand inevitable events may plunge him into equal misery. Teach him to place

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\* At present indeed, the case is a little altered; rank becoming daily more fixed and durable among them they grow accordingly more destitute of compassion.

no confidence in birth, health, or riches; show him all the vicissitudes of fortune; point out to him the many frequent examples of people, who, from a situation more exalted than his, have fallen to the lowest degree of poverty and distress; whether by their own fault or not, is at present out of the question. What idea can he have of a fault? let us not attempt to disturb the natural gradation of his knowledge, nor to enlighten his understanding by means above his comprehension. It requires no great learning, or capacity, to conceive, that all the prudence of man cannot positively insure him the continuance of life for a single hour to come; cannot promise him that before night comes on he shall not *be gnashing his teeth* in acute pain; that a month hence he shall not be reduced to poverty; that in less than a year he shall not be chained to the oar of an Algerine galley. But these things are not to be coldly repeated like his catechism. He must see, he must feel the calamities of human nature. Terrify his imagination with the perils by which mankind are continually surrounded, so that, in listening to the animated description, he may press close to your bosom for fear of falling into the abyss. But, say you, this will make a coward of him. As to that, we shall consider it in the sequel. Let us first endeavour to teach him humanity; this, at present, is our principal concern.



## T H I R D M A X I M.

*Our pity for the misfortunes of others, is not measured by the quantity of evil, but by the supposed sensibility of the sufferer.*

WE pity the wretched only in proportion as we believe them sensible of their own wretchedness. The mere physical sensation of evil is not so violent as it generally seems; it is the memory which makes us sensible of its continuance; it is the imagination extending it beyond the present moment which makes us really deserving of compassion. Probably this may be the reason why we are less affected at the sufferings of animals than of men. We do not pity a dray-horse when we see him in the stable, because we do not suppose that, in eating his hay, he remembers the inhumanity of his driver, or is apprehensive of the fatigues which he must undergo. In like manner, we never pity a sheep in its pasture, though we know it to be doomed to slaughter; because we suppose it to have no fore-knowledge of its destiny. By extending these ideas, we also become indifferent to the sufferings of our own species, and the rich excuse their conduct towards the poor, by supposing them too stupid to be sensible of their own misery. In general, I judge in what degree men estimate the happiness of their fellow-creatures, by their manner of treating them. It is quite natural that we should set little value on the felicity

city of beings we despise. Let us, therefore, not be surpris'd when politicians talk of the populace with so much disdain, nor that the generality of philosophers should affect to make man so wicked a being.

It is the populace which compose the bulk of mankind : those which are not in this class are so few in number, that they are hardly worth notice. Man is the same creature in every state ; therefore, that which is the most numerous ought to be most respected. To a man capable of reflexion, all civil distinctions are nothing : he observes the same passions, the same feelings, in the clown and the man of quality : the principal difference between them consists in the language they speak ; in a little refinement of expression : but, if there be any real distinction, it is certainly to the disadvantage of the least sincere. The common people appear as they really are, and they are not amiable : if those in high-life were equally undisguised, their appearance would make us shudder with horror.

There is, say our philosophers, an equal allotment of happiness and misery to every rank of men, a maxim as dangerous as it is absurd. If all mankind are equally happy, it would be ridiculous to give ourselves any trouble to promote their felicity. Let each remain in his situation : let the slave endure the lash, the lame his infirmity, and let the beggar perish, since they would gain nothing by a change of situation. The same philosophers enumerate the pangs of the rich, and expatiate on the vanity of their  
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their pleasures : was there ever so palpable a sophism ! The pangs of a rich man are not essential to riches, but to the abuse of them. If he were even more wretched than the poor, he would deserve no compassion, because he is the creator of his own misery, and happiness was in his power. But the sufferings of the indigent are the natural consequences of state ; he feels the weight of his hard lot ; no length of time nor habit, can ever render him insensible of fatigue and hunger : neither wisdom nor good humour can annihilate the evils which are inseparable from his situation. What avails it an Epictetus to foresee that his master is going to break his leg ? doth that prevent the evil ? on the contrary, his fore-knowledge adds greatly to his misfortune. If the populace were really as wise as we suppose them stupid, how could they act otherwise than as they do ? Study this order of men, and you will find that in another language they will utter as much wit and more good sense than yourself. Learn, therefore, to respect your species. Remember that the common people compose the most considerable part of mankind ; and that if all the kings and philosophers were to be taken away, the chasm would be imperceptible, and things would go on just as well without them. In short, teach your pupil to love mankind, and even those by whom mankind are vilified. Let him not rank himself particularly in one, but among all classes of men. Speak to him of man with tenderness

and compassion, but never with contempt. Man! dishonour not mankind.

By these, and the like methods equally uncommon, we must penetrate into the heart of youth, excite in it the first emotions of nature, and extend its benevolence to our whole species; and I will add, that in these operations, it is of infinite importance to stifle every selfish principle, and to guard as much as possible against the incursions of vanity, emulation, glory, and all those sentiments which lead us to compare ourselves with others; for such comparisons are never made without some impression of hatred to those who dispute the preference with us, even though it were only in our own estimation: so that we must either be blind to our own merit, or incensed against our competitor; we must be either envious or insensible. Let us, if possible, avoid this dilemma. These dangerous passions, I shall be told, will sooner or later take root in spite of us. I don't deny it; all things have their proper time and place; I insist only on our not aiding them in their growth.

Such, in general, is the method, in which we ought to proceed. A detail of particular examples would be useless, because we now begin to branch out into an almost infinite variety of characters, and that each example would not suit above one in a hundred thousand. At this age, also, if our tutor be a man of abilities, he will, with true philosophical observation, whilst he moulds the heart of his pupil, enquire into

its



its inmost texture. Whilst your pupil is yet unacquainted with disguise, the impression he receives from every object he sees, may easily be read in his eyes and gesture: his countenance, the true index of his soul, discovers all its motions; by a careful observation of these, we learn, in time, to foresee and, at last, to direct them.

It is generally remarked, that the sight of blood or wounds, the sound of cries and groans, the apparatus of painful operations, and all those objects which excite the idea of suffering, make a more early and more general impression upon mankind than that of death. The idea of final dissolution, being more complex, is not so striking. The image of death impresses our minds later, and more faintly, because we have no experience to assist our conception. To form any idea of the agonies of death, we must first have beheld the consequence thereof, in the lifeless body; but when once this image is perfectly formed in our minds, no spectacle can be more horrible; whether it proceeds from the appearance of total dissolution, or from the reflection that, death being inevitable, we ourselves shall, sooner or later, be in the same situation.

These impressions have their different modifications, and degrees, according to the character and habits of each individual; but the impressions themselves are universal. There are other impressions which are slower and less general,

ral, and which are peculiar to persons of great sensibility. I mean those which are received from the mental sufferings, sorrow, and affliction of our fellow creatures. There are people who are incapable of being moved, except by cries and tears; the long and silent grief of a heart torn with distress never drew a sigh from their breasts; they are not affected at the sight of a dejected countenance, pale complexion, and hollow eyes exhausted of their tears. On such hearts the sufferings of the mind have no effect. They are judges without feeling, from whom we have nothing to expect but inflexible rigour and cruelty. Possibly they may be just, but never humane, generous, or compassionate. I say, they may be just, if it be possible for man to be just without being merciful.

Let us not, however, be in haste to form our judgement of youth by this rule, especially those who have had a proper education; it being impossible for them to have any idea of moral pain, which they have never experienced. They can sympathise with the evils only which they have felt. But this seeming insensibility, proceeding merely from ignorance, will change into tenderness and compassion, as soon as they perceive that in human life there are a thousand evils with which they were unacquainted. As for my Emilius, if he discovers simplicity and plain sense in his infancy, I am very sure he will not want sensibility in his youth; for the truth of our sensations depends greatly on the justness of our ideas,  
But.

But, said the reader, why this scene of affliction? Certainly you must have forgot your first resolution, and the constant felicity which you promised to your pupil. Representations of misery and death: strange felicity! wonderful enjoyment for an heart just entering into life!— This will be the language. No matter: I promised to make him really, not apparently, happy. Is it my fault that you, who are the constant dupes of appearance, mistake it for reality?

Let us take two young boys, and suppose them, after the first stage of their education, entering the world through different ways, diametrically opposite to each other. One mounts up at once to the summit of Olympus, and mixes in the most brilliant society. He is presented at court, and introduced to the great; he becomes acquainted with the rich men and the fine women. We will suppose him universally entertained and caressed, without examining into its effects upon his reason, which we will imagine to be in no danger. Pleasures anticipate his desires: every day presents him with fresh amusements, and he seems to enjoy them all. He appears attentive, eager, and curious. You are struck with his first rapture. You think him happy; but look into the state of his mind. You think he enjoys these splendid amusements; I think he suffers under them.

His eyes no sooner open than he perceives a multitude of pretended pleasures which have entirely escaped him, and many others which,

from the shortness of their duration, seem to have presented themselves only to punish him with regret for their departure. Observe him surveying a palace, and you see, by his impatient curiosity, that he is asking himself why his paternal mansion is not equally magnificent? All his questions indicate that he is continually comparing himself with the owner of the palace, and every mortifying circumstance in the comparison serves only to stimulate and excite his vanity. If, by chance, he meets a youth better dressed than himself, I hear him murmuring against the avarice of his parents. If, on the contrary, he happens to excel in point of dress, perhaps he has the mortification to find himself eclipsed by the birth or sense of another, and all his finery humbled before a plain suit. If he shines at a ball or an assembly, and raises himself on tiptoe in order to be more conspicuous, is there a man in the whole company who does not wish to mortify the young coxcomb? They soon unite against him: the contemptuous regards of the grave, and the raillery of the gay, cannot fail to render his situation disagreeable; but were he to perceive himself despised only by one single man, that were alone sufficient to invalidate the applause of all the rest.

But we will suppose him possessed of real merit, and every agreeable accomplishment; that he is handsome, witty, amiable; that he is the favourite of the ladies; by anticipating his inclinations, however, they make a fool of him  
rather



rather than a lover. He will succeed in some affairs of gallantry; but he will have no passion, no transport for enjoyment. His desires being continually prevented, in the lap of pleasure he is tired with constraint. The sex, which was created for the happiness of the other, satisfies and disgusts him, even before he knows the sex. If he continues to visit them, it is now merely out of vanity; but if, at last, he becomes sincerely attached, he will find himself no longer the only young, sprightly, amiable fellow in the world; his mistresses will be no prodigies of fidelity.

I say nothing of the quarrels, treachery, vexation, and regret, which are inseparable from this way of life: we know that experience will, in time, convince us of its folly, and give us a distaste for it: I am now speaking only of the lasting disgust attendant upon the first illusion.

How different must this scene appear to one who, till now, had been wrapped up in the bosom of his family and friends, and was the sole object of their care and attention, to enter at once into a world where he is of so little account, and to find that he is where he is lost in a new sphere, who was himself so lately the center of his own. How many affronts! how many humiliations must he experience, before he loses the prejudice of his importance! Whilst a child, he was obeyed and flattered; and now he is become a young man, he is obliged to submit to all the world: or, if he should happen to forget himself, and

assume his former airs, how mortifying are the lessons which bring him back to reason ! Being accustomed to obtain with ease the objects of his desire, his desires are many ; consequently so are his disappointments. He covets every thing he sees ; he envies all mankind ; he wishes to be universally obeyed. Puffed up with vanity, enflamed with lawless appetites, tormented by jealousy, hatred, and every other devouring passion, he carries their agitation with him daily into the tumult of the world, and brings it back again every night. He comes home full of discontent. He lies down to rest with a thousand vain projects in his head, and his pride, even in his sleep, paints on his imagination the chimerical pleasures with which his desires torment him, but which he will never enjoy. Such is the portrait of your pupil : let us now take a view of mine.

If the first object which presents itself happens to exhibit a melancholy spectacle, the sensation is immediately succeeded by a pleasing idea : perceiving himself exempt from the evils with which others are afflicted, he finds that he is happier than he imagined. He sympathises in the sufferings of his fellow creatures ; but that sympathy is voluntary and agreeable. He enjoys at once the compassion which he feels for their misfortunes, and his own happiness in being exempt from their fate ; he perceives in himself that power which extends us beyond ourselves, and enables us to communicate to  
others

others the activity which is superfluous to our own well-being. To sympathise in the misfortunes of others, doubtless it is necessary we should know, though not that we should feel them. Having suffered, or being apprehensive of suffering, we pity those who actually suffer; but as soon as the evil becomes our own, all our pity centers in ourselves. Now all mankind being subject to the miseries of life, if we grant to others that sensibility only of which we have no need on our own account, it follows that pity must be a very pleasing sentiment, because it is a proof of our felicity; and that on the contrary, a man of no feeling must necessarily be unhappy, since the texture of his heart affords him no super-abundant sensibility for the sufferings of his fellow-creatures.

We are too apt to judge of happiness by appearance; we suppose it to be where it very rarely exists; we seek it where it cannot be found. Mirth is a very equivocal sign of happiness. A merry fellow is often in reality an unhappy mortal, who, by laughing, endeavours to conceal and to forget his misery. Those gentlemen who in a polite circle appear so good humoured, so open, so serene, are generally morose and peevish at home: their domestics feel the want of that good-nature which they lavish upon their companions. True contentment is never extremely gay or noisy; its possessor, ever careful of so pleasing a sensation, will not suffer it to evaporate, but enjoys the invaluable blessing

with deliberate taste and reflection. The man who is really happy speaks little, and seldom laughs: he, as it were, contracts his circle of felicity round his heart. Solitude and silence are friends to true pleasure. Tender emotions and tears are the companions of enjoyment; and even excessive joy more frequently produces tears than laughter.

The number and variety of amusements may possibly seem to contribute to happiness, and the simplicity of an uniform life appear tiresome; but a more attentive observation will convince us, that the most perfect felicity of the soul consists in moderation of enjoyment, so as to curb the violence of desire, and prevent disgust. The inquietude of desire produces curiosity and inconstancy; lassitude and discontent are the off-spring of turbulent pleasures. We cannot be weary of our situation if we know not a better. Of all mankind, savages are the least curious, and least tired of their existence. They look upon every object with indifference: they enjoy not the circumstances of life, but life itself. They spend their whole time in doing nothing, and yet their time never hangs heavily on their hands.

The man of the world is entirely covered with a mask; he is so accustomed to disguise, that if, at any time, he is obliged, for a moment, to assume his natural character, his uneasiness and constraint are palpably obvious.

Reality



Reality is no part of his concern, he aims at nothing more than appearance.

I cannot help figuring to myself, in the face of the fine young fop above-mentioned, a certain impertinent smile of affectation, which, to men of rational simplicity, is insupportable; and, on the contrary, in that of mine, methinks, I behold an interesting, open countenance, strongly expressive of the sincerity of his mind, inspiring esteem and confidence, and seeming to wait only the overflowings of his heart, to give his friendship to all those who approach him.

I think, we generally suppose the physiognomy, or countenance, to be formed by a simple display of the traces already sketched out by nature. For my part, I am of opinion, that besides this natural display of the features, they are insensibly fashioned into physiognomy by the frequent impression of certain affections of the mind. That these affections are impressed on the visage is beyond doubt, and that such impressions, by frequent repetition, must necessarily become durable. Hence, I suppose, it is, that a man's character may frequently be discovered in his face, without having recourse to mysterious explanations, which suppose a knowledge we are not endowed with.

In the countenance of a child there are only two affections which are strongly impressed, namely joy and grief: he laughs, or he cries; the intermediate affections are nothing. He passes incessantly

santly from one emotion to the other ; and this continual change prevents any permanent impression which might form a physiognomy ; but at an age when, becoming more sensible, he is more powerfully and frequently affected, the impressions are too deep to be easily effaced, and from the habitual state of the mind results a certain arrangement of features which in time becomes unalterable. Nevertheless, I have seen men change their physiognomy at different ages ; but whenever this happened, where it was in my power to observe them with attention, I have always remarked that there was a change also in their habitual passions. This single observation, sufficiently confirmed, seems to be decisive, and not improperly urged in a treatise on education, which ought to teach us how to perceive the emotions of the soul by exterior signs.

Whether my pupil will be less amiable for not having learned the art of disguising his sentiments and of feigning sensations which he never felt, is not my business to determine. This I know, that he will be more loving, and I am much inclined to doubt whether he who loves himself alone, can act his part so well as to seem more deserving of esteem, than he whose happiness, in some measure, consists in his affection for others. But with regard to this sentiment, I believe, I have already said enough to guide a sensible reader, and convince him that I have uniformly adhered to my first principles.

I now

I now return to my system, and proceed. When this critical age approaches, exhibit to your pupil such scenes as may restrain, rather than accelerate the growth of his passions. Carry him from the town, where the immodest dress and behaviour of the women anticipate the instructions of nature; where every scene presents him with pleasures, with which he ought to remain unacquainted, till he is able to choose with propriety. Carry him back to his first habitation, whose rural simplicity will suffer his passions to unfold in their natural gradation. But if a taste for the arts should attach him to the town, let that taste serve to prevent a dangerous inactivity. Be extremely circumspect in the choice of his companions, his employment, his pleasures. Show him such pictures as are affecting, but modest; such as will nourish his sensibility, without enflaming his desires. But let us not forget that whilst we endeavour to avoid one extreme there is a possibility of falling into the other. It is not my intention to afflict my young pupil continually with objects of horror and distress; to carry him from hospital to hospital, and from one prison to another. We must not, by too frequent repetition, harden, instead of softening, his heart, at the sight of human woes. What we too often behold we cease to imagine, and it is in imagination only that we feel the miseries of others. Hence, from their constant visits to the dying and the sick, the hearts of the priests and physicians grow

grow callous and obdurate. Let your pupil, therefore, be made acquainted with the lot of man, and the sufferings of his species; but let him not be too frequent a witness of such calamity. A single object, judiciously chosen, and shown at a proper time, will inspire him with tenderness, and afford him reflexion for a whole month. It is not so much the object itself, as his return to it in idea, which determines his judgement; and the permanency of the impression upon his mind depends also less upon the object, than the point of view in which it is recalled to his mind. By this management of our examples, lessons, and images, we shall for a long time blunt the dangerous edge of inclination, and divert the attention of nature whilst we follow her own dictates.

In proportion as he becomes more enlightened, let the ideas which you mean to excite be adapted to his understanding; and in proportion as his desires take fire, make choice of such objects as will most effectually stifle the flame. I remember to have been told by an old military gentleman, who was as much distinguished for his morals as for his courage, that his father who was a sensible man, but extremely devout, seeing that he was naturally too much inclined to women, spared no pains to curb this propensity; but finding, notwithstanding all his care, that his son still persisted in his vices, he carried him to an hospital established for the cure of people in the venereal disease, and  
without



without any previous intimation of his design, led him into a gallery full of those unhappy wretches, who were severely expiating the folly which had brought them thither. At this hideous spectacle, so offensive to all his senses, the young man grew sick. “*Go thou wretched debauchée* (said the father, with a significant look and emphasis) *follow thy loose inclinations; it will not be long before thou wilt think thyself happy in being admitted into this place, or perhaps, a victim to the most infamous sufferings, thou wilt compel thy father to thank God for thy death.*”

These few words, joined to the affecting scene before him, made an impression upon the young man which time could never efface. Condemned, by his profession, to spend his youth in garrisons, he chose rather to bear the raillery of his companions than imitate their vices. “*I was a man* (said he) *and have had my foibles; but during my whole life, I never could behold a publick prostitute without horror.*” Tutors! let me advise you to put little confidence in words; but learn to make a proper choice of time, place, and circumstances: let examples be your lectures, and rest assured of their effect.

During infancy, our employment is inconsiderable; the neglects or mistakes of that age are not without remedy, and the good we imbibe might be communicated at a later period: but it is otherwise with regard to the age when man begins first really to live. This age is always too short for the use which we ought to make of  
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it, and its importance requires an unwearied attention: for this reason I dwell upon the art of extending it beyond its natural duration. One of the first precepts in the art of cultivation, is to retard nature as much as possible, that her progress may be slow but certain. We must not suffer our youth to commence man the moment it is in his power. Whilst the body is growing, those spirits which give life to the blood, and strength to the fibres, are yet unprepared and imperfect. If they be carried into a different channel, and that which was intended to complete an individual, be employed in the formation of another, they will both remain feeble, and the work of nature will be left imperfect. The operations of the mind are also influenced by this perversion: the functions of the soul are as languid and spiritless as those of the body. Robust limbs, indeed, do not constitute courage or genius; and I can conceive that strength of mind will never accompany that of body, if the organs of communication between the body and mind are improperly disposed: but how perfect soever they may be in this respect, they will always act feebly, if the blood which gives them motion be exhausted, impoverished, and devoid of that substance which ought to give life and power to every spring in the machine. I have generally observed more vigour of mind among those people whose youth are preserved from a premature corruption of manners, than in more civilized

civilized communities, where the disorder commences with the power; and doubtless this is one of the reasons why a people, whose manners are uncorrupted, surpass their profligate neighbours in valour and good sense. The latter shine only in certain subtle qualities which they call wit, sagacity, cunning; but those grand and noble functions of wisdom and reason which, in great actions, distinguish and honour mankind, are rarely to be found except among the former.

Our instructors complain that the natural fire of this age renders youth ungovernable. Very true; but is it not entirely their own fault? Can they be ignorant that when they have once suffered this fire to make its way through the senses, it is not in their power to divert its course? will the tedious, frigid sermons of a pedant efface from the mind of his pupil, the idea of pleasure which he has conceived will they banish from his heart the desires which torment him? Will they quench the ardour of a flame of which he already knows the use? will he not be enraged at those obstacles which oppose the only happiness of which he has any idea? and in the severe law prescribed without explanation, what can he discover except the caprice and hatred of a man who chooses to torment him? Is it, therefore, wonderful that he should oppose and hate the pedagogue in his turn?

It

It is easy to conceive that by relaxing his severity a tutor may render himself less disagreeable to his pupil, and yet preserve an apparent authority; but I cannot perceive the use of that authority which serves only to foment the vices which it ought to repress: it is much the same as if a rider, in order to tame an unruly horse, were to leap him down a precipice.

This fire of youth, so far from being an obstacle in his education, is the proper instrument of its accomplishment; it is that which gives you an advantage over the heart of your pupil, when he ceases to be less powerful than yourself. His first affections are the reins with which you should direct all his motions. He was before at liberty; but now he is enslaved. Whilst he was incapable of affection, he was dependent only on himself and his necessities; but the moment he loves, he depends on his attachments. Thus are formed the first bonds which unite him to his species; but we are not to suppose that his new-born sensibility will be universal, or that he will conceive any meaning in the word Mankind. No! that sensibility will first be confined to his equals, and his equals are those only with whom he is acquainted; those whom custom has rendered dear to him, or useful; those in whom he perceives a similitude of ideas and sensations; those who are exposed to the pains, and are sensible of the pleasures, which he has experienced; in a word, those in whom the more manifest identity of nature increases his disposition



disposition to self-love. It is not till after having cultivated his disposition in a thousand forms, after much reflexion on his own sentiments, as well as those of others, that he will be able to generalize his notions under the abstract idea of humanity, and add to his particular affections those which are to unite him to the whole species.

In becoming capable of attachment, he becomes sensible of it in others\*, and therefore attentive to the signs of this attachment. Thus, you see, what a new empire you acquire over him; you enslave his heart before he is aware of it. What must be his sensations, when, turning his eyes upon himself, he discovers the services you have done for him; when he compares himself with other young people of his own age, and you with other tutors? I say, when he discovers, for let it never be urged: if you once hint the obligation, from that instant he will cease to perceive it. If you exact obedience in return for your services, he will suspect that he has been deceived; he will conclude that under pretence of serving him, you have bound him in a contract to which he never consented. In vain you will urge, that what you exact is entirely for his own good;  
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\* Attachment may exist without a return, but friendship cannot: the latter is an exchange, a contract, like any other, only more sacred. The word friendship has no *correlative*. Every man who is not the friend of his friend is doubtless a cheat; for friendship can only be obtained by friendship, either real or apparent.

it is sufficient that it is exacted; and that in return for what was done without his consent.

When an unhappy wretch accepts a shilling supposing it to be a gift, and afterwards finds himself to be inlisted, do we not exclaim against the injustice? and are you not equally unjust to demand a return for obligations which your pupil never accepted?

Ingratitude would be more rare, if benefits upon usury were less common. Nothing can be more natural than to love those who do us service. The heart of man is self-interested, but never ungrateful; and the obliged are less to be charged with ingratitude than their benefactors with self-interest. If you sell me your favours let us settle the price; but if you pretend to give, and afterwards expect to make terms with me, you are guilty of fraud; it is their being given gratis which renders them inestimable. The heart will receive laws only from itself; by endeavouring to enslave it you give it liberty, and by leaving it at liberty it becomes your slave.

When the fisherman throws his bait into the water, the fish assemble, and continue round him without suspicion; but when caught by the concealed hook they perceive him draw the line, they then endeavour to escape. Is the fisherman their benefactor, or are the fish ungrateful? Do we ever see a man, who is forgotten by his benefactor, forget the benefactor? On the contrary, he speaks of him with pleasure, and never  
thinks

thinks of him without emotion : and if by chance he has it in his power to make any return for the favours he has received, with what joy he snatches the opportunity ; with what rapture he exclaims, now it is my turn to oblige ; such is the true voice of nature. A real benefit can never produce ingratitude.

If, therefore, gratitude, be a natural sentiment, and you do not, by your own fault, destroy its effects, be assured that your pupil, beginning to perceive the benefits he receives from your care, will be sensible of his obligation, provided you yourself have not fixed a price on these benefits ; thus you will acquire an authority over his heart which nothing can possibly subvert. Till it is time to treat him as a man, let there be no mention of his obligations to his tutor, but to himself. If you mean to make him docile and tractable, let him have full liberty ; leave him frequently to himself and he will fly to you for assistance ; inspire him with the noble sentiment of gratitude, by speaking to him of his own interest. I avoided this argument so long as he was unable to comprehend it ; because seeing in it nothing further than the dependence of his tutor, he might possibly mistake him for his valet : but now he begins to have some idea of affection, he perceives those endearing ties by which a man may be united to a particular object ; and in your unwearied zeal for his welfare, he no longer beholds the attachment of a slave, but the affection

tion of a friend. Nothing has so much influence over the human heart as the voice of undoubted friendship; we know that our friend may possibly be mistaken, but we are certain he cannot intend to deceive us; we may differ from him in opinion, but we cannot treat his councils with contempt.

Having completed the second period of our physical existence, we now enter upon the system of our moral relations. If this were the proper place, I should endeavour to show in what manner the first suggestions of conscience proceed from the first emotions of the heart; and how our notions of good and evil are the offspring of our sentiments of love and hatred. I could demonstrate that *justice* and *goodness* are not merely abstract ideas, having only a moral existence in the understanding; but that they are real affections of the soul enlightened by reason, and proceeding in regular progression from our primitive affections; that reason, independent of conscience, would be unable to establish any one natural law; and that the law of nature is a mere chimera, if it is not founded on some innate principle in the human heart\*. But I am  
not

\* Even the precept of doing as we would be done by has no true foundation except in conscience and sensibility. Where is the precise reason for my acting as if I were another, especially, if I am morally certain that I shall never be in his situation? Who will be answerable, provided I observe this maxim, that others will not act upon the same principle with me? The villain reaps advantage from the probity of the just, and from his own



not writing a treatise of morals or metaphysics, not a course of science of any kind: I intend only to trace the order and progress of our knowledge and sentiments relative to our natural constitution. Possibly others may demonstrate what I have chosen in this place only to indicate.

My Emilius, having hitherto regarded only himself, no sooner begins to consider his fellow-creatures, than he compares himself with them, and the first sentiment excited by this comparison is the desire of preference. This is the period when the natural love of himself changes into selfishness, and when all its attendant passions begin to exist; but, in order to determine what particular passions will be predominant in his character, whether he will incline to humanity, compassion, benevolence, or to envy, revenge, and cruelty it is necessary to know, to what rank of men he imagines himself to belong,

injustice: he would be glad that all the world were just except himself. This maxim, say what we will, is by no means advantageous to honest men. But when the force of an expansive mind makes me, as it were, identically the same person with my fellow-creature, I prevent his suffering for my own sake, and in this I follow nature who inspires me with the desire of my own well-being in all situations. Hence, I conclude that the precepts of natural law are not founded merely upon reason: they rest upon a more certain and solid basis. The love of mankind derived from self-love is the great principle of human justice. The summary of all morality is given in the gospel under that of the law.

and what kind of obstacles he will have to remove, before he can arrive at the place which he intends to occupy.

In order to direct him in his choice, after having shown him mankind by the accidents common to the species, you will then show them by their differences. Hence will arise the measure of natural and civil inequality, and a just picture of the whole order of society.

We must study society by studying men, and men by studying society. Those who treat morals and politics separately, will never be acquainted with either. By first considering man's primitive relations, we perceive in what manner they ought to affect him, and what passions they ought to produce: we discover that it is reciprocally as the progress of the passions that these relations multiply or diminish. It is not so much their power, as their moderation, which renders mankind independent. He whose desires are few, has few attachments; but, confounding our luxuriant desires with our physical necessities, those who have considered the latter as the foundation of human society, have mistaken the effect for the cause, and have consequently pursued a continued chain of false reasoning.

There is, in the state of nature, an equality of real and unalterable right; for it is impossible that in such a state, the difference between man and man should be so great as to render one dependent on the other. In the state of civil society,

society, there is a chimerical equality of right; for the means intended to maintain that right serve only to destroy it, and the strength of the publick being added to that of the stronger in order to oppress the weak, destroys the equilibrium in which mankind were placed by nature\*. From this first contradiction proceed all the others which we observe, in civil society, between appearance and reality. The many will always be sacrificed to the few, and publick interest to that of particulars. The specious names of justice and subordination will be made the instruments of violence and the weapons of iniquity. Hence it follows, that those distinguished orders of men, which pretend to be useful to the rest, are in reality, at the expence of the rest, useful only to themselves; and hence may be determined what consideration they deserve according to the laws of reason and justice. We are now to enquire whether the rank which they have assumed contributes more to their own happiness, that hence we may know what judgement we ought each of us to form of our own lot. This is the proper object of our present enquiry; but it will be necessary first to make ourselves acquainted with the human heart.

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\* The universal spirit of laws, in all countries, is to favour the strong in opposition to the weak, and to assist those who have possessions against those who have none. This inconveniency is inevitable, and without exception.

If man is to be shown to our pupil only in masquerade, we might save ourselves that trouble, for he will see enough of that without our assistance; but since the mask is not the man, and as youth ought not to be deceived, let us paint mankind as they really are; but let them be exhibited in such a light as may excite his compassion rather than his contempt. That compassion which implies a resolution to avoid their follies, is the most laudable sentiment a man can entertain with respect to his species.

With this intention, we must now take a different route from that which we have hitherto pursued, and instruct our pupil rather by the experience of others, than by his own. If men deceive him, he will hate them; but if, whilst he is respected, they deceive each other, they will excite his compassion. “A view of the world (said Pythagoras) is like that of the Olympick games. Some carry on trade and are attentive only to their profit, others expose their persons in pursuit of glory, whilst others again are mere spectators of the sports, and these perhaps are not the worst employed.

It were to be wished, that the companions of our pupil were so chosen as to make him think well of those with whom he converses, and that it were possible to give him so just a knowledge of the world as to make him think ill of all its transactions. He should know that man is naturally good, he should perceive it in his own heart, and judge of his neighbour by himself;  
but



but let him observe how mankind are depraved and perverted by society: show him that their prejudices are the source of all their vices. Let him be inclined to esteem each individual, but to despise the multitude. Make him sensible, that all men wear nearly the same mask; but that there are some faces much handsomer than the masks by which they are disguised.

This method, it must be confessed, has its inconveniencies, and is somewhat difficult in practice; for, by making him so early an observer, by teaching him to scan the actions of men so minutely, you will render him slanderous and satyrical, peremptory and uncharitable in his judgement. He will grow familiar with the sight of vice; and, as by custom we lose our sensibility for the wretched, he will soon contemplate the actions of the wicked without horror. He will soon consider the general depravity as an example for his imitation, rather than as a lesson of instruction, and will see no reason why he should endeavour to be better than the rest of mankind.

If, on the contrary, you mean to proceed methodically and whilst you display the human heart, show him the application of those external causes which convert our natural inclinations into vices; by thus transporting him from sensible to intellectual objects, you employ a metaphysical process which he cannot comprehend; you fall into the error, which we have hitherto so carefully avoided, of teaching by les-

fons which have the appearance of mere precept, and of substituting the experience and authority of the master, in the room of his own experience and the natural progress of his reason.

To obviate these objections, and to bring him acquainted with the human heart, without endangering his own, I would show him mankind at a distance, in other times and other places; so that he might be a spectator of the scene without having it in his power to become an actor. This is the proper time to introduce history; there he will read the heart of man, without the assistance of philosophical lectures; there he will behold mankind, not as their accomplice or accuser, but as their impartial judge.

If we would know men, it is necessary that we should see them act. Our cotemporaries expose their words, and conceal their actions; but history lifts the veil, and we found our judgment upon facts. In history even the words of men serve to ascertain their character; for by comparing them with their actions, we see at once what they really are, and what they would appear to be: the more they disguise themselves, the better they are known.

Unfortunately, the study of history is not without its dangers and inconveniencies of various kinds. It is a very difficult matter to place one's self in such a point of view, as to be able to judge equitably of our fellow-creatures. It is one of the common vices of history, to paint

man in a disadvantageous, rather than a favourable light. Revolutions and fatal catastrophes being most interesting, so long as a people have continued to increase and prosper in the calm of a peaceable government, history hath remained silent; it speaks of nations only when, growing insupportable to themselves, they begin to interfere with their neighbours, or to suffer their neighbours to interfere with them: it begins not to make them illustrious till they are already on the decline: in short, all our histories begin where they ought to end. We are favoured with very exact accounts of those nations which verge towards destruction; but of those which have been flourishing we have no history at all: they have been so wise and so happy as to furnish no events worth recording. Even in our own times we see that those governments which are best conducted are least mentioned. Only bad men are celebrated, whilst the good are forgotten, or turned into ridicule: thus history, as well as philosophy, never ceases to calumniate mankind.

But the historical relation of facts is by no means an accurate delineation of them, as they really happened: they change their aspect in the brain of the historian, they bend to his interest, and are tinged by his prejudices. What historian ever brought his reader to the scene of action, and showed the event exactly as it happened? Every thing is disguised by ignorance or partiality. How easy it is, by a different

representation of circumstances, to give a thousand various appearances to the same facts? Show an object in different points of view, and we hardly believe it to be the same, and yet nothing is changed, except the eye of the spectator. Is it sufficient for the honour of truth, to exhibit a real fact in a false light? How often has it happened that a few trees more or less, a hill upon the right or left, or a sudden cloud of dust, have turned the scale of victory, without the cause being perceived? Nevertheless the historian will assign a reason for the victory or defeat with as much confidence as if he had been at the same instant in every part of the battle. Of what consequence are mere facts, or what am I to learn from a relation of events of whose causes I am totally ignorant? The historian, it is true, assigns causes, but they are of his own invention: even criticism itself, is nothing more than the art of conjecturing; the art of selecting, from a number of lies, that which bears the nearest resemblance to truth.

Probably you have read *Cleopatra*, or *Cassandra*, or other books of the same kind. The authour makes choice of a known event, which he accommodates to his design, adorns with circumstances of his own invention, and personages which never existed, crowding fiction upon fiction to make his story more entertaining. Now, I see little difference between those romances and our real histories, except that the romance-writer gives a greater scope to his own imagination,  
and



and the historian accommodates himself more to that of other people: to which I may add, that the former has a moral object in view, either good or bad, about which the latter gives himself no concern.

It will be urged, that the veracity of history is of less consequence than the truth of manners and characters; provided we have a faithful delineation of the human heart, no matter whether events are truly reported or not; for, after all, what concern have we with facts that happened two thousand years ago? You are quite in the right, if your historian has painted his manners and characters from nature; but, since they are chiefly creatures of his own imagination, are we not falling into the very error we endeavoured to avoid, by giving that credit to the historian which we refused to our tutor? If my pupil is to see nothing but ideal representations, I would choose to sketch them with my own hand, as, in that case, they will probably be better adapted.

The worst historians, for a young reader, are those who *favour* us with their judgement. A plain narrative of facts is all he wants: let him judge for himself, and he will learn to know mankind. If he is constantly guided by an authour's opinion, he sees only with the eyes of another; and when these are taken from him he does not see at all.

I throw aside modern history, not only because it has no characteristick, and that all our

men exactly resemble each other; but because our historians, intent only on displaying their talents, think of nothing but painting portraits highly coloured, and which frequently bear no resemblance to any thing in nature\*. The ancients, in general, abound less in portraiture, and show less wit, but more sense in their reflexions; yet even the ancients are very different from each other: we should at first rather prefer the most simple, than the most profound and judicious. I would neither put Polybius nor Sallust into the hands of a boy; as for Tacitus, he is intelligible only to old men. We must learn to read, in the actions of men, the outlines of the human heart, before we attempt to fathom it to the bottom. We must learn to read facts before maxims. Philosophy, laid down in maxims, belongs only to experience. Youth ought to generalize nothing: all our instructions should be derived from particular examples.

Thucydides, in my opinion, is the best model for historians: he relates facts without judging of them; but he omits no circumstance which may serve to direct the judgement of his reader. He presents every object to our sight; and so far from interposing his authority, he carefully conceals himself from us: we do not

seem

\* See Davila, Guicciardini, Strada, Solis, Machiavel, and sometimes even Thuanus himself. Vertot is almost the only one who has not fallen into this vicious practice of portrait-painting.

seem to read events, but actually to see them. Unfortunately his constant subject is war, and a recital of battles is, of all things, the least instructive. Xenophon's retreat of the ten thousand, and Cæsar's Commentaries, are remarkable for the same prudence and the same defect. Honest Herodotus, without painting, without maxims, but flowing, simple, and full of pleasing and interesting particulars, would be perhaps the best historian, if his details did not frequently degenerate into puerility, more likely to vitiate than improve the taste of youth: it requires discernment to read Herodotus.—I take no notice of Livy at present, except that he is a politician, a rhetorician, and every thing that is improper at this age.

History is generally defective in recording only those facts which are rendered conspicuous by name, place, or date; but the slow progressive causes of those facts, not being thus distinguished, remain for ever unknown. How frequently do we find a battle, lost or won, mentioned as the cause of a revolution, which was become inevitable before the battle was fought? War is generally nothing more than a manifestation of events already determined by moral causes, of which historians are ignorant.

The spirit of philosophy has, in like manner, infected many of the writers in this age; but I am in doubt whether truth gains any thing by their labours. A madness for system having got possession of them all, they never en-

deavour to see things as they really are, but as they best agree with their favourite hypotheses.

To these reflections we may add, that history is a representation of actions rather than of men, who are shown only at certain intervals, in their vestments of parade: we see man only in publick life, after he has put himself in a proper position for being viewed. History follows him not into his house, into his closet, among his family and friends: it paints him only when he makes his appearance: it exhibits his dress and not his person.

I should rather choose to begin the study of the human heart by reading the lives of particular men: for there it is impossible for the hero to conceal himself a moment. The biographer pursues him into his most secret recesses, and exposes him to the piercing eye of the spectator; he is best known when he believes himself most concealed. "I like (says Montagne) those biographers who give us the history of counsels, rather than events; who show us what passes within, rather than without: therefore Plutarch is the writer after my own heart."

I confess the genius of a people is very different from that of man considered as an individual, and that we shall be imperfectly acquainted with mankind if we neglect the study of the multitude; but it is also true, that we must begin by studying man in order to know mankind; and that if we know the propensities of each individual, it will not be difficult to  
foresee



foresee their effects when combined in the body of the people.

Here again we are obliged to have recourse to the ancients, partly for the reasons already urged, but more especially because all familiar and low, though true and characteristick details, are inconsistent with the polite style of the moderns; hence men are equally adorned and disguised in private as in publick life. Decency, no less severe in description than in action, permits us to *say* nothing in publick which we are not allowed to *do*; and as men are to be shown only in disguise, we learn as little of them in books as from our theatres. We may write and rewrite the lives of kings as often as we please, but we shall never see another Suetonius\*.

Plutarch's excellence consists chiefly in those very minutiae into which we dare not enter. There is an inimitable gracefulness in his manner of painting great men engaged in trivial employments, and he is so happy in the choice of his incidents, that frequently a single word, a smile, a gesture, is sufficient to characterise his hero. Hannibal with a judicious piece of pleasantry, re-animates his disheartened troops, and leads them smiling to the battle which opened to him the gates of Italy. In Agesilaus astride upon

\* Only one of our historians, who has imitated the grand strokes of Tacitus, has dared to copy Suetonius, and sometimes to transcribe Comines, in their details; but he has been condemned by the criticks for this circumstance, which really adds merit to his book.

upon a stick, I admire the conquerour of a great monarch. Cæsar, in passing through a poor village, and talking familiarly with his friends, discloses, without intending it, the deceiver, who before pretended he only wanted to be on an equality with Pompey.

Alexander swallows a medicine without speaking a word; this was the most brilliant moment of his life: Aristides writes his own name upon a shell, and thus justifies his surname: Philopœmen throws aside his robe and cleaves wood in the kitchen of his host. This is the true art of painting. We ought not to judge of physiognomy by the strongest lines in the face, nor of the characters of men by their great actions. Publick transactions are either too common or too much studied and prepared; yet these are the only incidents worthy the dignity of modern history.

Marshal Turenne was incontestably one of the greatest men of the last age. The writer of his life has had the courage to render it interesting by relating some minute particulars which make his hero known and beloved; but how many was he not obliged to suppress, which would have taught us to know and love him still more! I shall instance only one, which I have from good authority, and which Plutarch would by no means have omitted, but which Ramsay, if he had known it, would not have dared to relate.

The Marshal happened, one hot day, to be looking out at the window of his ante-chamber in a white waistcoat and night-cap. A servant entering the room, deceived by his dress, mistakes him for one of the under cooks. He comes softly behind him, and with a hand, which was not of the lightest, gives him a violent slap on the breech. The Marshal instantly turns about, and the fellow frightened out of his wits, beholds the face of his master: down he drops upon his knees—" *Oh! My lord! I thought it was George*"—" *And suppose it had been George* (replied the Marshal rubbing his backside) *you ought not to have struck quite so hard.*" Such are the strokes our modern daubers dare not attempt. Go on, and remain for ever destitute of nature, void of sensibility! steel your hearts with your wretched decorum; and by your formality render yourselves despicable! But, thou honest young man, who readest this anecdote, and who feelest with tenderness all that sweetness of disposition which it immediately indicates, and which is so rarely found in our first emotions; read also the minutiae of this great man when his birth and name were in question. Remember it is the same Turenne who constantly gave place to his nephew, so that one might always perceive the child to be a sovereign prince. Compare these contrasts, love nature, despise opinion, and know mankind.

There are few people capable of conceiving the effect which reading, thus directed, will have

have upon young minds. Accustomed, from our infancy, to grow dull by poring over books, and to read without thinking, we are still less affected by what we read; for having within ourselves the same passions and prejudices with which history abounds, every transaction appears natural, because we ourselves have deviated from nature, and we judge of others accordingly. But let us, on the contrary, imagine a youth educated according to my principles; my Emilius, for example, in whom, to preserve a sound judgement and integrity of heart, has been the object of eighteen years assiduity. Let us suppose him, when the curtain is drawn up, casting his eyes, for the first time, on the stage of the world; or rather, placed behind the scenes, observing the actors dress and undress, and counting the cords and pulleys, by the gross delusion of which the eyes of the spectators are deceived. His first surprise will soon be succeeded by emotions of shame, and disdain of his species: he will, with a just contempt, behold mankind their own dupes, debasing themselves by such puerile occupations; but he will weep to see his brethren tear each other in pieces for mere shadows: not satisfied with being men, becoming beasts of prey.

Certainly, with the dispositions natural to our pupil, if our tutor has any judgement in the choice of books, or capacity to direct the youth in his reflexions, his reading will be in effect, a course of practical philosophy; better and  
more



more intelligible than the idle speculations which confound the senses of our young people in the schools.

Cyneas, having followed Pyrrhus through all his romantick projects, asks him what real benefit he would reap from the conquest of the whole world, since he could not enjoy that which he already possessed, without so much trouble and anxiety? We see nothing in this question, except a slight flash of wit which immediately vanishes; but Emilius perceives in it a wise reflexion, which he himself might have made, and which can never be effaced from his mind, because it meets with no opposite prejudice to hinder the impression. When in reading the life of this madman, he finds afterwards that all his grand designs led him only to die by the hand of a woman; instead of admiring his pretended heroism, what will he behold, in all the exploits of so great a general, and all the intrigues of so subtle a politician, but so many steps in quest of that unlucky tile, which was to terminate all his schemes by an inglorious death?

All conquerours have not been killed; all usurpers have not fallen in their enterprises; many of them have appeared happy in the superficial opinion of the vulgar; but one who, not imposed on by appearances, judges of men's happiness by the state of their hearts, will discover misery even in their success, corroding anxiety and insatiable desires increase with their  
fortune,

fortune, and will see them gasping for breath as they advance, without ever reaching the prize. He will compare them to travellers, who in their first attempt to pass the Alps, think every mountain the last, and when they reach the top, are discouraged, to find still higher mountains before them.

Augustus having subjected his fellow-citizens, and destroyed his rivals, governed during forty years the greatest empire that ever existed; but did this immense power hinder him from beating his head against the wall, and filling the palace with his cries, when he desired of Varus his exterminated legions? If he had even conquered all his enemies, what would his vain triumphs have signified, so long as his troubles were daily increasing, his dearest friends attempting his life, and he himself reduced to bewail the infamy or death of all his relations? The poor wretch would govern the world, and was not able to govern his own family! What was the consequence? He saw his nephew, his adopted son, and his son-in-law, perish in the flower of their age; his grand-son was reduced to eat his bed-straw, to prolong his miserable existence a few hours; his daughter and his grand-daughter finished their infamous lives, one in misery and want on a desert island, the other in prison by the hand of an executioner. At last, the great Augustus himself, the solitary remnant of his unhappy family, is reduced by his own wife to leave the government of his empire to that monster

fter Tiberius. Such was the lot of this mighty ruler of the world, so universally celebrated for his glory and felicity : can I believe that any one of those who are captivated by such phantoms, would purchase them at the same price ?

I have chosen ambition for an example ; but the effects of all the human passions afford the same lesson to those who study history with a design to know themselves, and to learn wisdom from the dead. The time draws near, when the life of Antoninus will afford more instruction to a young man than that of Augustus. Emilius may possibly be a little bewildered among the variety of objects which this new study will present ; but, perceiving that mankind have, in all ages been blinded by their passions, he will learn to see through their illusion before they exist in himself.

These instructions I own, are not well adapted to him ; and possibly they may also be found too late and insufficient : but you will please to recollect, that these are not the lessons which I intended to inculcate by this method of studying history. I had another object in view, which must certainly be attained, if it is not the fault of the teacher.

Let us remember, that self-love no sooner displays itself, than personal interest begins to act ; that our young man compares himself with every one he observes : it is therefore necessary, that we should know what rank he assumes  
among

among his fellow-creatures, after having examined them. In the common method by which children are taught to read history, they are to be transformed alternately into the various characters, as they arise: thus the pupil is now a Cicero, now a Trajan, and by and by an Alexander. Thus he is mortified upon reflexion, and regrets that he is only himself. I do not deny that this method may have its advantages; but with regard to my Emilius, if in his comparisons it should ever happen that he had rather be another than himself, were it even Socrates or Cato, all is lost. He, who begins to be estranged from himself, will soon forget himself entirely.

Men are not best known by the philosophers; who view them through the prejudices of philosophy, and there is no class of people more prejudiced. A savage judges more rationally of mankind than a philosopher: the first is sensible of his own vices, is angry at our's, and says to himself, we are all knaves: the latter regards us without emotion, and cries, you are all fools. He is in the right for we none of us pursue vice for its own sake. My Emilius is the savage, with this difference only, that having more reflexion, being more accustomed to compare ideas, and to view our errors with more circumspection, he places a stronger guard over himself, and judges only from what he knows.

We are irritated by our own passions against those of others. It is self-interest which makes us hate the wicked: if they had done us no evil,

we

we should feel for them more pity than hatred. The evil which the wicked do to us, makes us forget that which they do to themselves. We should more readily pardon their vices, if we knew how severely they are punished by their own hearts. We perceive the offence, but we do not see the punishment: the advantages are apparent, but their sufferings invisible. He who thinks he enjoys the fruits of vice, feels no less torment than if he had not been successful; the object is changed, but his inquietude is the same: in vain he makes a display of his good fortune, and conceals his heart; it is visible through his conduct, but visible to those only whose hearts are of a different mould.

We are seduced by those passions which we participate, and offended with those which oppose our interest; and hence we blame in others that which we ourselves would imitate. This seduction and aversion are inevitable, when we are obliged to suffer from others those evils which we in their situation should perpetrate.

What then is required towards an accurate observation of men? An ardent desire to know them, impartiality in our judgement, and sensibility of heart sufficient to conceive all the variety of human passions, yet so calm as not to be under their influence. If there be any period of life peculiarly favourable to this study, it is certainly the present age of Emilius: if we suppose him younger, mankind are above his comprehension; if older, he would resemble the



the rest. Opinion, whose universal empire he contemplates, has hitherto acquired no dominion over him. The passions, whose effects he perceives, have not yet inflamed his heart. As a man, he feels for his brethren; but as a judge of his peers, he is just, and therefore cannot possibly wish himself in the place of any other man, because the general aim of all human disquietude, being founded on prejudices to which he is a stranger, must necessarily appear chimerical. As to his part, all his desires are within his reach. He has strength, health\*, moderation, few wants, and those few he has the power of satisfying. Educated in the most extensive liberty, he has no conception of any evil greater than servitude. He pities the wretched kings who are slaves to those by whom they are obeyed; he is sorry for those pretended sages, who are dupes to their vain reputation; he feels compassion for the rich fools, who are martyrs to pomp and pageantry; he deplores those seeming voluptuaries, who languish through a tedious life, merely for the sake of being deemed men of pleasure: he will also pity his most inveterate enemy; “for (says he) the unhappy man foolishly makes his own fate dependent on mine.”

One step farther, and we reach the goal. Self-interest is an useful but dangerous instrument; it often cuts the hand that holds it, and seldom produces

\* I believe I may safely number health and a good constitution among the effects of his education, or rather among the gifts of nature preserved by his education.

duces good without evil. Emilius, reflecting on his superiority among the human species, will be tempted to suppose the work of your reason to be the produce of his own, and to attribute his happiness to his merit. Mankind, says he to himself, are fools, but I am wise. Whilst he pities others he despises them; in congratulating himself, he increases his self-esteem, and perceiving that he is happier than the rest of the world, he imagines himself more deserving. This error is most of all to be dreaded, because it is most difficult to remove. Should he continue in this situation, he would reap but little advantage from all our labour. Were I to choose, I think I should prefer the illusion of prejudice to that of pride.

Truely great men are not mistaken in their superiority; they see, they feel it, and are not less modest. The more they possess, the more sensible they are of what they still want. They are less proud of their elevation above us, than humbled by the sensation of their own misery; and with regard to the exclusive advantages they possess, they are too wise to be vain of what they had no merit in acquiring. A good man has some reason to be proud of his virtue; but why should a man of natural talents be vain? What had Racine done that he was not Pradon? or Boileau, that he was not born Cotin?

Here again the case is different, let us continue in the common course of things. I neither suppose my pupil a superlative genius, nor a blockhead.

blockhead. I take him from the class of common understandings, because I mean to try the power of education. Extraordinary cases have nothing to do with rules. If Emilius, in consequence of my care, should prefer his own being, his own perception of things to that of other men, he is in the right; but when he therefore concludes himself to have been born a peculiar favourite of nature, he is certainly wrong. He is in an error and must be undeceived; or rather let us endeavour to prevent the error, lest it should not afterwards be in our power to remove it.

There is no folly of which a man, who is not a fool, may not be cured, except vanity; as to this if any thing will do, it must be experience: at least if taken in time this may prevent its growth. It were ridiculous to lose your labour in demonstrating to your pupil, that he is a man like others, and subject to the same frailties: he must perceive it himself, or your arguments will be to no purpose. This is another exception to my own rules: it is that of exposing my pupil to every accident which may serve to convince him that he is not wiser than the rest of mankind. Our adventure with the juggler must be repeated in a thousand different shapes. Let flatterers take every advantage of him; if he suffers himself to be led into folly and extravagance by young rakes, I let him risk the danger; if he falls into the snares of gamblers

blers, I suffer him to become their dupe\*; I let them flatter him, and rob him of his money; and when after entirely exhausting his purse, they finish by making him the subject of their mirth, I return them thanks, in his presence, for the excellent lesson which they have taught my pupil. The only decoys into which I shall prevent his falling are those of prostitutes; in other instances, all I shall do for him will be to partake his danger, and submit to all the affronts to which he is exposed. I shall bear every thing with patience, without uttering a single word of reproach, and you may be certain, if my discretion be properly sustained, that what I have undergone upon his account will make a deeper impression on his heart than all that he himself has suffered.

\* Not that our pupil will be much exposed to this danger, because he will be in no want of variety of amusements, and is hardly acquainted with the use of money. The two springs by which children are generally moved are interest and vanity, and these are also used by sharpers and courtezans in the sequel. When you see their avarice excited by rewards, and hear them applauded, at ten years old, for their performance in some publick exercise in the academy, you just see how they will leave their purse in a gaming house at twenty, and their health in a brothel. I would always lye a wager that the best scholar in his class will turn out the greatest debauchee. It must be always remembered, however, that it is my constant maxim to consider things in the worst light. At first, indeed, I endeavour to prevent vice, and afterwards suppose it committed, in order to point out the remedy.

I cannot help taking notice of the ridiculous dignity of some tutors, who, in order to appear wonderfully wise, degrade the understanding of their pupil, affect to treat him as a child, and to distinguish themselves from him in every transaction. So far from thus depressing his juvenile spirit, you ought to omit nothing that may tend to elevate your pupil's mind. That his may become your equals, treat them as such; since you cannot lift them up to your level, descend without scruple to their's. Remember that your honour is no longer in yourself but in your pupil; to inspire him with courage partake his faults; and to efface his shame you must take it upon yourself: imitate that brave Roman who, finding it impossible to rally his flying army, put himself at their head, and retreating with the rest, cried aloud: "*they do not fly, they only follow their leader.*" Was he dishonoured by this conduct? by no means: by thus sacrificing his glory he increased its lustre. The force of duty and the charms of virtue command our approbation, in spite of ourselves, and overturn all our irrational prejudices. If I were to receive from Emilius a box on the ear in consequence of performing my duty to him, so far from resenting the affront, I should boast of it wherever I came; and I am of opinion there are few people in the world base enough not to esteem me the more on that very account.

Not that our pupil ought to suppose his tutor as ignorant as himself, and as easy to be imposed  
on.



on. Such an opinion might do in a mere child, who, being incapable of comparing ideas, brings mankind to a level with himself, and gives his confidence to those only who know how to reduce themselves to his standard. But a youth of the age of Emilius, and of his sense, is not to be thus imposed on. His confidence in his governor is of another kind: it is founded on the authority of reason and superiority of knowledge, on advantages which are obvious to the pupil, and of whose utility to himself he has no doubt. Long experience has convinced him that he is beloved by his tutor; that his tutor is a prudent, sensible man, who has both the inclination and power to promote his happiness; and therefore it is his interest to listen to his advice.

But, if the tutor suffers himself to be as easily deceived as his pupil, will he not lose his credit and forfeit the right of advising? Or would it not be equally improper for our youth to suppose that his tutor laid snares for his simplicity, and designedly suffered him to be imposed on? What then must be done to avoid these two inconveniencies? The best method, and the most natural, is to imitate his simplicity and truth, warn him of the dangers to which he is exposed, point them out with precision and perspicuity, but without exaggeration, ill-humour, or pedantry; and especially avoid delivering your advice in the style of commands, lest that imperious tone should in time become necessary. If, nevertheless, he should persist, which doubt-

less will sometimes be the case, say not a word, leave him at full liberty, follow him, imitate him, and that with all the good humour you can possibly assume. If the consequences should grow too dangerous, you can stop them whenever you think proper. In the mean while, there can be no doubt but your former advice and present compliance will have their effect on the mind of your pupil. His faults are so many reins in your hands to stop his course as often as it shall be necessary. The great art, therefore, of the tutor is so to manage his opportunities, and apply his exhortations, that he may be able to foresee when his pupil will comply and when he will persist; thus he will be constantly surrounded by lessons of experience, without being exposed to too much danger.

Point out the evil consequence of his faults before he commits them: but never reproach him for what is past, because that will answer no other purpose than to rouse and inflame his self-love. Nothing can be more idle than the phrase, *I told you what would happen*. The best method to make him remember what you say, is to seem to forget it yourself. When you perceive him ashamed of not having followed your advice, raise him gently from his humiliation by words of candour and encouragement. Nothing will more certainly conciliate his affection than to find that, on his account, you are unmindful of yourself; and that, instead of exulting, you console him. If, on the contrary,

you

you add reproaches to his chagrin, he will infallibly hate you, and will determine to listen to you no longer, were it only to convince you that he differs from you in opinion with regard to the importance of your advice.

Even your consolations may be so ordered as to convey instruction, which will have the better effect for not having the appearance of a lecture. For instance, by saying that many others have committed the same fault, you throw him off his guard, you correct whilst you seem only to pity him: for to him, who thought himself above the generality of young people, to console him with their example must be a mortifying circumstance; it is to insinuate that all the excuse he can pretend to, is that they are no better than himself.

The age of faults is the age of fables. In censuring the culpable under a borrowed mask, you instruct without offending; your pupil perceives that the moral is no lie, by the truth of its application to himself. A child who has never been deceived by flattery will not comprehend the fable which I heretofore examined; but the forward youth, who has been duped by a sycophant, perceives immediately that the raven was a fool. Thus from a fact he draws a maxim; and the experience, which otherwise he would soon have forgotten, is, by a fable, deeply impressed on his memory. There is no moral instruction which may not be acquired either by our own experience or by that of others. In

cases where this experience may be attended with danger, it must be learnt from history. When it may be done with safety, it is best to let youth make the experiment; and then instead of the moral, we reduce to maxims the particular cases with which they are acquainted.

I do not mean that these maxims ought to be explained or even expressed. Nothing can be more absurd than the morals with which fables generally end; as if the moral was not included in the fable, so as to appear obvious to the reader: why then should we deprive him of the pleasure of finding it himself? The great art of instruction is to render it pleasing to your pupil, and, at the same time, not so palpably explicit, as to leave his mind entirely inactive. The pride of the tutor should leave something for that of the pupil; let him say to himself, I conceive, I penetrate, I act, I instruct myself. One of the reasons why the Pantaloon in the Italian comedy is so extremely tiresome, is his taking so much pains to explain his low wit to the audience. I would not have a tutor to be a Pantaloon, and much less an authour. We should speak and write so as to be understood, but we are not to say all: he that says all, says very little in effect, for he will soon be disregarded. Of what consequence are those four lines which La Fontaine adds to the fable of the frog and the ox? Was he afraid it would not be understood? Could it be necessary for so great a painter to  
write

write their names under his figures? So far from rendering his moral, by this means, general, he makes it particular, and by confining it to the object in question, prevents the reader from applying it to any other. Before I put the fables of this inimitable writer into the hands of my pupil, I would certainly curtail each fable of its conclusion, in which the authour takes the trouble of explaining what he has before so clearly and agreeably related. If the learner does not understand the fable without explication, be assured he will never understand it all.

These fables ought to be disposed in a manner more instructive, and better adapted to the capacity of youth. Nothing can be more ridiculous than to follow the order in which they happen to be placed, without any regard to circumstance or occasion: first the raven, then the grasshopper, then the frog, then the two mules, and so on. These two mules have made a particular impression on my mind, because I remember to have known a boy, who was intended for an employment in the revenue, read, get by heart, and repeat this fable a thousand times, without ever conceiving the least objection to the occupation for which he was intended. I not only do not remember ever to have known children make a solid application of the fables they had learnt, but I do not even recollect ever to have seen any body trouble their heads about the matter. Moral instruction is the pretence of this study; but the real intention both of the parent and



the child, is, by his repeating the fables, to excite the admiration of the company: therefore, when he grows up, having no longer occasion to recite them, they all escape his memory, at that very time when he ought to profit by them. In short, fables are calculated for the instruction of men only: it is therefore now the proper time for Emilius to begin.

Not choosing to be too explicit, I have pointed out, at a distance, those paths which diverge from the right road; being known, they may easily be avoided. By pursuing that which I have traced out, I believe, your pupil will purchase the knowledge of himself, and of mankind, at the cheapest rate possible; that he will be able to contemplate the sport of fortune without envying her favourites; and will be satisfied with himself, without thinking other people less wise. We have begun to make him act, in order to qualify him for a spectator: let us finish our task. From the pit we see the objects as they seem; but from the scenes we behold them as they really are. If we mean to survey the whole, we must fix ourselves in the proper point of view; but we must come nearer the object, when we design to examine its parts. But under what pretensions can a stripling enter into the affairs of the world? What right has he to be initiated into these dark mysteries? The intrigues of pleasure are inconsistent with his interest at that age: he can dispose only of himself, and he might as well have nothing to dispose

dispose of. Man is the worst of all merchandise: among all our important rights of property, that of our persons is the least considerable.

When I observe that during the age of the greatest activity, young people are generally confined to studies which are merely speculative; and that they are afterwards suddenly pushed into the world without the least experience, I find it to be a practice contrary both to reason and nature, and am no longer surpris'd that so few men are capable of conducting themselves through life. Can any thing be more unaccountable than to spend so much time in teaching us things which are quite useless, whilst the great art of acting is entirely neglected. Under a pretence of forming us for society, we are instructed as if each individual were destined to spend his whole life in chimerical speculations alone in a cell. You teach your children a certain form of words, and a few contorsions of the body, and then you conclude them perfectly acquainted with the art of living. I too have taught my Emilius how to live; for I have instructed him how to live by himself, and have also taught him how to earn his bread: but this is not enough. In order to live in the world, it is necessary that we should know how to deal with mankind, and the means by which advantages are obtained; we must know how to calculate the action and reaction of particular interest in civil society, and so far to foresee events,

as not to be often deceived, but always to embrace the most probable means of success. The laws do not permit children to transact their own affairs nor dispose of their fortunes; but why this precaution? If till the age prescribed they can acquire no experience, they will be no wiser at twenty-five than they were at fifteen. Without doubt it is necessary to take care that a youth, blinded by ignorance and deceived by his passions, commits no folly the consequences of which might be fatal; but at all ages we are capable of beneficence, and, under the guidance of a prudent man, may certainly assist the unhappy.

A child becomes attached to his mother and his nurse by their peculiar care of him. The practice of the social virtues roots the love of humanity in the bottom of our hearts. By doing good actions we become good ourselves: I know of no method more certain. Employ your pupil in every good action within his power; teach him to consider the interest of the indigent as his own; let him not only assist them with his purse but with his care; he must protect them, and dedicate his person and time to their service; he is their steward, he can never be more nobly employed. How many poor wretches groaning under oppression, who would never have been heard, will obtain justice when demanded by him with that intrepidity which the exercise of virtue inspires; when he forces open the gates of the rich  
and

and great; when he penetrates, if necessary, even to the throne, and pleads the cause of those to whom all admittance was rendered impossible by their misery, and who were fearful of complaining, lest they should be punished for the ills with which they were oppressed.

But are we to make a knight errant, a Don Quixote of our Emilius? Shall he intrude into publick affairs, play the Sage, and the defender of the laws among the great, a solicitor to the judges, and a pleader in courts of justice? I know nothing of all this. Ridiculous appellations make no alteration in the nature of things. Emilius must do every thing which he knows to be useful and good; he will do no more, and he knows that nothing can be useful and good for him, which is not suitable to his age. He knows that his first duty is towards himself, that youth ought to be diffident, circumspect, respectful to age, cautious of speaking without cause, modest in matters of indifference, but intrepid in doing well, and resolute in speaking the truth. Such were the illustrious Romans, who, before they were admitted to publick employments, spend their youth in opposing vice and defending innocence, without any other advantage than that of instructing themselves, in support of justice and morality.

Emilius likes no riot or quarelling, neither among men\*, nor in the brute creation. He

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will

\* But suppose any one should resolve to quarrel with him, how must he behave? I answer, his conduct will

will never set dogs to worry each other, nor encourage them to pursue a cat. The spirit of peace is the natural effect of his education; his self-opinion not having been fomented, he seeks no pleasure in dominion, nor in the misfortunes of others.

he such that he will never be exposed to quarrels. But, say you, who can be secure from a slap in the face, or from not having the lie given him by some brutal drunkard, or hectoring bravo, who for the pleasure of killing his man begins by affronting him? The case is different: neither the honour, nor life, of a worthy member of society ought to be at the mercy of such wretches, and we can no more be secure from such an accident than from the fall of a tile. A slap in the face, or the lie, received and endured, will be attended with consequences to society, which no wisdom can prevent, and for which no tribunal can avenge the person injured. Therefore, the insufficiency of the laws in this case restores to him his liberty, and he becomes the sole magistrate, the sole judge between the offender and himself; he must interpret and execute the law of nature; he owes himself justice, he can receive it from no other hand, and there can be no government on earth so senseless as to punish him for having taken it. I do not say he ought to fight; that were madness: I say he owes himself justice, and he is the only dispenser of it. Without so many edicts against duelling, were I a sovereign prince, I would be answerable to put an entire stop to affronts of this kind, and that by a very simple method with which the courts of justice should have no concern. Be that as it may, Emilius, if the case should happen, knows the justice he owes himself, and the example he ought to set to persons of honour. It is not in the power of the bravest man to prevent his being insulted; but it is certainly in his power to prevent the person insulting him from long making a boast of it.



others. He suffers when he sees others suffer ; it is a natural sensation. The hearts of youth are hardened by vanity ; when they receive pleasure from the torment of a sensible being, it is because they believe themselves exempted from such pains, by their wisdom or superiority. Those, who are early taught to think otherwise, are in no danger of falling into this vice. Emilius loves peace. The appearance of happiness gives him pleasure ; and that pleasure is an additional motive for him to endeavour to promote it. I never supposed that he would behold the unhappy with that fruitless, cruel, compassion, which contents itself with bewailing the evils which it might remove. His active beneficence produces a knowledge which, with a more obdurate heart, he would have acquired much later, or perhaps not at all. If discord reigns among his companions, he endeavours to reconcile them ; if he sees his fellow-creatures in affliction, he enquires into the cause ; if the wretched groan under the oppression of the great and powerful, he will not rest till he has detected the iniquity of the oppressor ; in short, the means of alleviating distress he always considers as a matter of importance. How then shall we proceed, in order to make a proper use, according to his age, of these favourable dispositions ? We must regulate his attention and knowledge, and endeavour to augment them by a proper application of his zeal.

I cannot

I cannot repeat it too often: let your lessons to youth consist in action rather than words; they must learn nothing from books which may be taught by experience. Can any thing be more absurd than to make them harangue without a motive; to suppose it possible to make them feel all the energy of the language of the passions, and the power of persuasion, without having any interest in persuading? All the precepts in the art of rhetorick seem a mere jumble of words to those who do not perceive the advantage of using them. What is it to a school-boy how Hannibal prevailed on his troops to pass the Alps? If, instead of these magnificent harangues, you were to teach him how to prevail on the master to give him a holiday, be assured he would be more attentive to your instructions.

Were I to teach rhetorick to a youth whose passions were perfectly ripened, I would constantly throw such objects in his way as would excite them, and I would then consider with him what language is most likely to persuade mankind to favour his desires. But my Emilius happens not to be in a situation so favourable to the art of oratory. Confined almost to mere physical necessities, he has less need of mankind than others have of him; and having nothing to ask for himself, he is not interested enough in any cause to be violently affected. Hence it follows that his language will be simple; he generally speaks to the point, and only  
with

with a design to be understood; he is not sententious, because he has not learnt to generalize his ideas; he uses few metaphors, because his passions are seldom enflamed.

Not that Emilius is quite flegmatick and cold; this, neither his age, his manners, nor his taste will permit. In the fire of youth the animal spirits, retained and mingled with his blood, convey to his young heart a fervour which sparkles in his eyes, enlivens his conversation, and influences all his actions. He acquires an emphasis in speaking, and sometimes vehemence. The noble sentiments with which he is inspired give him force and elevation; influenced by his great humanity, when he speaks he expresses the emotions of his soul; there is a generous unreservedness in his manner, which is more persuasive than the artificial eloquence of others; or rather, he alone is truly eloquent, for he needs only display his own feelings, to communicate them to his hearers.

The more I reflect, the more I am convinced, that by thus employing the principle of benevolence, and by drawing, from our good or bad success, reflexions on their causes, there is little useful knowledge which may not be cultivated in the mind of a youth; and that to the real learning of the schools may be added that which is much more important, namely, its application to the uses of life. Thus interested in the welfare of his fellow-creatures, he will soon learn to estimate their actions, their taste, their pleasures,

pleasures, and in general to fix a truer value on what will promote or destroy human felicity, than those who know no interest separate from their own, and who act only for themselves. Such men are too strongly biased to judge rationally. Applying every thing to themselves, and forming their ideas of good and evil by their own advantages, they fill their minds with a thousand ridiculous prejudices, and every attempt that clashes with their interest seems to threaten destruction to the universe.

If we extend this self-love to other beings, it becomes a virtue, and there exists not a human heart in which it may not be found. The less immediately the object of our care is attached to ourselves, the less the illusion of self-interest is to be apprehended; the more we generalise that interest the more equitable it becomes, and the love of mankind will be no other than the love of justice. If, therefore, we intend that Emilius shall be virtuous, let us endeavour in all his transactions to detach him from himself. The more he devotes his time and attention to the happiness of others, the more rational will be his conduct, and the less he will be deceived in his judgement of good and evil; but he must indulge no capricious partiality. Why should he injure one to serve another? It is of little consequence to him, who has the greatest share of fortune, provided it concurs in augmenting the general felicity: that is the first concern of a wise man, next to his private interest; for  
each

each is a part of his species, and not of another individual.

To prevent compassion from degenerating into weakness, it must extend to all mankind: we shall then carry it no farther than is consistent with justice; because, of all virtues, justice contributes most to man's happiness. From reason, and from a regard to ourselves, our love to our species should over-balance that to our neighbour: there can be no greater cruelty to mankind than to indulge compassion for the wicked.

Upon the whole, let it be observed that all the means by which I detach my pupil from himself, have ultimately a direct tendency towards him; and will not only afford him pleasure upon reflexion, but whilst he is employed in acts of benevolence to others he himself insensibly imbibes instruction.

Having prescribed the means, let us now observe the effect. What vast designs I see gradually forming in his mind! How do his sublime sentiments prevent the seeds of every groveling passion from taking root in his heart! How clear his judgement! How justly he is enabled to reason from his regulated desires, and from that experience which confines the wishes of a great soul within the narrow limits of possibility, and induces superior minds (unable to elevate the notions of the multitude) to let themselves down to the common level! The true principles of rectitude, the just model of the Beautiful, the moral



ral relations of beings, and all the ideas of order are impressed on his understanding; he sees how every thing ought to be, and the reason why it is otherwise; he knows what will be productive of good, and what will have a contrary effect; without having experienced the human passions, he is sensible of their consequence, and their illusion.

Hurried on by the natural force of things, I am carried perhaps a little precipitately forward; without any intention, however, of imposing on the judgement of my readers. It is long since they have imagined me to be wandering in the land of chimeras; and I as constantly see them misled in that of prejudices. In departing so far from vulgar opinions, they are nevertheless, incessantly present to my mind. I examine and meditate on them, neither with a view to adopt or reject them; but to weigh them in the balance of right reason. The moment I am obliged to depart from them, I take it, on known experience, for granted, that nobody will follow me: I know that people in general, persisting in the reality and propriety only of what they see before their eyes, will take my pupil for an imaginary and fantastick being, because he differs from all those with whom they compare him; without thinking that he ought to be so different, on account of his different mode of education. Thus having taught him contrary maxims and affected him with different sentiments, it would be more surprising that he should resemble, than that

that he should differ from ordinary pupils. Mine is not an artificial, but a natural man. There certainly should appear a difference between him and us.

At the commencement of this work, I made no supposition of any thing which the whole world might not observe as well as myself. The birth of man is a term from which we all set out alike: but the farther I advance, in the cultivation of our nature, and you in the depravation of it, the farther we necessarily depart from each other. My pupil, at six years of age, differed but little from your's; as you had not then had time enough to spoil him; but the age at which the former is now arrived ought to represent him in a very different form, if I have not thrown my time and pains away. The quantity of information or number of acquirements may be the same, both on the one part and on the other; but the nature of that information or the knowledge acquired is very different. You are astonished to find in your pupils those sublime sentiments of which mine has not the least notion or idea; but you are to consider that the former were philosophers and theologists, before Emilius knew what philosophy was, or even heard talk of a deity.

If any person should object, therefore, and tell me that nothing which I have supposed has any real existence, that young people are not so formed, that they have such or such passions; that they do so or so; what is all this? They  
might

might as well deny that an apple-tree is ever a large standard tree, because we see nothing but dwarfs in our gardens.

I must take the liberty to desire those persons, who are so ready to censure, to consider that I know every thing they can say on this head as well as they; that I have reflected on this subject, in all probability much longer than they; and that, having no interest to impose on them, I have a right to expect they will not precipitately condemn me, without taking proper time to examine wherein I may be mistaken. Let them investigate first the constitution of man; let them trace the developements of the human heart in such or such circumstances, in order that they may know, how much one individual may differ from another on account of education: let them then compare my system with the effects I attribute to it, and, if they demonstrate that I have reasoned falsely, I have nothing further to say.

I am the more positive, and think myself the more excusable for being so, on this head, as I have indulged myself as little as possible in systematick reasoning; but have rested my whole cause on observation. I lay no stress on what I have imagined, but on what I have seen. It is true that I have not confined my observations within the walls of a city, nor to any one order of men; but, after having taken a comparative view of as many ranks and degrees of people as I have met with, during a whole life spent in observing

observing them, I have thrown aside, as artificial, all the peculiarities of particular nations, ranks, and conditions; and have regarded those things only, as incontestibly belonging to man, which are common to men of all countries, ages, and circumstances of life.

Now, if adopting this method, you trace, from his infancy, the steps of a young man, who should receive no particular form, but be influenced as little as possible by the authority and opinion of others, which, do you think, he would most resemble? my pupil or your's? This seems to me the precise question to be resolved by those, who would determine whether or not I am mistaken.

Men do not easily begin to think, but when they begin they never cease to think afterwards. The understanding, once accustomed to reflexion, can never remain inactive. It may hence be suspected that I have, in this respect, done either too much or too little; that the human mind is not naturally so ready to display its faculties as I have supposed, and that after having given it a premature facility of exerting them, I restrain them too long within so narrow a circle of ideas.

But consider, in the first place, that there is a wide difference between educating a man for society, according to the principles of nature, and the rearing a savage, to be sent afterwards to inhabit the woods. It is sufficient that my pupil, secluded within the vortex of society, is  
prevented

prevented from being infected by the contagion of the passions and prejudices of mankind; that he see, and feel himself governed by no other authority than that of his own reason. In this situation it is evident that he will be struck by a multitude of objects, that he will be affected by a variety of sentiments; all which, with the various means suggested to provide for his real wants, will furnish him with a multiplicity of ideas which he would otherwise never have had, or at least would have acquired much later. The natural progress of the understanding is indeed accelerated but not perverted. The same man, who would have remained stupid if strolling about a forest, would have become a reasonable creature if living in a city, even though only a simple uninstructed spectator.

Nothing is more proper to render a man sensible and prudent than the follies he sees practised, without partaking of them; nay, even the participation of them is still farther improving, provided he is not made a dupe to them, and does not adopt the errors of those who are principally concerned in committing them.

It should be considered, also, that, as we are confined by our faculties to sensible objects, we are not easily influenced to conceive abstract notions of philosophy, and ideas purely intellectual.

To acquire these, it is necessary, either to disengage ourselves from the body to which we are so firmly attached; to make a slow and gradual progress from object to object, or in short to  
take



take at once a gigantick step from the material to the intellectual world, of which a child is incapable. To get over the interval between them requires indeed, for men, a ladder of many rounds, expressly made for that purpose. The first abstract idea we conceive, is the first of these rounds; but I cannot easily apprehend how they are combined and constructed.

The incomprehensible being, in whom every thing is comprehended, who gives motion to the material, and life to the animal, system, is neither visible to the sight nor palpable to the touch: he escapes the investigation of all our senses. The work is displayed at large, but the artist is concealed. It is not a little point attained, even to know that he exists; and when we have got so far, and would enquire farther what he is, and where! our understanding soon bewilders itself, and we no longer know what to think of him.

Locke would have us begin our studies with the investigation of spirits, and to pass from thence to that of bodies. This method is that of superstition, prejudice, and error; it is not that of reason, nor even of nature rightly disposed: this would be to shut our eyes in order to learn to see. It is requisite to study the nature of bodies a long time to acquire a true notion of spirits, or even to suspect that they exist. By proceeding in a contrary order we only proceed to establish materialism.

As our senses are the primary instruments of our knowledge, perceptible and corporeal objects

jects are the only ones of which we have the immediate idea. The word spirit has no meaning with those who have never philosophised. With children, and with ordinary people, a spirit is nothing more than a body. Do not they conceive that spirits talk, fight, and make a noise? It must be acknowledged therefore that such spirits, having arms and tongues, must greatly resemble human bodies. This is the reason why all the people in the world, not excepting the Jews themselves, have worshipped corporeal deities. Even we, christians, with our theological terms of Spirit, the Trinity, and the persons of the Godhead, are, for the most part, real anthropomorphites. I own indeed we are taught to say, that God is every where present: but we believe also that air is diffused throughout the universe, at least throughout our atmosphere; and the word Spirit in its original signification, stands for *breath* or *wind*. If once people are brought to use words of which they do not understand the meaning, it is easy, after that, to make them say what we please.

The sense of our action on other bodies should, very naturally, at first make us believe, that when they acted on us it must be in a similar manner. Thus man began to suppose all those beings animated, of whose action he became susceptible. Perceiving also that most of those beings had more strength than he had, he supposed that strength to be unlimited, and thus  
made

made as many deities as he became acquainted with bodies. During the first ages of the world, man, being apprehensive of danger from every object, beheld nothing dead or inanimate in nature. He was not longer in acquiring the abstract idea of matter than that of spirit. Thus did mankind stock the universe with material divinities. The stars, winds, mountains, rivers, trees, even houses, every thing was possessed of a soul, and had its deity. The monkeys of Laban, the manitou of the savages, the fetiches of the Negroes, the works of art as well as nature, have been formerly esteemed as Gods by mankind. Polytheism was the first religion in the world, and the first worship was idolatry. Men could not arrive at the acknowledgment of one God, till, generalising their ideas by degrees, they were enabled to recur to a first cause, to unite the whole system of beings in one idea, and to give a meaning to the word *substance*, which is in fact the greatest of abstractions. Every child who believes in God is, therefore, necessarily an idolater, or at least an anthropomorphite; and when even the imagination hath attained a view of the deity, it is very seldom that the understanding can form any conception of him. This is the very error into which the order prescribed by Mr. Locke will necessarily lead us.

Having fallen, I hardly know how, on the abstract idea of substance; it is plain that in order to admit of the existence only of one simple

substance, we must suppose it possessed of qualities that are incompatible, and reciprocally exclusive of each other, such as those of thought and extension, one of which is essentially divisible, and the other incapable of divisibility. Thought, or, if you will, sentiment, is, beside, supposed to be a primitive quality and inseparable from the substance to which it belongs; that it bears the same relation to it as even its extension. Hence it is to be concluded that those beings which lose either of these qualities lose the substance also to which it belongs; that, of consequence, death is only a separation of substances, and that Beings, in which these two qualities are united, are composed of the two substances to which these two qualities appertain.

Now, reflect on the vast difference that still remains between the notion of these two substances and that of the divine nature; between the incomprehensible idea of the action of the soul on the body: and the idea of the action of God on all created beings. The ideas of a creating and annihilating power, omnipresence, eternity, omnipotence, are those of the divine attributes, which so small a part of mankind are capable to form, confused and indistinct as they are, and which nevertheless do not appear obscure at all to the common people, because they form nothing of them. How is it possible to present these ideas in all their force, that is to say, in their full obscurity, to those



youthful understandings which are as yet totally occupied with the primary operations of the senses, and are hardly able to conceive any thing but what they feel. It is in vain the vast abyss of infinity is thrown open before us; a child cannot be struck and confounded at the unfathomable void, its feeble opticks cannot pierce its immense profundity. Every thing appears infinite to children, they know not how to prescribe bounds to any thing; not because they extend the limits of nature beyond measure, but because the rule of their understanding is so short. I have even observed that they place infinity more often within, than without, the limits which are even known to them. They estimate a space to be immense, rather by their feet than their eyes; infinity does not extend farther than they can see, but only farther than they can go. If we speak to them of the power of the deity, they think him almost as strong as their father. Their knowledge in all cases, being to them the measure of possibilities, they judge every thing that is told them to be less, and inferior to what they know. Such are the conclusions natural to ignorance and weakness of understanding. Ajax was afraid to encounter Achilles, and yet challenged Jupiter: this was because he knew the strength and prowess of Achilles, and was ignorant of the omnipotence of Jove. Should we endeavour to give a Swiss peasant, who imagines himself the wealthiest of mankind,



the idea of a king, he will ask us, with an air of purse-proud self-sufficiency, if a king has an hundred cows grazing on the mountains?

I foresee how much my readers will be surprised to find I have attended my pupil throughout the whole first age of life, without once speaking to him of religion. He hardly knows, at fifteen years of age, whether or not he hath a soul; and perhaps it will not be time to inform him of it when he is eighteen; for if he learns it too soon, he runs a risk of never knowing it at all.

If I were to design a picture of the most deplorable stupidity, I would draw a pedant teaching children their catechism; and were I resolved to crack the brain of a child, I would oblige him to explain what he said when he repeated his catechism. It may be objected, that the greater part of the dogmas of christianity being mysterious, to expect the human mind should be capable of conceiving them, is not so much to expect children should be men, but that man should be something more. To this I answer, in the first place, that there are mysteries, which it is not only impossible for man to comprehend but also to believe; and I do not see what we get by teaching them to children, unless it be to learn them betimes to tell lies. I will say further, that before we admit of mysteries, it is necessary for us to comprehend, at least, that they are incomprehensible; and children are not even capable of this. At an age when every  
thing

thing is mysterious, there are no such things properly speaking as mysteries.

*Believe in God and thou shalt be saved.* This dogma, misunderstood, is the principle of sanguinary persecution, and the cause of all those futile instructions which have given a mortal blow to human reason, by accustoming it to be satisfied with words. Doubtless, not a moment is to be lost when we are running the race of eternal salvation: but if, to obtain this important prize, it be sufficient to learn to repeat a set form of words, I do not see what should hinder us from peopling heaven with magpies and parroquets as well as with children.

To impose an obligation of believing supposes the possibility of it. The philosopher who does not believe is certainly in the wrong; because he misuses the understanding he has cultivated, and is capacitated to comprehend the sublime truths he rejects. But, though a child should profess the christian religion, what can he believe? He can believe only what he conceives, and he conceives so little of what is said to him, that if you tell him directly the contrary, he adopts the latter dogma as readily as he did the former. The faith of children, and indeed of many grown persons, is merely an affair of geography. Are they to be rewarded in heaven because they were born at Rome and not at Mecca. One man is told that Mahomet was a prophet sent by God, and he accordingly says that Mahomet was a prophet sent by God:

the other is told that Mahomet was an imposter, and he in like manner also says Mahomet was an imposter. Had these two persons only changed places, each would also have changed his tone, and affirmed what he now denies. Can we infer from two dispositions so much alike, that one will go to heaven and the other to hell? When a child says he believes in God, it is not in God he believes, but in Peter or James, who tell him there is something which is called God; thus he believes in the manner of Euripides, when Jupiter was thus addressed in one of his tragedies\*;

*O Jupiter! Though nothing I know of thee  
but thy name—*

We protestants hold that no child, who dies before he arrives at the age of reason, is deprived of salvation: the Roman Catholicks believe the same of every child that is baptised, though it should never once have heard the name of God. There are some cases therefore in which men may be saved without believing in God, as in infancy or imbecility of mind, as in ideots and madmen, where the understanding is incapable of the operations requisite to infer an acknowledgement of the deity. All the difference that I see here between me and my readers is, that you think children of seven years of age capacitated to believe in God, and I do not think

\* The tragedy of Menalippus, which at first began with this line; but the clamours of the Athenians obliged Euripides afterwards to alter it. *Plutarch*.

think them capable of it even at fifteen. Whether I am right or wrong in this particular, it is not in itself an article of faith, but only a simple observation in natural history.

On the same principles, it is evident that if a man should arrive at old age without believing in God, he would not be deprived of his presence in the other world, provided his infidelity was not wilful; and this I say may sometimes happen. You will admit that, with respect to madmen, a malady deprives them of their intellectual faculties, but not of their condition as men, nor of course of their claim to the beneficence of their creator. Why, then, will you not admit the same claim in those, who, sequestered in their infancy from all society, have lived the real life of a savage, deprived of that information which is to be acquired only by conversation with mankind\*? For it is a demonstrable impossibility that such a savage should ever raise his ideas to the knowledge of the true God. Reason tells us that man is punishable only for his wilful errors, and that invincible ignorance can never be imputed to him as a crime. Hence it should follow that, in the eye of eternal justice, every man who would have believed had he had the opportunities of information, will appear as a believer; and that none will be punished for infidelity but those whose hearts refuse to admit the truth.

L 4

Let

\* See the first part of my discourse on the inequality of mankind; wherein I treat of the natural state of the human mind and the slowness of its progress.



Let us beware of divulging the truth to those who are incapable of understanding it: for this is the way to substitute error in the room of it. It were better to have no idea of God at all, than to entertain those which are mean, fantastical, injurious, and unworthy a divine object: it is a less crime to be ignorant of, than insult, him. I had much rather, says the amiable Plutarch, that people should believe there is no such person as Plutarch in the world, than that they should say he is unjust, envious, jealous, and so tyrannical as to require of others what he has not left them power to perform.

The great evil of those preposterous images of the Deity, which we may trace in the minds of children, is, that they remain indelible during their whole life; and that when they are men they have no better conceptions of God than they had when they were children. I once knew a very worthy and pious woman in Switzerland so well satisfied of the truth of this maxim, that she would give her son no early instructions about religion, lest he should content himself with such imperfect ideas as he was then only able to conceive, and neglect the acquisition of more perfect ones when he grew up. This child never heard the name of God pronounced but with awe and reverence; and whenever he began to speak of him was immediately silenced, as if the subject was too great and sublime for his comprehension. This reserve excited his curiosity, and his self-love aspired after the time  
when



when it should be proper for him to be made acquainted with the mystery that was so carefully concealed from him. The less he was spoken to of God, the less he was suffered to speak of him, the more his thoughts were employed on this unknown object. He saw God in every thing around him; and what I should fear most from this air of mystery carried to extremes, would be, that, in overheating the imagination of a young man, it would turn his head, and that in the end it would make him a fanatick instead of a believer.

We need be under no such apprehensions, however, with respect to Emilius, who, constantly refusing to pay any attention to objects above his capacity, hears with the most perfect indifference those things he doth not understand. There are so many of these, of which he is accustomed to say, "this matter is not my concern," that he will not be embarrassed about any one that may be proposed to him; and even when he begins to interest himself in these important questions, it is not because he may have happened to hear them proposed, but when the progress of his understanding leads him to such disquisitions.

We have seen by what means a cultivated understanding makes its approaches to the knowledge of these mysteries, and I readily agree that it does not naturally arrive at such knowledge, even in the midst of society, before we reach a very advanced age. But, as there are

numerous and inevitable causes in society, from which the progress of the passions is accelerated; if the progress of the understanding, which serves to regulate those passions, be not accelerated in the same proportion, then it is that we depart from the order of nature, and that the equilibrium between our reason and our passions is destroyed. If we are not sufficiently our own masters to moderate a too rapid development of certain faculties, it is necessary to hurry on with the same rapidity those which ought to correspond with them, so that the order in which they should all be naturally displayed be not perverted; that those which ought to go together be not separated; and that man, as the same conscious individual during every moment of his life, should not be advanced to a certain degree by one of his faculties, and to a different degree by another.

What a difficulty do I see here rising up against me! a difficulty by so much the greater as it depends less on the things themselves, than on the pusillanimity of those who dare not venture to resolve it. Let us begin at least by daring to propose it. A child should be educated in the religion of his father; it is always easy to convince him that such a faith, be it what it will, is the only true one; and that all others are absurd and extravagant. The force of our arguments on this head depends absolutely on this point, to wit, on the country in which they are proposed. Let a Turk, who finds  
Christianity

Christianity so ridiculous at Constantinople, go and see how ridiculous Mahometanism is at Paris. Custom and prejudice triumph particularly in matters of religion. But how shall we, who, on all occasions, pretend to shake off its yoke; we, who pay no regard to the authority of opinion; who would teach our pupil nothing but what he might have learned himself, in any country; in what religion shall we educate Emilius? To what sect shall we unite the man of nature? The answer appears to me very simple; we shall unite him neither to one nor another; but place him in a proper situation, and qualify him to make choice of that which the best use of his reason may induce him to adopt.

*Incedo per ignes*

*Suppositos cineri doloso.*

No matter; my zeal and sincerity have hitherto stood me in the stead of prudence. I hope these, my securities, will not forsake me in necessity. Fear not, readers, that I shall take any precautions unworthy a friend to truth: I shall never lose sight of my motto; but certainly I may be permitted to distrust my own judgement. Instead of telling you what I think myself, I will give you the sentiments of a man of greater weight than I am. I answer for the veracity of the facts which are here related: they really happened to the authour of the paper I am going to transcribe. It is your business to see if any useful reflexions may be drawn from it relative

to the subject of which it treats. I neither propose the sentiments of myself or another as a rule for you, but only submit them to your examination.

“ABOUT thirty years ago, a young man, who had forsaken his own country and rambled into Italy, found himself reduced to circumstances of great poverty and distress. He had been bred a Calvinist: but, in consequence of his misconduct, and of being unhappily a fugitive in a foreign country, without money or friends, he was induced to change his religion for the sake of subsistence. To this end he procured admittance into an house established for the reception of proselytes. Here, the instructions he received concerning some controversial points, excited doubts he had not before entertained, and brought him first acquainted with the evil of the step he had taken. He was taught strange dogmas, and was eye-witness to stranger manners; and to these he saw himself a destined victim. He now attempted to make his escape, but was prevented, and more closely confined; if he complained, he was punished for complaining; and, lying at the mercy of his tyrannical oppressors, found himself treated as criminal, because he could not without reluctance submit to be so. Let those, who are sensible how much the first act of violence and injustice irritate young and unexperienced minds, judge of the situation of this unfortunate youth. Sworn with indignation, the tears of

rage



rage burst from his eyes. He implored the assistance of heaven and earth in vain; he appealed to the whole world, but nobody attended to his plea. His complaints could reach the ears only of a parcel of vile domesticks, slaves to the wretch by whom he was thus treated; or accomplices in the same crime; who ridiculed his non-conformity and endeavoured to excite his imitation. He had been doubtless entirely ruined had it not been for the good offices of an honest ecclesiastick, who came to the hospital on some business, and with whom he found an opportunity of a private conference. The good priest was himself poor, and stood in need of every one's assistance; the oppressed proselyte, however, stood yet in greater need of him: the former did not hesitate, therefore, to favour his escape, at the risk of making himself a powerful enemy.

“ Having escaped from vice only to return to indigence, this young adventurer struggled without success against his destiny: for a moment, indeed, he thought himself above it, and at the first prospect of good-fortune, his former distresses and his protector were forgotten together. He was soon punished, however, for his ingratitude, as his groundless hopes soon vanished: his youth stood in vain on his side; his romantick notions proving destructive to all his designs. Having neither capacity nor address to surmount the difficulties that fell in his way; stranger to the virtues of moderation and the  
arts



arts of knavery, he attempted so many things that he could bring none to perfection. Hence, fallen into his former distress, in want of food and lodging, and ready to perish with hunger, he recollected his benefactor.

“ To him he returned, and was well received; the sight of the unhappy youth brought to the poor vicar’s mind the remembrance of a good action: a remembrance always grateful to an honest mind. This good priest was naturally humane and compassionate, his own misfortunes had taught him to feel for those of others, nor had prosperity hardened his heart; in a word, the maxims of true wisdom and conscious virtue had confirmed the goodness of his natural disposition. He cordially embraced the young wanderer, provided him a lodging, and shared with him the slender means of his own subsistence. Nor was this all: he went still farther, giving him both instruction and consolation, in order to teach him that difficult art of supporting adversity with patience. Could you believe, ye sons of prejudice! that a priest, and a priest in Italy too, could be capable of this?

“ This honest ecclesiastick was a poor Savoyard, who, having in his younger days incurred the displeasure of his bishop, was obliged to pass the mountains, in order to seek that provision which was denied him in his own country. He was neither deficient in literature nor understanding; his talents, therefore, together with an engaging appearance, soon procured him

him protectors, who recommended him to be tutor to a young man of quality. He preferred poverty, however, to dependence; and, being a stranger to the manners and behaviour of the great, he remained but a short time in that situation. In quitting this service, nevertheless, he did not lose the esteem of his patron; and, as he behaved with great prudence, and was universally beloved, he flattered himself he should in time regain the good opinion of his bishop, and obtain some little benefice in the mountains, where he hoped to spend the rest of his days. This was the height of his ambition.

“ Interested, by a natural propensity, in favour of the young fugitive; he examined very carefully into his character and disposition. In this examination, he saw that his misfortunes had already debased his heart; that the shame and contempt to which he had been exposed had depressed his courage, and that his disappointed pride, converted into indignation, deduced from the injustice and cruelty of mankind the depravity of human nature, and the emptiness of virtue. He had observed religion made use of as a mask to self-interest, and its worship as a cloak to hypocrisy. He had seen the terms heaven and hell prostituted in the subtilty of vain disputes; the joys of the one and pains of the other being annexed to a mere repetition of words. He had observed the sublime and primitive idea of the Divinity disfigured by  
the

the fantastical imaginations of men; and, finding that, in order to believe in God, it was necessary to give up that understanding he hath bestowed on us, he held in the same disdain as well the sacred object of our idle reveries as those reveries themselves. Without knowing any thing of natural causes, or giving himself any trouble to think about them, he had plunged himself into the most stupid ignorance, mixed with the most profound contempt for those who pretended to know more than himself.

“A neglect of all religious duties leads to a neglect of all moral obligations. The heart of this young libertine had already made a great progress from one toward the other. Not that he was constitutionally vicious; but, incredulity and misfortune having stifled by degrees the propensities of his natural disposition, they were hurrying him on to ruin; adding to the manners of the beggar the principles of the Atheist.

“His ruin, however, though almost inevitable, was not absolutely completed. His education not having been neglected, he was not without knowledge. He had not as yet exceeded that happy term of life, wherein the fermenting blood serves to invigorate the mind without enflaming the passions. His were as yet unrelaxed and unexcited. A natural modesty and timidity of disposition had hitherto supplied the place of restraint; and had prolonged that term in which you endeavour so long

long to preserve your pupil. The odious example of brutal depravity, and of vices without temptation, so far from animating his imagination, had mortified it. Disgust had long supplied the place of virtue in the preservation of his innocence; to corrupt this required more powerful seductions.

“The good priest saw the danger and the remedy. The difficulties which appeared in the application did not deter him from the attempt: he took a pleasure in his design, and resolved to complete it; by restoring to virtue the victim he had snatched from infamy.

“To this end he set out at a distance in the execution of his project; the merit of the motive increased his hopes, and inspired means worthy of his zeal. Whatever might be the success, he was certain he should not throw away his labour: we are always sure so far to succeed in well doing.

“He began with striving to gain the confidence of the proselyte, by conferring on him his favours disinterestedly; by never importuning him with exhortations, and by descending always to a level with his ideas and manner of thinking. It must have been an affecting sight to see a grave divine become the comrade of a young libertine; to see virtue affect the air of licentiousness, in order to triumph the more certainly over it. Whenever the heedless youth made him the confidant of his follies, and unboresomed himself freely to his benefactor, the  
good



good priest listened attentively to his stories, and, without approving the evil, interested himself in the consequences. No ill-timed censure ever indiscreetly checked his communicative temper. The pleasure with which he thought himself heard, increased that which he took in telling all his secrets. Thus he was induced to make a free and general confession without thinking of his confessing any thing.

“ Having thus made himself master of his sentiments and character, the priest was enabled to see clearly that, without being ignorant for his years, he had forgot every thing of consequence for him to know, and that the state of meanness into which he was reduced, had almost stifled in him the sense of good and evil. There is a degree of low stupidity, which deprives the soul as it were of life; the voice of conscience also is little heard by those who think of nothing but the means of subsistence. To rescue the unfortunate youth from the moral death that so nearly threatened him, he began, therefore, by awakening his self-love and exciting in him a due regard to himself. He represented to his imagination a more happy success, from the future employment of his talents: he animated him with a generous ardour, by a recital of the commendable actions of others; and by raising his admiration of those who performed them, excited in him a spirit of emulation, and a desire of imitating them. In order to detach him insensibly from an idle and vagabond



bond life, he employed him in copying extracts from books; and under pretence of having occasion for such extracts, cherished in him the noble sentiment of gratitude to his benefactor. By this method also he instructed him indirectly by the books he employed him to copy; and induced him to recover so good an opinion of himself as to think he was not quite good for nothing, and to hold himself not so despicable in his own esteem.

“ A trifling circumstance may serve to show the art which this benevolent instructor made use of insensibly to elevate the heart of his disciple, without appearing to think of giving him instruction. This good ecclesiastick was so well known and esteemed for his probity and discernment, that many persons chose rather to entrust him with the distribution of their alms than the richer clergy of the cities. Now it happened, that receiving one day a sum of money in charge for the poor; the young man had the meanness to desire some of it, under that title, for himself. ‘ No (replied his benefactor) you and I are brethren; you belong to me, and I ought not to apply the charity deposited with me to my own use.’ He then gave him the sum he wanted out of his own pocket. Lessons of this kind are hardly ever thrown away on young people, whose hearts are not entirely corrupted.

“ But I will continue to speak no longer in the third person, which is indeed a superfluous caution;

caution; as you are very sensible, my dear countryman, that the unhappy fugitive I have been speaking of is myself. I conceive myself far enough removed from the irregularities of my youth to dare to avow them; and think the hand which extricated me from them, too well deserving my gratitude, for me not to do it honour, at the expence of a little shame.

“ The most striking circumstance of all was to observe, in the retired life of my worthy master, virtue without hypocrisy, humanity without weakness, his conversation always honest and simple, and his conduct ever conformable to his discourse. I never found him troubling himself whether the persons he assisted went constantly to vespers; whether they went frequently to confession, or fasted on certain days of the week: nor did I ever know him impose on them any of those conditions, without which a man might perish for want, and have no hopes of relief from the devout.

“ Encouraged by these observations, so far was I from affecting, in his presence, the forward zeal of a new profelyte, that I took no pains to conceal my thoughts, nor did I ever remark his being scandalized at this freedom. Hence, have I sometimes said to myself, he certainly overlooks my indifference for the new mode of worship I have embraced, in consideration of the disregard which he sees I have for that in which I was educated; as he finds my indifference is not partial to either. But what  
could

could I think when I heard him sometimes approve dogmas contrary to those of the Roman church, and appear to hold its ceremonies in little esteem? I should have been apt to conclude him a protestant in disguise, had I seen him less observant of those very ceremonies which he seemed to think of so little account; but, knowing that he acquitted himself as punctually of his duties as a priest, in private as in publick, I knew not how to judge of these seeming contradictions. If we except the failing which first brought him into disgrace with his superiour, and of which he was not altogether corrected, his life was exemplary, his manners irreproachable, and his conversation prudent and sensible. As I lived with him in the greatest intimacy, I learned every day to respect him more and more; and as he had entirely won my heart by so many acts of kindness, I waited with an impatient curiosity, to know the principles on which a life and conduct so singular and uniform could be founded.

“ It was some time, however, before this curiosity was satisfied. Before he would disclose himself to his disciple, he endeavoured to cultivate those seeds of reason and goodness, which he had sown in his mind. The greatest difficulty he met with, was to eradicate from my heart a proud misanthropy, a certain rancorous hatred which I bore to the wealthy and fortunate, as if they were made such at my expense,

and had usurped apparent happiness from what should have been really mine. The idle vanity of youth, which is opposed to all kind of humiliation, encouraged but too much my propensity to indulge this splenetick humour; while that self-love which my Mentor strove so much to cherish, increasing my pride, rendered mankind still more detestable, and only added to my hatred of them the most egregious contempt.

“ Without directly attacking this pride, he contented himself to prevent its degenerating into barbarity, and, without diminishing myself-esteem, made me less disdainful of my neighbours. In withdrawing the gaudy veil of external appearances, and presenting to my view the real evils it covered, he taught me to lament the failings of my fellow-creatures, to sympathise with their miseries, and to pity instead of envying them. Moved to compassion for human frailties, from a deep sense of his own, he saw mankind every where the victims either of their own vices or of those of others: he saw the poor groan beneath the yoke of the rich, and the rich beneath that of their own prepossessions and prejudices. ‘ Believe me, said he, our mistaken notions of things are so far from concealing our misfortunes from our view, that they augment those evils, by rendering trifles of importance, and making us sensible of a thousand wants, which we should never have known but from our prejudices.



judices. Peace of mind consists in a contempt for every thing that may disturb it. The man who gives himself the greatest concern about life, is he who enjoys it least; and he who aspires the most earnestly after happiness is always the most miserable.'

"Alas! (cried I with all the bitterness of discontent) what a deplorable picture do you present of human life! If we may indulge ourselves in nothing, to what purpose are we born? If we must despise even happiness itself, who is there can know what it is to be happy?"—"I know" (replied, the good priest in a tone and manner that struck me.) "You! (said I) so little favoured by fortune! so poor! exiled! persecuted! can you be happy? And, if you are, what have you done to purchase happiness?"—"My dear child (returned he) I will very readily tell you. As you have freely confessed to me, I will do the same to you. I will disclose to you (said he, embracing me) all the sentiments of my heart. You shall see me, if not such as I really am, at least such as I think myself to be: and when you have heard my whole profession of faith, when you know fully the situation of my heart, you will know why I think myself happy; and, if you think as I do, what you have to do to become so likewise. But this profession is not to be made in a moment: it will require some time to disclose to you my thoughts on the situation of man, and the real value of human life;—we will take a proper opportunity



opportunity for an hour's uninterrupted conversation on this subject.

"As I expressed an earnest desire for such an opportunity, it was put off only to the next morning. It was in summer time, and we rose at break of day; when, taking me out of town, he led me to the top of a hill, at the foot of which ran the river Po, watering the fertile vales. That immense chain of mountains, the Alps, terminated the distant prospect. The rising sun had cast its orient rays over the gilded plains, and, by projecting the long shadows of the trees, the houses and adjacent hills, described the most beautiful scene ever mortal eye beheld. One might have been tempted to think that nature had at this time displayed all its magnificence, as a subject for our conversation. Here it was that, after contemplating for a short time the surrounding objects in silence, my guide and benefactor thus began:

*The* PROFESSION of FAITH of a Savoyard  
Curate.

"Expect not either learned declamations or profound arguments; I am no great philosopher, and I give myself little trouble whether I ever shall be such or not. But I perceive sometimes the glimmering of good-sense, and have always a regard for the truth. I will not enter into any disputation, or endeavour to refute you; but only lay down my own sentiments in simplicity of heart: consult your own, during this exposition

sition; this is all I require of you. If I am mistaken, it is undesignedly: which is sufficient to clear me of all criminal error; and if you are in like manner unwittingly deceived, it is of little consequence: if I am right, reason is common to both; we are equally interested in listening to it: and why should you not think as I do?

“ I was born a poor peasant, destined by my situation to the business of husbandry; it was thought, however, much more adviseable for me to learn to get my bread by the profession of a priest; and means were found to give me a proper education. In this, most certainly, neither my parents nor I consulted what was really good, true, or useful for me to know; but only that I should learn what was necessary to my ordination. I learned therefore what was required of me to learn, I said what was required of me to say, and accordingly was made a priest. I was not long, however, before I perceived too plainly that, in laying myself under an obligation to be no longer a man, I had engaged for more than I could possibly perform.

“ Some will tell us that conscience is founded merely on our prejudices, but I know, for certain, from my own experience, that its dictates constantly follow the order of nature, in contradiction to all human laws and institutions. We are in vain forbid to do this thing or the other; we shall feel but little remorse for doing

any thing to which a well-regulated natural instinct excites us, how strongly soever prohibited by reason. Nature, my dear youth, hath in this respect been hitherto silent to you; may you continue long in that happy state wherein her voice is the voice of innocence! Remember that you offend her more by anticipating her instructions than by refusing to hear them. In order to know when to listen to her without a crime, you should begin by learning to check her insinuations.

“ I had always a due respect for marriage, as the first and most sacred institution of nature. Having given up my right to enter into such an engagement, I resolved, therefore, not to profane it: for, notwithstanding my manner of education, as I had always led a simple and uniform life, I had preserved all that clearness of understanding in which my first ideas were cultivated. The maxims of the world had not obscured my primitive notions, and my poverty kept me at a sufficient distance from those temptations that teach us the sophistry of vice.

“ The virtuous resolution I had formed, however, was the very cause of my ruin: my full determination not to violate the bed of another left my faults exposed to detection. It was necessary to expiate the scandal; I was accordingly suspended and banished; falling a sacrifice to my scruples rather than to my incontinence. From the reproaches also made me, on my disgrace, I found that the way to escape punishment for  
a crime,

a crime, is often to aggravate the guilt, by committing a greater.

“ A few instances of this kind go far with persons capable of reflexion. Finding, by sorrowful experience, the ideas I had formed of justice, honesty, and other moral obligations, contradicted in practice, I began to give up most of the opinions I had received, till, at length, the few which I retained being no longer sufficient to support themselves, I called in question the evidence on which they were established. Thus, knowing hardly what to think, I found myself at last reduced to your own situation of mind; with this difference only, that my infidelity being the later fruit of a maturer age, it was a work of greater difficulty to remove it.

“ I was in that state of doubt and uncertainty in which Descartes requires the mind to be involved, in order to enable it to investigate truth. This disposition of mind, however, is too disquieting to last long; its duration being owing only to vice or indolence. My heart was not so corrupt as to seek such indulgence; and nothing preserves so well the habit of reflexion, as to be more content with ourselves than with our fortune.

“ I reflected therefore, on the unhappy lot of mortals, always floating on the ocean of human opinions, without compass or rudder; left to the mercy of their tempestuous passions, with no other guide than an unexperienced pi-

lot, ignorant of his course, as well as whence he came, and whither he is going. I said often to my self, I love the truth; I seek, yet cannot find it; let any one show it me and I will readily embrace it: why doth it hide its charms from an heart formed to adore them?

“ I have frequently experienced at times much greater evils; and yet no part of my life was ever so constantly disagreeable to me as that interval of scruples and anxiety. Running perpetually from one doubt and uncertainty to another, all that I could deduce from my long and painful meditations was incertitude, obscurity, and contradiction; as well with regard to my existence as my duty.

“ I cannot comprehend how any man can be sincerely a sceptick, on principle. Such philosophers either do not exist, or they are certainly the most miserable of men. To be in doubt, about things which it is important for us to know, is a situation too perplexing for the human mind; it cannot long support such incertitude; but will, in spite of itself, determine one way or other, rather deceiving itself than content to believe nothing of the matter.

“ What added further to my perplexity was, that, being educated in a church whose authority being universally decisive, admits not of the least doubt; in rejecting one point, I rejected in a manner all the rest; and the impossibility of admitting so many absurd decisions, set me against those which were not so. In being



ing told I must believe all, I was prevented from believing any thing, and I knew not where to stop.

“ In this situation I consulted the philosophers; I turned over their books, and examined their several opinions; in all which I found them vain, dictatorial, and dogmatical, even in their pretended scepticism; ignorant of nothing, yet proving nothing; ridiculing one another; and in this last particular only, wherein they were all agreed, they seemed to be in the right. Affecting to triumph, whenever they attacked their opponents, they wanted every thing to make them capable of a vigorous defense. If you examine their reasons, you will find them calculated only to refute: if you number voices, every one is reduced to his own suffrage: they agree in nothing but disputing: to attend to these, therefore, was not the way to remove my uncertainty.

“ I conceived that the weakness of the human understanding was the first cause of the prodigious variety I found in their sentiments, and that pride was the second. We have no standard with which to measure this immense machine; we cannot calculate its various relations; we neither know the first cause nor the final effects; we are ignorant even of ourselves; we neither know our own nature nor principle of action; nay, we hardly know whether man be a simple or compound being; impenetrable mysteries surround us on every side; they ex-

tend beyond the region of sense; we imagine ourselves possessed of understanding to penetrate them, and we have only imagination. Every one strikes out a way of his own across this imaginary world; but no one knows whether it will lead him to the point he aims at. We are yet desirous to penetrate, to know, every thing. The only thing we know not, is to remain ignorant of what it is impossible for us to know. We had much rather determine at random, and believe the thing which is not, than confess that none of us is capable of seeing the thing that is. Being ourselves but a small part of that great Whole, whose limits surpass our most extensive views, and concerning which its Creator leaves us to make our idle conjectures, we are vain enough to decide what is that Whole in itself, and what we are in relation to it.

“ But were the philosophers even in a situation to discover the truth which of them would be interested in so doing? Each of them knows very well that his system is no better founded than those of others; he defends it, nevertheless, because it is his own. There is not one of them, who, really knowing truth from falsehood, would not prefer the latter, of his own invention, to the former, discovered by any body else. Where is the philosopher who would not readily deceive mankind, to increase his own reputation? Where is he, who secretly proposes any other object than that of distinguishing

distinguishing himself from the rest of mankind? Provided he raises himself above the vulgar, and carries away the prize of fame from his competitors, what doth he require more? The most essential point is to think differently from the rest of the world. Among believers he is an atheist, and among atheists he affects to be a believer.

“ The first fruit I gathered from these reflexions was to learn to confine my enquiries to those things in which I was immediately interested: to remain contented in a profound ignorance of the rest, and not to trouble myself so far as even to doubt about what it did not concern me to know.

“ I could see, further, that instead of clearing up any unnecessary doubts, the philosophers only contributed to multiply those which most tormented me; and resolved absolutely none. I therefore applied to another guide, and said to myself, let me consult my innate instructor, who will deceive me less than I may be deceived by others; or, at least, the errors I fall into will be my own, and I shall grow less depraved in the pursuit of my own illusions, than in giving myself up to the deceptions of others.

“ Taking a retrospect, then, of the several opinions, which had successively prevailed with me from my infancy, I found that, although none of them were so evident as to produce immediate conviction, they had nevertheless different degrees of probability, and that my in-

nate sense of truth and falsehood leaned more or less to each. On this first observation, proceeding to compare impartially, and without prejudice, these different opinions with each other, I found that the first and most common was also the most simple and most rational; and that it wanted nothing more, to secure universal suffrage, than the circumstance of having been last proposed. Let us suppose that all our philosophers, ancient and modern, had exhausted all their whimsical systems of power, chance, fate, necessity, atoms, an animated world, sensitive matter, materialism, and of every other kind; and after them, let us imagine the celebrated Dr. Clarke, enlightening the world by displaying the Being of Beings, the supreme and sovereign disposer of all things. With what universal admiration, with what unanimous applause would not the world receive this new system, so great, so consolatory, so sublime, so proper to elevate the soul; to lay the foundations of virtue, and, at the same time, so striking, so enlightened, so simple, and, as it appears to me, pregnant with less incomprehensibilities and absurdity than any other system whatever! I reflected that unanswerable objections might be made to all, because the human understanding is incapable of resolving them, no proof therefore could be brought exclusively of any: but what difference is there in proofs! Ought not that system then which explains every thing to be preferred, when  
attended

attended with no greater difficulties than the rest?

“ The love of truth, therefore, being all my philosophy, and my method of philosophising the simple and easy rule of common sense, which dispensed with the vain subtilty of argumentation, I re-examined, by this rule, all the interesting knowledge I was possessed of; resolved to admit, as evident, every thing to which I could not, in the sincerity of my heart, refuse my assent; to admit also, as true, all that appeared to have a necessary connexion with the former, and to leave every thing else as uncertain, without rejecting or admitting it; determined not to trouble myself about clearing up any point which did not tend to utility in practice.

“ But, after all, who am I? What right have I to judge of these things? And what is it that determines my conclusions? If, subject to the impressions I receive, these are formed in direct consequence of those impressions, I trouble myself to no purpose in these investigations. It is necessary, therefore, to examine myself, to know what instruments are made use of in such researches, and how far I may confide in their use.

“ In the first place, I know that I exist, and have senses whereby I am affected. This is a truth so striking that I am compelled to acquiesce in it. But have I properly a distinct sense of my existence, or do I only know it



from my various sensations? This is my first doubt; which, at present, it is impossible for me to resolve: for, being continually affected by sensations, either directly from the objects of them or from the memory, how can I tell whether my self-consciousness be, or be not, something foreign to those sensations and independent of them.

“ My sensations are all internal, as they make me sensible of my own existence; but the cause of them is external and independent, as they affect me without my consent, and do not depend on my will, for their production or annihilation. I conceive very clearly, therefore, that the sensation which is internal, and its cause or object which is external, are not one and the same thing.

“ Thus I know that I not only exist, but that other beings exist as well as myself; to wit, the objects of my sensations; and though these objects should be nothing but ideas, it is very certain that these ideas are no part of myself.

“ Now, every thing that I perceive out of myself, and which acts on my senses, I call matter; and all those portions of matter which I conceive united in individual beings I call bodies. Thus all the disputes between the Idealists and Materialists signify nothing to me; their distinctions between the appearance and reality of bodies being chimerical.

“ Hence I have already acquired as certain knowledge of the existence of the universe as  
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of my own. I next reflect on the objects of my sensations; and, finding in myself the faculty of comparing them with each other, I perceive myself endowed with an active power with which I was before unacquainted.

“ To perceive is only to feel or be sensible of things; to compare them is to judge of their existence: to judge of things and to be sensible of them are very different. Things present themselves to our sensations as single, and detached from each other, such as they barely exist in nature: but in our intellectual comparison of them they are removed, transported as it were, from place to place, disposed on and beside each other, to enable us to pronounce concerning their difference and similitude. The characteristick faculty of an intelligent, active being, is, in my opinion, that of giving a sense to the word *exist*. In beings merely sensitive, I have searched in vain to discover the like force of intellect; nor can I conceive it to be in their nature. Such passive beings perceive every object single or by itself; or if two objects present themselves, they are perceived as united into one. Such beings having no power to place one in competition with, beside, or upon the other, they cannot compare them or judge of their separate existence.

“ To see two objects at once, is not to see their relations to each other, nor to judge of their difference; as to see many objects, though distinct from one another is not to reckon their

number. I may possibly have in my mind the ideas of a great stick and a little one, without comparing those ideas together, or judging that one is less than the other; as I may look at my hand without counting my fingers\*. The comparative ideas of *greater* and *less*, as well as numerical ideas of *one*, *two*, &c. are certainly no sensations, although the understanding produces them only from our sensations.

“ It has been pretended that sensitive beings distinguish sensations one from the other, by the actual difference there is between those sensations: this, however, demands an explanation. When such sensations are different, a sensitive being is supposed to distinguish them by their difference; but when they are alike, they can then only distinguish them because they perceive one without the other: for otherwise, how can two objects exactly alike be distinguished in a simultaneous sensation? Such objects must necessarily be blended together and taken for one and the same; particularly according to that system of philosophy, in which it is pretended that the sensations representative of extension are not extended.

“ When two comparative sensations are perceived, they make both a joint and separate impression; but their relation to each other is  
not

\* M. de la Condamine tells us of a people, who knew how to reckon only as far as three. Yet these people, having hands, must necessarily have often seen their fingers without ever having counted five.

not necessarily perceived in consequence of either. If the judgement we form of this relation were indeed a mere sensation, excited by the objects, we should never be deceived in it, for it can never be denied that I truly perceive what I feel.

“ How, therefore, can I be deceived in the relation between these two sticks, particularly, if they are not parallel? Why do I say, for instance, that the little one is a third part as long as the great one, when it is in reality only a fourth? Why is not the image, which is the sensation, conformable to its model, which is the object? It is because I am active when I judge, the operation which forms the comparison is defective, and my understanding, which judges of relations, mixes its errors with the truth of those sensations which are representative of objects.

“ Add to this a reflexion, which, I am certain you will think striking, when you have duly weighed it: this is, that if we were merely passive in the use of our senses, there would be no communication between them: so that it would be impossible for us to know, that the body we touched with our hands and the object we saw with our eyes were one and the same. Either we should not be able to perceive external objects at all, or they would appear to exist as five perceptible substances, of which we should have no method of ascertaining the identity.

“ What-

“ Whatever name be given to that power of the mind, which assembles and compares my sensations; call it attention, meditation, reflexion, or what you please; certain it is, that it exists in me, and not in the objects of those sensations: it is I alone who produce it, although it be displayed only in consequence of the impressions made on me by those objects. Without being so far master over myself as to perceive or not perceive at pleasure, I am still more or less capable of making an examination into the objects perceived.

“ I am not, therefore, a mere sensitive and passive, but an active and intelligent being; and, whatever philosophers may pretend, lay claim to the honour of thinking. I know only that truth depends on the existence of things, and not on my understanding, which judges of them; and that the less such judgement depends on me, the nearer I am certain of approaching the truth. Hence my rule, of confiding more on sentiment than reason, is confirmed by reason itself.

“ Being thus far assured of my own nature and capacity, I begin to consider the objects about me; regarding myself, with a kind of shuddering, as a creature thrown on the wide world of the universe, and as it were lost in an infinite variety of other beings, without knowing any thing of what they are, either among themselves or with regard to me.

“ Every



“ Every thing that is perceptible to my senses is matter, and I deduce all the essential properties of matter from those sensible qualities, which occasion its being perceptible, and are inseparable from it. I see it sometimes in motion and at other times at rest\*; hence I infer that neither motion nor rest are essential to it; but motion, being an action, is clearly the effect of a cause, of which rest is only the absence. When nothing acts on matter, therefore, it does not move; and for that very reason, that it is equally indifferent to motion and rest; its natural state is to be at rest.

“ Again, I perceive in bodies two kinds of motion; that is, a mechanical or communicated motion, and a spontaneous or voluntary one. In the first, the moving cause is out of the body moved; and in the last exists within it. I shall not hence conclude, however, that the motion of a watch, for example, is spontaneous; for, if nothing should act upon it but the spring, that spring would not wind itself up again when once down. For the same reason, also, I should as little accede to the spontaneous motion

\* This rest may be said to be only relative; but as we perceive degrees in motion, we can very clearly conceive one of the two extremes which is rest; and this we conceive so distinctly, that we are even induced to take that for absolute rest which is only relative. Now motion cannot be essential to matter, if matter can be conceived to exist at rest.

motion of fluids, nor even to fire itself, the cause of their fluidity\*.

“ You will ask me, if the motions of animals are spontaneous? I will freely answer, I cannot positively tell, but analogy speaks in the affirmative. You may ask me further, how I know there is any such thing as spontaneous motion? I answer, very well, because I feel it. I *will* to move my arm, and accordingly it moves, without the intervention of any other immediate cause. It is in vain to endeavour to reason me out of this sentiment; it is more powerful than any rational evidence: you might as well attempt to convince me that I do not exist.

“ If the actions of men are not spontaneous, and there be no such spontaneous action in what passes on earth, we are only the more embarrassed to conceive what is the first cause of all motion. For my part, I am so fully persuaded, that the natural state of matter is a state of rest, and that it has in itself no principle of activity, that whenever I see a body in motion, I instantly conclude either that it is an animated body, or that its motion is communicated to it. My understanding will by no means acquiesce in the notion that unorganized matter can move of itself, or be productive of any kind of action.

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\* The chemists conceive the element of fire to be diffused, and stagnant, in those mixed bodies of which it makes a part, till some external cause sets it in motion, and changes it into palpable fire.

“ The visible universe, however, is composed of inanimate matter\*, which appears to have nothing in its composition of organization, or that sensation which is common to the parts of an animated body : as it is certain that we ourselves, being parts thereof, do not perceive our existence in the whole. The universe also is in motion ; and its movements being all regular, uniform, and subjected to constant laws, nothing appears therein similar to that liberty which is remarkable in the spontaneous motion of men and animals. The world, therefore, is not an huge self-moving animal, but receives its motions from some foreign cause, which we do not perceive : but I am so strongly persuaded within myself of the existence of this cause, that it is impossible for me to observe the apparent diurnal revolution of the sun, without conceiving that some force must urge it forward ; or, if it is the earth itself that turns, I cannot but conceive that some hand must turn it.

“ If it be necessary to admit general laws, that have no apparent relation to matter, from what fixed point must that enquiry set out ? Those laws, being nothing real, or substantial, have some prior foundation equally unknown and occult.

\* I have made the strongest efforts I am able, to conceive the existence of a living molecule, or primary element, but in vain. The idea of matter, perceiving without organs of perception, appears to me contradictory and unintelligible. To reject or adopt this notion, it is necessary we should first comprehend it ; and I must confess I am not so happy.

occult. Experience and observation have taught us the laws of motion; these laws, however, determine effects only without displaying their causes; and, therefore, are not sufficient to explain the system of the universe. Descartes could form a model of the heavens and the earth with dice; but he could not give their motions to those dice, nor bring into play his centrifugal-force without the assistance of a rotatory motion. Newton discovered the law of attraction; but attraction alone would soon have reduced the universe into one solid mass: to this law, therefore, he found it necessary to add a projectile force, in order to account for the revolution of the heavenly bodies. Could Descartes tell us by what physical law his vortices were put and kept in motion? Could Newton produce the hand that first impelled the planets in the tangent of their respective orbits?

“ The first causes of motion do not exist in matter; bodies receive from and communicate motion to each other, but they cannot originally produce it. The more I observe the action and re-action of the powers of nature acting on each other, the more I am convinced that they are merely effects, and that we must ever recur to some volition as the first cause; for to suppose there is a progression of causes to infinity, is to suppose there is no first cause at all. In a word, every motion, that is not produced by some other, must be the effect of a spontaneous, voluntary act: inanimate bodies have

no

no action but motion; and there can be no real action without volition. Such is my first principle. I believe, therefore, that a *Will* gives motion to the universe, and animates all nature. This is my first article of faith.

“ In what manner volition is productive of physical and corporeal action, I know not, but I experience within myself that it is productive of it. I *will* to act, and the action immediately succeeds; I *will* to move my body, and my body instantly moves; but, that an inanimate body, lying at rest, should move itself or produce motion is incomprehensible and unprecedented. The *Will* also is known by its effects and not by its essence. I know it as the cause of motion; but, to conceive matter producing motion, would be evidently to conceive an effect without a cause, or rather not to conceive any thing at all.

“ It is no more possible for me to conceive how the will moves the body, than how the sensations affect the soul. I even know not why one of these mysteries ever appeared more explicable than the other. For my own part, whether at the time I am active or passive, the means of union between the two substances appear to me absolutely incomprehensible. Is it not strange that the philosophers have thrown off this incomprehensibility, merely to confound the two substances together, as if operations so different could be better explained as the effects of one subject than of two.

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“ The principle which I have here laid down, is undoubtedly something obscure; it is however intelligible, and contains nothing repugnant to reason or observation: can we say as much of the doctrines of materialism? It is very certain that, if motion be essential to matter, it would be inseparable from it; it would be always the same in every portion of it, incommunicable, and incapable of increase or diminution; it would be impossible for us even to conceive matter at rest. Again, when I am told that motion is not indeed essential to matter, but necessary to its existence, I see through the attempt to impose on me, by a form of words, which it would be more easy to refute, if more intelligible. For, whether the motion of matter arises from itself, and is therefore essential to it, or whether it is derived from some external cause, it is no further necessary to it than as the moving cause acting thereon: so that we still remain under the first difficulty.

“ General and abstract ideas form the source of our greatest errors. The jargon of metaphysics never discovered one truth; but it has filled philosophy with absurdities, of which we are ashamed as soon as they are stripped of their pompous expressions. Tell me truly, my friend, if, when you are told of a blind, unintelligent power being diffused throughout all nature, any precise idea is conveyed to your understanding? It is imagined that something is meant by those vague terms, Universal force and Necessary motion;

motion; and yet they convey no meaning. The idea of motion is nothing more than the idea of passing from one place to another, nor can there be any motion without some particular direction; for no individual being can move several ways at once. In what manner, then, is it, that matter necessarily moves? Has all the matter of which bodies are composed, a general and uniform motion, or has each atom a particular motion of its own? If we give into the first notion, the whole universe will appear to be one solid and indivisible mass; and according to the second, it should constitute a diffused and incoherent fluid, without a possibility that two atoms ever could be united. What can be the direction of this motion common to all matter? Is it in a right line upwards or downwards, to the right or to the left? Again, if every particle of matter has its particular direction, what can be the cause of all those directions and their variations? If every atom or particle of matter revolved only on its axis, none of them would change their place, and there would be no motion communicated; and even in this case it is necessary that such a revolving motion should be carried on one way. To ascribe to matter motion in the abstract, is to make use of terms without a meaning; and in giving it any determinate motion, we must of necessity suppose the cause that determines it. The more I multiply particular forces, the more new causes have I to explain, without  
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ever finding one common agent that directs them. So far from being able to conceive any regularity or order in the fortuitous concurrence of elements, I cannot even conceive the nature of their concurrence; and an universal chaos is more inconceivable than universal harmony. I easily comprehend that the mechanism of the world cannot be perfectly known to the human understanding; but, whenever men undertake to explain it, they ought at least to speak in such a manner that others may understand them.

“ If from matter being put in motion I discover the existence of a *Will*, as the first active cause, this matter being subjected to certain regular laws of motion, display also intelligence: This is my second article of faith. To act, to compare, to prefer, are the operations of an active, thinking being; such a being, therefore, exists. Do you proceed to ask me, where I discover its existence? I answer, not only in the revolutions of the celestial bodies; not only in myself, but in the flocks that feed on the plain, in the birds that fly in the air, in the stone that falls to the ground, and in the leaf that trembles in the wind.

“ I am enabled to judge of the physical order of things, although ignorant of their final cause; because, to be able to form such a judgement, it is sufficient for me to compare the several parts of the visible universe with each other, to study their mutual concurrence, their reciprocal relations, and to observe the general result of the whole.

whole. I am ignorant why the universe exists, but I am enabled nevertheless to see how it is modified; I cannot fail to perceive that intimate connexion, by which the several beings it is composed of afford each other mutual assistance. I resemble, in this respect, a man who sees the inside of a watch for the first time, and is captivated with the beauty of the work, although ignorant of its use. I know not, he may say, what this machine is good for, but I see that each part is made to fit some other; I admire the artist for every part of his performance, and am certain that all these wheels act thus in concert to some common end which it is impossible for me to see.

“ But let us compare the partial and particular ends, the means whereby they are effected, and their constant relations of every kind; then let us appeal to our innate sense of conviction; what man in his senses can refuse to acquiesce in such testimony? To what unprejudiced view does not the visible arrangement of the universe display the supreme intelligence of its authour? How much sophistry does it not require, to disavow the harmony of created beings, and that admirable order in which all the parts of the system concur to the preservation of each other? You may talk to me as much as you please, of combinations and chances; what end will it answer to reduce me to silence, if you cannot persuade me into the truth of what you advance? and how will you divest me of that  
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involuntary sentiment, which continually contradicts you? If organised bodies are fortuitously combined in a thousand ways, before they assume settled and constant forms; if at first they are formed stomachs without mouths, feet without heads, hands without arms, and imperfect organs of every kind, which have perished for want of the necessary faculties of self-preservation; how comes it that none of these imperfect essays have engaged our attention? Why hath nature, at length, confined herself to laws to which she was not at first subjected? I confess that I ought not to be surprised that any possible thing should happen, when the rarity of the event is compensated by the great odds that it did not happen. And yet if any one was to tell me that a number of Printers types, jumbled promiscuously together, had disposed themselves in the order of the letters composing the *Æneid*, I certainly should not deign to take one step to verify or disprove such a story. It may be said, I forget the number of chances; but, pray how many must I suppose to render such a combination in any degree probable? I, who see only the one, must conclude that there is an infinite number against it, and that it is not the effect of chance. Add to this that the product of these combinations must be always of the same nature with the combined elements; hence life and organization never can result from a blind concourse of atoms, nor will the chemist, with all his art in compounds,  
ever



even find sensation and thought at the bottom of his crucible\*.

“ I have been frequently surpris'd, and sometimes scandalized, in the reading of *Nieuwentheit*. What a presumption was it to sit down to make a book of those wonders of nature that display the wisdom of their authour? Had his book been as big as the whole world, he would not have exhausted his subject; and no sooner do we enter into the minutiae of things than the greatest wonder of all escapes us; that is, the harmony and connexion of the whole. The generation of living and organised bodies alone baffles all the efforts of the human understanding. That insurmountable barrier which nature hath placed between the various species of animals, that they might not be confounded with each other, makes her intentions sufficiently evident. Not contented only to establish order, she had taken effectual methods to prevent its being disturbed.

\* It would be incredible, if we had not proof of it, that human extravagance could be carried to such a pitch. *Amatus Lusitanus* assures us, that he has seen in a Phial an Homuncule, about an inch long, which *Julius Camillus*, like another *Prometheus* had generated by his skill in Alchemy. *Paracelsus*, in his treatise *de natura rerum*, gives the process of making these Mannikins, and maintains that Pygmies, Fauns, Satyrs, and Nymphs were engendered by Chemistry. There wants nothing more, in my opinion, to establish the possibility of these facts, than to prove that the organical materials can resist fire, and that the component molecule may preserve themselves alive in the intense heat of a reverberatory furnace.

“ There is not a being in the universe which may not, in some respect, be regarded as the common centre of all others, which are ranged around it in such a manner that they serve reciprocally as cause and effect to one another. The imagination is lost and the understanding confounded in such an infinite diversity of relations of which, however, not one of them is either lost or confounded in the crowd. How absurd the supposition, to deduce this wonderful harmony from the blind mechanism of a fortuitous jumble of atoms! Those who deny the unity of design, so manifest in the relation of all the parts of this grand system, may endeavour, as much as they will, to conceal their absurdities with abstract ideas, co-ordinations, general principles, and emblematical terms; whatever they may advance, it is impossible for me to conceive that a system of beings can be so duly regulated, without the existence of some intelligent cause which effects such regulation. It is not in my power to believe that passive inanimate matter could ever have produced living and sensible creatures; that a blind fatality should be productive of intelligent beings; or, that a cause, incapable itself of thinking, should produce the faculty of thinking in its effect.

“ I believe therefore, that the world is governed by a wise and powerful Will. I see it, or rather I feel it; and this is of importance for me to know: but is the world eternal or is it created? Are things derived from one self-existent prin-

iple? or are there two, or more; and what is their essence? Of all this I know nothing, nor do I see that it is of any consequence I should. In proportion as such knowledge may become interesting, I will endeavour to acquire it: but, further than this, I give up all such idle disquisitions, which serve only to make me discontented with myself, are useless in practice, and above my understanding.

“ You will remember, however, that I am not dictating my sentiments to you; but only displaying what they are. Whether matter be eternal or only created, whether it have a passive principle or not, certain it is that the whole universe is one design, and sufficiently displays one intelligent agent: for I see no part of this system that is not under regulation, or that does not concur to one and the same end; viz. that of preserving the present and established order of things. That Being, whose will is his deed, whose principle of action is in himself, that Being, in a word, whatever it be, that gives motion to all the parts of the universe and governs all things, I call God.

“ To this term I annex the ideas of intelligence, power, and will, which I have collected from the order of things; and to these I add that of goodness, which is a necessary consequence of their union: but I am not at all the wiser concerning the essence of the Being to which I give these attributes: he remains at an equal distance from my senses and my understanding:

standing : the more I think of him, the more I am confounded; I know of a certainty that he exists, and that his existence is independent of any of his creatures: I know also that my existence is dependent on his, and that every thing I know is in the same situation with myself. I perceive the deity in all his works, I feel him within me, and behold him in every object around me: but, I no sooner endeavour to contemplate what he is in himself; I no sooner enquire where he is, and what is his substance, than he eludes the strongest efforts of my imagination; and my bewildered understanding is convinced of its own weakness.

“ For this reason I shall never take upon me to argue, about the nature of God, further than I am obliged to it by the relation he appears to stand in to myself. There is so great a temerity in such disquisitions, that a wise man will never enter on them without trembling and being fully assured of his incapacity to proceed far on so sublime a subject: for it is less injurious to the deity to entertain no ideas of him at all, than to harbour those which are depreciating and unjust.

“ After having discovered those of his attributes, by which I am convinced of his existence, I return to myself and consider the place I occupy in that order of things, which is directed by him and subjected to my examination. Here I find my species stand incontestibly in the first rank; as man, by virtue of his will and the instruments



struments he is possessed of to put it in execution, has a greater power over the bodies by which he is surrounded, than they, by mere physical impulse, have over him: by virtue of his intelligence also I find he is the only created being here below that can take a general survey of the whole system. Is there one among them except man, who knows how to observe all others? to weigh, to calculate, to foresee their motions, their effects, and to join, if I may so express myself, the sentiment of a general existence to that of the individual? What is there so very ridiculous in supposing every thing made for man, when he is the only created being who knows how to consider the relation in which all things stand to himself.

“ It is then true that man is lord of the creation, that he is, at least, sovereign over the habitable earth; for it is certain that he not only subdues all other animals, and even disposes of the elements at his pleasure by his industry; but he alone of all other terrestrial beings knows how to subject the earth to his convenience, and even to appropriate to his use, by contemplation, the very stars and planets he cannot approach. Let any one produce me an animal of another species, who knows how to make use of fire, or hath faculties to admire the sun. What! am I able to observe, to know other beings and their relations; am I capable of discovering what is order, beauty, virtue, of contemplating the universe, of elevating my



ideas to the hand which governs the whole; am I capable of loving what is good, and doing it, and shall I compare myself to the brutes? Abject soul! it is your gloomy philosophy alone that renders you at all like them. Or, rather, it is in vain you would debase yourself; your own genius rises up against your principles; your benevolent heart gives the lie to your absurd doctrines, and even the abuse of your faculties demonstrates their excellence in spite of yourself.

“ For my own part, who have no system to maintain, who am only a simple, honest man, attached to no party, unambitious of being the founder of any sect, and contented with the situation in which God hath placed me, I see nothing in the world, except the deity, better than my own species; and were I left to choose my place in the order of created beings, I see none that I could prefer to that of man.

“ This reflexion, however, is less vain than affecting; for my state is not the effect of choice, and could not be due to the merit of a being that did not before exist. Can I behold myself, nevertheless thus distinguished, without thinking myself happy in occupying so honourable a post; or without blessing the hand that placed me here? From the first view I thus took of myself, my heart began to glow with a sense of gratitude towards the authour of our being; and hence arose my first idea of the worship due to a beneficent deity. I adore the supreme power,  
and

and melt into tenderness at his goodness. I have no need to be taught artificial forms of worship; the dictates of nature are sufficient. Is it not a natural consequence of self-love, to honour those who protect us, and to love such as do us good?

“ But when I come afterwards to take a view of the particular rank and relation in which I stand, as an individual, among the fellow-creatures of my species; to consider the different ranks of society and the persons by whom they are filled; what a scene is presented me! Where is that order and regularity before observed? The scenes of nature present to my view the most perfect harmony and proportion: those of mankind nothing but confusion and disorder. The physical elements of things act in concert with each other, the moral world alone is a chaos of discord. Mere animals are happy, but man, their lord and sovereign, is miserable! Where, Supreme Wisdom! are thy laws? Is it thus, O Providence! thou governest the world? What is become of thy power, thou Supreme Beneficence! when I see evil prevailing on the earth?

“ Would you believe, my good friend, that, from such gloomy reflexions and apparent contradictions, I should form to myself more sublime ideas of the soul, than ever resulted from my former researches? In meditating on the nature of man, I conceived that I discovered two distinct principles; the one raising him to the study of eternal truths, the love of justice

and moral beauty, bearing him aloft to the regions of the intellectual world, the contemplation of which yields the truest delight to the philosopher; the other debasing him even below himself, subjecting him to the slavery of sense, the tyranny of the passions, and exciting these to counteract every noble and generous sentiment inspired by the former. When I perceived myself hurried away by two such contrary powers, I naturally concluded that man is not one simple and individual substance. I will, and I will not; I perceive myself at once free and a slave; I see what is good, I admire it, and yet I do the evil: I am active when I listen to my reason, and passive when hurried away by my passions; while my greatest uneasiness is, to find, when fallen under temptations, that I had the power of resisting them.

“ Attend, young man, with confidence, to what I say, you will find I shall never deceive you. If conscience be the offspring of our prejudices, I am doubtless in the wrong, and moral virtue is not to be demonstrated; but, if self-love, which makes us prefer ourselves to every thing else, be natural to man, and if nevertheless, an innate sense of justice be found in his heart; let those, who imagine him to be a simple un compounded being reconcile these contradictions, and I will give up my opinion, and acknowledge him to be one substance.

“ You will please to observe that, by the word substance, I here mean, in general, a being,

ing, possessed of some primitive quality, abstracted from all particular or secondary modifications. Now, if all known primitive qualities may be united in one and the same being, we have no need to admit of more than one substance; but if some of these qualities are incompatible with, and necessarily exclusive of each other, we must admit of the existence of as many different substances as there are such incompatible qualities. You will do well to reflect on this subject; for my part, notwithstanding what Mr. Locke hath said on this head, I need only to know that matter is extended and divisible, to be assured that it cannot think; and when a philosopher comes and tells me that trees and rocks have thought and perception\*, he may

N 5

embarrass

\* It seems to me that, so far from attributing thought to stocks and stones, our modern philosophers have discovered that even men are incapable of thinking. They acknowledge none but merely sensitive beings in nature; and all the difference they admit between a man and a stone is, that the former is a sensitive being possessed of sensations, and the latter a sensitive being that has none. But if it be true that all matter be sensible, wherein consists the consciousness of the individual? Is it in every particle of matter, or only in compound bodies, in heterogeneous mixtures or single elements? Does the individual exist alike in fluids and in solids? Is it said that nothing but individuals exist in nature, I ask what these individuals are? Is that stone, for instance, an individual or an aggregate of individuals? Is it a single sensitive being, or does it contain as many separate ones as it contains grains of sand? If every elementary atom be a sensitive being, how am I to conceive that intimate



embarrass me, indeed, with the subtilty of his arguments; but I cannot help regarding him as a disingenuous sophist, who had rather attribute sentiment to stocks and stones than acknowledge man to have a soul.

“ Let us suppose that a man, born deaf, should deny the reality of sounds, because his ears were never sensible of them. To convince him of his error, I place a violin before his eyes; and, by playing on another, concealed from him, give a vibration to the strings of the former. This motion I tell him is effected by sound. “ Not at all (says he) the cause of the vibration of the string, is in the string itself; it is a common quality in all bodies so to vibrate :”

communication, by which one so perceives itself in another, that their two separate identities are confounded in one? Attraction is one of the laws of nature, the mystery of which may possibly be impenetrable; but we are at least capable of conceiving that gravity, acting in the ratio of the quantity of matter, is neither incompatible with extension nor divisibility. Can you conceive the same of thought and sentiment? The sensible parts are extended, but the sensitive being is single and indivisible; it is either entirely itself or nothing: the sensitive being, therefore, is not a body. I know not how the materialists conceive this thing; but it seems to me that the same difficulties which make them give up their pretensions to thought, should induce them also to give up those of sentiment: nor do I see what should hinder them, after having taken the first step, from proceeding to take the latter: what can it cost them more? As they are so well convinced they are incapable of thinking, how dare they so confidently affirm they are able to perceive?



brate:"—" Do (I reply) show me then the same vibration in other bodies, or at least the cause of it in this string?" The deaf man will again reply, in his turn, " I cannot; but wherefore must I, because I do not conceive how this string vibrates, attribute the cause to your pretended sounds, of which I cannot entertain the least idea. This would be to attempt an explanation of one obscurity by another still greater. Either make your sounds perceptible to me, or I shall continue to deny their existence."

" The more I reflect on our capacity of thinking, and the nature of the human understanding, the greater is the resemblance I find between the arguments of our materialists and that of such a deaf man. They are, in effect, equally deaf to that internal voice, which nevertheless, calls to them so loud and emphatically. A mere machine is evidently incapable of thinking, it has neither motion nor figure productive of reflexion: whereas in man there exists something perpetually prone to expand, and to burst the fetters by which it is confined. Space itself affords not bounds to the human mind: the whole universe is not extensive enough for him; his sentiments, his desires, his anxieties, and even his pride, take rise from a principle, different from that body within which he perceives himself confined.

" No material being can be self-active, and I perceive that I am so. It is in vain to dispute

with me so clear a point; my own sentiment carries with it a stronger conviction than any reason which can ever be brought against it. I have a body, on which other bodies act; and which acts reciprocally on them. This reciprocal action is indubitable; but my will is independent of my senses. I can either consent to, or resist their impressions; I am either vanquished or victor, and perceive clearly within myself when I act according to my will, and when I submit to be governed by my passions. I have always the power to will, though not the force to execute it. When I give myself up to any temptation, I act from the impulse of external objects. When I reproach myself for my weakness in so doing, I listen only to the dictates of my will: I am a slave in my vices, and free in my repentance; the sentiment of my liberty is effaced only by my depravation, and when I prevent the voice of the soul from being heard in opposition to the laws of the body.

“ All the knowledge I have of volition, is deduced from a sense of my own; and the understanding is known no better. When I am asked what is the cause that determines my will, I ask, in my turn, what is the cause that determines my judgement? for it is clear that these two causes make but one; and, if we conceive that man is active in forming his judgement of things, that his understanding is only a power of comparing and judging, we shall see that his

liberty is only a similar power or one derived from this: he chooses the good as he judges of the true, and for the same reason as he deduces a false judgement, he makes a bad choice. What then is the cause that determines his will? It is his judgement. And what is the cause that determines his judgement? It is his intelligent faculty, his power of judging; the determining cause lies in himself. If we go beyond this point, I know nothing of the matter.

“ Not that I can suppose myself at liberty, not to will my own good, or to will my own evil: but my liberty consists in this very circumstance, that I am incapable to will any thing but what is useful to me, or at least what appears so, without any foreign object interfering in my determination. Does it follow from hence that I am not my own master, because I am incapable of assuming another being, or of divesting myself of what is essential to my existence?

“ The principle of all action lies in the will of a free being; we can go no farther in search of its source. It is not the word liberty that has no signification; it is that of necessity. To suppose any act or effect, which is not derived from an active principle, is indeed to suppose effects without a cause. Either there is no first impulse, or every first impulse can have no prior cause; nor can there be any such thing as will without liberty. Man is, therefore, a free agent, and as such animated by an immaterial substance;

substance; this is my third article of faith. From these three first you may easily deduce all the rest, without my continuing to number them.

“ If man be an active and free being, he acts of himself; none of his spontaneous actions, therefore, enter into the general system of Providence, nor can be imputed to it. Providence doth not contrive the evil, which is the consequence of man’s abusing the liberty his Creator gave him; it only doth not prevent it, either because the evil, which so impotent a being is capable of doing, is beneath its notice, or because it cannot prevent it without laying a restraint upon his liberty, and causing a greater evil by debasing his nature. Providence hath left man at liberty, not that he should do evil, but good, by choice. It hath capacitated him to make such choice, in making a proper use of the faculties it hath bestowed on him: his powers, however, are at the same time so limited and confined, that the abuse he makes of his liberty is not of importance enough to disturb the general order of the universe. The evil done by man falls upon his own head, without making any change in the system of the world, without hindering the human species from being preserved in spite of themselves. To complain, therefore, that God doth not prevent man from doing evil is, in fact, to complain that he hath given a superiour excellence to human nature, that he hath ennobled our actions by annexing  
to



to them the merit of virtue. The highest enjoyment is that of being contented with ourselves, it is in order to deserve this contentment that we are placed here on earth and endowed with liberty; that we are tempted by our passions, and restrained by conscience. What could Omnipotence itself do more in our favour? Could it have established a contradiction in our nature, or have allotted a reward for well-doing, to a being incapable of doing ill? Is it necessary, in order to prevent man from being wicked, to reduce all his faculties to a simple instinct, and make him a mere brute? No, never can I reproach the Deity for having given me a soul, made in his own image, that I might be free, good, and happy like himself.

“ It is the abuse of our faculties which makes us wicked and miserable. Our cares, our anxieties, our griefs, are all owing to ourselves. Moral evil is incontestably our own work, and physical evil would in fact be nothing, did not our vices render us sensible of it. Is it not for our preservation that nature makes us sensible of our wants? Is not pain of body an indication that the machine is out of order, and a caution for us to provide a remedy? And as to death—do not the wicked render both our lives and their own miserable? Who is there desirous of living here for ever? Death is a remedy for all the evils we inflict on ourselves; nature will not let us suffer perpetually. To how few evils are men subject, who live in primeval simplicity!

they



they hardly know any disease, and are irritated by scarcely any passions: they neither foresee death, nor suffer by the apprehensions of it; when it approaches, their miseries render it desirable, and it is to them no evil. If we could be contented with being what we are, we should have no inducement to lament our fate; but we inflict on ourselves a thousand real evils in seeking after an imaginary happiness. Those who are impatient under trifling inconveniences, must expect to suffer much greater. In our endeavours to re-establish by medicines a constitution impaired by irregularities, we always add to the evil we feel, the greater one which we fear; our apprehensions of death anticipate its horrors, and hasten its approach. The faster we endeavour to fly, the swifter it pursues us; thus we are terrified as long as we live, and die murmuring against nature, on account of those evils which we bring on ourselves by doing outrage to her laws.

“ Enquire no longer, man, who is the author of evil: behold him in yourself. There exists no other evil in nature than what you either do or suffer, and you are equally the author of both. A general evil could exist only in disorder, but, in the system of nature, I see an established order which is never disturbed. Particular evil exists only in the sentiment of the suffering being: and this sentiment is not given to man by nature; but is of his own acquisition. Pain and sorrow have but little hold on those,  
who,

who, unaccustomed to reflexion, have neither memory nor foresight. Take away our fatal improvements, take away our errors and our vices, take away, in short, every thing that is the work of man, and all the rest is good.

“ Where every thing is good, nothing can be unjust, justice being inseparable from goodness. Now goodness is the necessary effect of infinite power, and self-love essential to every being conscious of its existence. An omnipotent Being extends its existence, also, if I may so express myself, with that of its creatures. Production and preservation follow from the constant exertion of its power: it does not act on non-existence: God is not the God of the dead, but of the living; he cannot be mischievous or wicked without hurting himself. A being capable of doing every thing cannot *will* to do any thing but what is good. He, who is infinitely good, therefore, because he is infinitely powerful, must also be supremely just, otherwise he would be inconsistent with himself: for that love of order which produces it we call goodness, and that love of order which preserves it is called justice.

“ God, it is said, owes nothing to his creatures; for my part, I believe he owes them every thing he promised them when he gave them being. Now what is less than to promise them a blessing, if he gives them an idea of it and has so constituted them as to feel the want of it? The more I look into myself, the more plainly

plainly I read these words written in my soul;  
*be just and thou wilt be happy.* I see not the  
 truth of this, however, in the present state of  
 things, wherein the wicked triumph and the  
 just are trampled on and oppressed. What in-  
 dignation, hence, arises within us, to find our  
 hopes are frustrated! Conscience itself rises up  
 and complains of its Maker, it cries out to him;  
*lamenting, thou hast deceived me!*

“ I have deceived thee! rash man! who hath  
 told thee so? Is thy soul annihilated? Dost  
 thou cease to exist?—Oh, Brutus! stain not a  
 life of glory in the end: leave not thy honour  
 and thy hopes with thy body in the fields of  
 Philippi. Wherefore dost thou say, virtue is a  
 shadow, when thou art going to enjoy the re-  
 ward of thine own? Dost thou imagine thou  
 art going to die? No; thou art going to live,  
 and then I will make good every promise I have  
 made thee.”

“ One would be apt to think, from the mur-  
 murs of impatient mortals, that God owed  
 them a recompence before they had deserved it;  
 and that he was obliged to reward their virtue  
 beforehand. No; let us be first virtuous, and  
 rest assured we shall sooner or later be happy.  
 Let us not require the prize before we have got  
 the victory, nor demand the price of our labour  
 before the work be finished. It is not in the  
 lists, says Plutarch, that the victors at our  
 games are crowned, but after the contest is  
 over.

If

“ If the soul be immaterial, it may survive the body, and if so, Providence is justified. Had I no other proof of the immateriality of the soul, than the oppression of the just and the triumph of the wicked in this world, this alone would prevent my having the least doubt of it. So shocking a discord amidst the general harmony of things, would make me naturally look out for the cause. I should say to myself, we do not cease to exist with this life, every thing re-assumes its order after death. I should, indeed, be embarrassed to tell where man was to be found, when all his perceptible properties were destroyed. At present, however, there appears to me no difficulty in this point, as I acknowledge the existence of two different substances. It is very plain that during my corporeal life, as I perceive nothing but by means of my senses, whatever is not submitted to their cognizance must escape me. When the union of the body and the soul is broken, I conceive that the one may be dissolved, and the other preserved entire. Why should the dissolution of the one, necessarily bring on that of the other? On the contrary, being so different in their natures, their state of union is a state of violence, and when it is broken they both return to their natural situation: the active and living substance regains all the force it had employed in giving motion to the passive and dead substance to which it had been united. Alas! my failings make me but too sensible that man is but half alive in  
this



this life, and that the life of the soul commences at the death of the body.

“ But what is that life? Is the soul immortal in its own nature? My limited comprehension is incapable of conceiving any thing that is unlimited. Whatever we call infinite is beyond my conception. What can I deny, or affirm? what arguments can I employ on a subject I cannot conceive? I believe that the soul survives the body so long as is necessary to justify Providence in the good order of things; but who knows that this will be for ever? I can readily conceive how material bodies wear away and are destroyed by the separation of their parts, but I cannot conceive a like dissolution of a thinking being; and hence, as I cannot imagine how it can die, I presume it cannot die at all. This presumption, also, being consolatory, and not unreasonable, why should I be fearful to indulge it?

“ I feel that I have a soul, I know it both from thought and sentiment; I know that it exists, without knowing its essence; I cannot reason, therefore, on ideas which I have not. One thing, indeed, I know very well, which is, that the identity of my being can be preserved only by the memory, and that to be in fact the same person I must remember to have before existed. Now I cannot recollect, after my death, what I was during life, without recollecting also my perceptions, and consequently my actions: and I doubt not but this remembrance will one day constitute



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constitute the happiness of the just and the torment of the wicked. Here below, the violence of our passions absorbs the innate sentiment of right and wrong, and stifles remorse. The mortification and disgrace also, under which virtue labours in the world, prevents our being sensible of its charms. But, when, delivered from the delusions of sense, we shall enjoy the contemplation of the Supreme Being, and those eternal truths of which he is the source; when the beauty of the natural order of things shall strike all the faculties of the soul, and when we shall be employed solely in comparing what we have really done with what we ought to have done, then will the voice of conscience reassume its tone and strength; then will that pure delight, which arises from a consciousness of virtue, and the bitter regret of having debased ourselves by vice, determine the lot which is severally prepared for us. Ask me not, my good friend, if there may not be some other causes of future happiness and misery. I confess I am ignorant; these, however, which I conceive, are sufficient to console me under the inconveniencies of this life, and give me hopes of another. I do not pretend to say that the virtuous will receive any peculiar rewards; for what other advantage can a Being, excellent in its own nature, expect than to exist in a manner agreeable to the excellence of its constitution? I dare affirm nevertheless that they will be happy: because their Creator, the authour of all justice,

tice, having given them sensibility, cannot have made them to be miserable; and, as they have not abused their liberty on earth, they have not perverted the design of their creation by their own fault: yet, as they have suffered evils in this life, they will certainly be indemnified in another. This opinion is not so much founded on the merits of a man, as on the notion of that goodness which appears to me inseparable from the divine nature. I only suppose the order of things strictly maintained, and that the Deity is ever consistent with himself.

“It would be to as little purpose to ask me whether the torments of the wicked will be eternal: Of this I am also equally ignorant, and have not the vain curiosity to perplex myself with such useless disquisitions. What is it to me what becomes of the wicked? I interest myself very little in their destiny. I can never believe, however, that they will be condemned to everlasting torments.

“If supreme justice avenges itself on the wicked, it avenges itself on them here below. It is you and your errors, ye nations! that are its ministers of vengeance. It employs the evils you bring on each other, to punish the crimes for which you deserve them. It is in the insatiable hearts of mankind, corroding with envy, avarice, and ambition, that their avenging passions punish them for their vices, amidst all the false appearances of prosperity. Where is the necessity of seeking a hell in another life, when it is

to be found even in this, in the hearts of the wicked?

“Where our momentary necessities or senseless desires have an end, there ought our passions and our vices to end also. Of what perversity can pure spirits be susceptible? As they stand in need of nothing, to what end should they be vicious? If destitute of our grosser senses, all their happiness consists in the contemplation of things, they cannot be desirous of any thing but good; and whoever ceases to be wicked, is it possible he should be eternally miserable? This is what I am inclined to believe on this head, without giving myself the trouble to determine positively concerning the matter.—O righteous and merciful Being! whatever be thy decrees, I acknowledge their rectitude; if thou punishest the wicked, my weak reason is dumb before thy justice. But, if the remorse of these unfortunate wretches is to have an end, if the same fate is one day to attend us all, my soul exults in thy praise. Is not the wicked man, after all, my brother? How often have I been tempted to resemble him in partaking of his vices. O, may he be delivered from his misery; may he cast off, also, that malignity which accompanies it; may he be ever happy as myself; so far from exciting my jealousy, his happiness will only add to mine.

“It is thus that contemplating God in his works, and studying him in those attributes which it imports me to know, I learn by degrees

grees to extend that imperfect and confined idea I at first formed of the supreme Being. But, if this idea becomes thus more grand and noble, it is proportionably less adapted to the weakness of the human understanding. In proportion, as my mind approaches eternal light, its lightness dazzles and confounds me; so that I am forced to give up all those mean and earthly images which assist my imagination. God is no longer a corporeal and perceptible Being: the supreme Intelligence which governs the world, is no longer the world itself: but in vain I endeavour to raise my thoughts to a conception of his essence. When I reflect that it is he who gives life and activity to that living and active substance, which moves and governs animated bodies; when I am told that my soul is a spiritual Being, and that God also is a spirit, I am incensed at this debasement of the divine essence, as if God and my soul were of the same nature, as if God was not the only absolute, the only truly active Being, perceiving, thinking, and willing of himself, from whom his creatures derive thought, activity, will, liberty, and existence. We are free only because it is his will that we should be so; his inexplicable substance being, with respect to our souls, such as our souls are in regard to our bodies. I know nothing of his having created matter, bodies, spirits, or the world. The idea of creation confounds me and surpasses my conception, though I believe as much of it as I am able to conceive: but I know  
that



that he hath formed the universe, and all that exists in the most consummate order. God is doubtless eternal; but I am incapacitated to conceive an idea of eternity. Why then should I amuse myself with words? All that I conceive is, that he existed before all things, that he exists with them, and will exist after them, if they should ever have an end. That a Being, whose essence is inconceivable, should give existence to other beings, is at best obscure and incomprehensible to our ideas; but that something and nothing should be reciprocally converted into each other is a palpable contradiction, a most manifest absurdity.

“ God is intelligent; but in what manner? Man is intelligent by the act of reasoning, but the supreme intelligence lies under no necessity to reason. He requires neither premises nor consequences; nor even the simple form of a proposition: his knowledge is purely intuitive; he beholds equally what is and will be; all truths are to him as one idea, as all places are but one point, and all times one moment. Human power acts by the use of means, the divine power in and of itself. God is powerful because he is willing, his will constituting his power. God is good, nothing is more manifest than this truth; goodness in man, however, consists in a love to his fellow-creatures, and the goodness of God in a love of order: for it is on such order that the connexion and preservation of all things depend. Again, God is just; this I am fully



convinced of, as it is the natural consequence of his goodness. The injustice of men is their own work, not his; and that moral disorder, which, in the judgement of some philosophers, makes against the system of providence, is in mine the strongest argument for it. Justice in man, indeed, is to render every one his due; but the justice of God requires at the hands of every one, an account of the talents with which he has entrusted them.

“ In the discovery, however, by the force of reason, of those divine attributes, of which I have no absolute idea, I only affirm what I do not clearly comprehend, which is in effect to affirm nothing. I may say, it is true that God is this or that; I may be sensible of it, and fully convinced within myself that he is so, I am yet never the better able to conceive how, or in what manner, he so is.

“ In short, the greater efforts I make to contemplate his infinite essence, the less I am able to conceive it: But I am certain that he is, and that is sufficient; the more he surpasses my conceptions, the more I adore him. I humble myself before him, and say, ‘ Being of beings, I am, ‘ because thou art; to meditate continually on ‘ thee is to elevate my thoughts to the fountain ‘ of existence. The most meritorious use of my ‘ reason is to be annihilated before thee: it is ‘ the delight of my soul, to feel my weak faculties overcome by the splendour of thy greatness.’

“ After

“ After having thus deduced, from the impressions of perceptible objects, and that innate principle which leads me to judge of natural causes from experience, the most important truth; it remains for me to enquire what maxims I ought to draw from them, for my conduct in life, what rules I ought to prescribe to myself, in order to fulfil my destination on earth, agreeably to the design of him who placed me here. To pursue my own method, I deduce not these rules from the sublime principles of philosophy; but find them written in indelible characters on my heart. I have only to consult myself concerning what I ought to do; all that I feel to be right, is right; whatever I feel to be wrong, is wrong: conscience is the ablest of all casuists, and it is only when we are trafficking with her, that we have recourse to the subtilities of logical ratiocination. The chief of our concerns is that of ourselves; yet how often have we not been told by the monitor within, that to pursue our own interest at the expence of others would be to do wrong! we imagine thus, that we are sometimes obeying the impulse of nature, and we are all the while resisting it: in listening to the voice of our senses we turn a deaf ear to the dictates of our hearts, the active Being obeys, the passive Being commands. Conscience is the voice of the soul, the passions are the voice of the body. Is it surprising that these two voices should sometimes contradict each other; or can it be doubted,

when they do, which ought to be obeyed? Reason deceives us but too often, and has given us a right to distrust her conclusions; but conscience never deceives us. She is a man's truest and safest guide; conscience is in the soul what instinct is in the body\*. Whoever puts himself

\* Modern philosophy, which affects to admit of nothing but what it can explain, hath nevertheless very unadvisedly admitted of that obscure faculty, called instinct, which appears to direct animals to the purposes of their being, without any acquisition of knowledge. Instinct, according to one of our greatest philosophers, is a habit destitute of reflexion, but acquired by reflecting: thus from the manner in which he explains its progress, we are led to conclude that children reflect more than grown persons; a paradox singular enough to require some examination. Without entering, however, into the discussion of it at present, I would only ask what name I am to give to that eagerness which my dog shows to pursue a mole, for instance, which he does not eat when he has caught it; to that patience with which he stands watching for them whole hours, and to that expertness with which he makes them a prey the moment they reach the surface of the earth; and that in order only to kill them, without ever having been trained to mole hunting, or having been taught that moles were beneath the spot? I would ask further, as more important, why the first time I threaten the same dog, he throws himself down with his back to the ground and his feet raised in a suppliant attitude, the most proper of all others to excite my compassion, an attitude in which he would not long remain, if I were so obdurate as to beat him lying in such a posture? Is it possible that a young puppy can have already acquired moral ideas? Can he have any notion of clemency and generosity? What experience can encourage him to hope he shall appease me, by giving himself up to my mercy? Almost all dogs do

self under the conduct of this guide, pursues the direct path of nature, and need not fear to be misled. This point is very important (pursued my benefactor, perceiving I was going to interrupt him) permit me to detain you a little longer, in order to clear it up.

“ All the morality of our actions lies in the judgement we ourselves form of them. If virtue be any thing real, it ought to be the same in our hearts as in our actions; and one of the first rewards of justice is to be conscious of our putting it in practice. If moral goodness be agreeable to our nature, a man cannot be sound of mind, or perfectly constituted, unless he be good. On the contrary, if it be not so, and man is naturally wicked, he cannot become good without a corruption of his nature; goodness being evidently contrary to his constitution. Formed for the destruction of his fellow-creatures, as the wolf to devour its prey, an humane and compassionate man would be as depraved an animal as a meek and lamb-like wolf, while virtue only would leave behind it the stings of remorse.

“ Let us examine ourselves, my young friend, all partiality apart, and see which way our in-

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clinations

nearly the same thing in the same circumstances, nor do I advance any thing here of which every one may not convince himself. Let the philosophers, who reject so disdainfully the term instinct, explain this fact merely by the operation of our senses, and the knowledge thereby acquired; let them explain it, I say, in a manner satisfactory to any person of common sense, and I have no more to say in favour of instinct.



clinations tend. Which is most agreeable to us, to contemplate the happiness or the miseries of others? Which is most pleasing for us to do, and leaves the most agreeable reflexion behind it, an act of benevolence or of mischief? For whom are we the most deeply interested at our theatres? Do you take a pleasure in acts of villainy? or do you shed tears at seeing the authours of them brought to condign punishment? It has been said that every thing is indifferent to us in which we are not interested: the contrary, however, is certain, as the soothing endearments of friendship and humanity console us under affliction; and even in our pleasures we should be too solitary, too miserable, if we had nobody to partake them with us. If there be nothing moral in the heart of man, whence arise those transports of admiration and esteem we entertain for heroick actions, and great minds? What has this virtuous enthusiasm to do with our private interest? Wherefore do I rather wish to be an expiring Cato, than a triumphant Cæsar? Deprive our hearts of a natural affection for the sublime and beautiful, and you deprive us of all the pleasures of life. The man, whose meaner passions have stifled, in his narrow soul, such delightful sentiments; he, who, by dint of concentrating all his affections within himself, hath arrived at the pitch of having no regard for any one else, is no longer capable of such transports; his frozen heart never flutters with joy; no sympathetick tenderness brings the tears into his

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eyes;

eyes; he is incapable of enjoyment; the unhappy wretch is void of sensibility: he is already dead.

“ But how great soever may be the number of the wicked; there are but few of these cadaverous souls, but few persons so insensible, if their own interest be set aside, to what is just and good. Iniquity never pleases unless we profit by it; in every other case it is natural for us to desire the protection of the innocent. Do we see, for instance, an act of injustice or violence committed in the street, or on the highway; an emotion of resentment and indignation immediately rises in the heart, and incites us to stand up in defence of the injured or oppressed: but a more powerful consideration restrains us, and the laws deprive individuals of the right of taking upon themselves to avenge insulted innocence. On the contrary, if we happen to be witnesses to any act of compassion or generosity with what admiration, with what esteem are we instantly inspired! Who is there that doth not, on such an occasion, say to himself, would I had done as much! It is certainly of very little consequence to us whether a man was good or bad who lived two thousand years ago; and yet we are as much affected in this respect, by the relations we meet with in ancient history, as if the transactions recorded had happened in our own times. Of what hurt is the wickedness of a Catiline to me? Am I afraid of falling a victim to his villainy? Wherefore then, do I look

upon him with the same horror as if he was my cotemporary? We do not hate the wicked only because their vices are hurtful, but also because they are wicked. We are not only desirous of happiness for ourselves, but also of the happiness of others; and when that happiness does not diminish our's, it necessarily increases it. In a word, we cannot help sympathizing with the unfortunate, and always suffer when we are witnesses to their misery. The most perverse natures cannot be altogether divested of this sympathy; though we see it frequently makes them act in contradiction to themselves. The robber, who strips the passenger on the highway, will frequently distribute his spoils to cover the nakedness of the poor, and the most barbarous assassin may be induced humanely to support a man falling into a fit.

“ We hear daily of the cries of remorse, and the goadings of conscience for secret crimes; and see remarkable instances of their frequently bringing them to light. Alas! who is a total stranger to this importunate voice? We speak of it from experience, and would be glad to silence so disagreeable a monitor. But let us be obedient to Nature; we know that her government is very mild and gracious; and that nothing is more agreeable than that testimony of a good conscience, which ever follows our observance of her laws. The wicked man is afraid of, and shuns himself; he turns his eyes on every side in search of objects to amuse him; without

without an opportunity for satire and raillery, he would be always sad: his only pleasure lies in mockery and insult. On the contrary, the serenity of the just is internal, his smiles are not those of malignity but of joy: The source of them is found in himself, and he is as chearful when alone, as in the midst of an assembly: he derives not contentment from those who approach him, but communicates it to them.

“ Cast your eye over the several nations of the world, take a retrospective view of their histories. Amidst all the many inhuman and absurd forms of worship, amidst all that prodigious diversity of manners and characters, you will every-where find the same ideas of justice and honesty, the same notions of good and evil. Ancient paganism adopted the most abominable deities, which it would have punished on earth as infamous criminals; deities that presented no other picture of supreme happiness than the commission of crimes and the gratification of their passions. But vice, armed even with sacred authority, descended in vain on earth: moral instinct influenced the human heart to revolt against it. Even in celebrating the debaucheries of Jupiter, the world admired and respected the continence of Zenocrates; the chaste Lucretia adored the impudent Venus; the intrepid Roman sacrificed to Fear; they invoked the God who disabled his father, and yet died without murmuring by the hand of their's; the most contemptible divinities were adored by the noblest of men. The  
voice



voice of nature, more powerful than that of the Gods, made itself respected on earth, and seemed to have banished vice to Heaven.

“ There evidently exists, therefore, in the soul of man an innate principle of justice and goodness; by which, in spite of our own maxims, we approve or condemn the actions of ourselves and others: to this principle it is that I give the appellation of conscience.

“ At this word, however, I hear the clamour of our pretended philosophers; who all exclaim about the mistakes of infancy, and the prejudices of education. There is nothing, they say, in the human mind but what is instilled by experience; nor can we judge of any thing but from the ideas we have acquired. Nay, they go farther, and venture to reject the universal sense of all nations; seeking some obscure example known only to themselves, to controvert this striking uniformity in the judgement of mankind: as if all the natural inclinations of man were annihilated by the depravation of one people, and as if when monsters appeared the species itself were extinct. But what end did it serve to the sceptical Montagne, to take so much trouble to discover, in an obscure corner of the world, a custom opposed to the common notions of justice? What end did it answer for him to place a confidence in the most suspicious travellers, which he refused to the most celebrated writers? Should a few whimsical and uncertain customs, founded on local

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local motives unknown to us, invalidate a general induction, drawn from the united concurrence of all nations, contradicting each other in every other point, and agreeing only in this? You pique yourself, Montagne, on being ingenuous and sincere; give us a proof, if it be in the power of a philosopher, of your frankness and veracity: tell me if there be any country upon earth, in which it is deemed a crime to be sincere, compassionate, beneficent, and generous; in which an honest man is despicable, and knavery held in esteem?

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

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local motives unknown to us, involve a ge-  
neral exclusion, except from the united canon-  
ries of all nations, constituting each other in  
every other point, and only in this  
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tions and sacred; tell me, if there be any, contrary  
upon earth, in which it is denied a crime to  
be false, compassionate, benevolent, and gene-  
rous; in which an honest man is despised, and  
sincerely holds a claim?



End of the Second Volume.

